Commentary

VOLUME EIGHTY-NINE • NUMBER ONE • JANUARY 1990

A Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe?
Irwin M. Stelzer

Power, Powerlessness & the Jews
David Vital

ABC and Me
Jessica Gress-Wright

The Scandal of the Boat People
William McGurn

What Heidegger Wrought
Mark Lilla

From "Lolita" to "Piss Christ"
Carol Iannone

Gardens and Ghettos
André A. Aciman

Books in Review: Angelo M. Codevilla / David G. Dalin / Wilfred M. McClay / Rael Jean Isaac / Jeffrey Marsh

PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE/$3.75

HOSTED AT JEWISH.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ABSOLUT STANDARD.

FOR GIFT DE ERY OF ABSOLUT® VODKA (EXCEPT WHERE PROHIBITED BY LAW) CA 1-800-CHEE
C/VOL (80 AND 100 PROOF). 100% GRAIN NE TRAL SPIRITS. ©1988

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Commentary

VOLUME 89 NUMBER ONE *JANUARY 1990*

Articles
17 A Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe? *Irwin M. Stelzer*
23 Power, Powerlessness & the Jews *David Vital*
29 ABC and Me *Jessica Gress-Wright*
36 The Scandal of the Boat People *William McGurn*
41 What Heidegger Wrought *Mark Lilla*

Observations
52 From "Lolita" to "Piss Christ" *Carol Iannone*
55 Gardens and Ghettos *André A. Aciman*

Letters
2 from *William Damon, Chester E. Finn, Jr., Sidney A. Freifeld, Eugene V. Rostow, Philip J. Costopoulos, Michael Novak, Thomas D. Gordon, Lucy S. Dawidowicz, Jerold S. Auerbach, Daniel Pipes, Wolf Blitzer,* and others

Books in Review
60 Lost Victory, by William Colby *Angelo M. Codevilla*
62 Abba Hillel Silver, by Marc Lee Raphael *David G. Dalin*
64 Fear of Falling, by Barbara Ehrenreich *Wilfred M. McClay*
67 Nowhere to Go, by E. Fuller Torrey *Rael Jean Isaac*
70 Journey to the Stars, by Robert Jastrow *Jeffrey Marsh*

Editor: Norman Podhoretz
Executive Editor: Neal Kozodoy
Managing Editor: Marion Magid
Associate Editor: Brenda Brown
Production Manager: Bruce Lodi
Circulation Manager: Helene Hansen

COMMENTARY (ISSN 0010-2601) is published monthly by the American Jewish Committee—Single copy is $3.75, $39 a year; 2 years $72, 3 years $105—Add $8.00 per year for all foreign subscriptions, including Canada and Latin America—Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to COMMENTARY, 165 East 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

Copyright © 1990 by the American Jewish Committee; all rights reserved under International and Pan American Copyright Conventions—Indexed in *Reader's Guide, Book Review Digest, Public Affairs Information Service, Index to Jewish Periodicals, ABC Pol Sci, Historical Abstracts, Religion Index One: Periodicals, Political Science Abstracts,* and *America: History and Life*—Unsolicited manuscripts must be accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed return envelope.

EDITORIAL & BUSINESS OFFICES: 165 E. 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Statement of Aims

In sponsoring COMMENTARY, the American Jewish Committee aims to meet the need for a journal of significant thought and opinion on Jewish affairs and contemporary issues. The opinions and views expressed by COMMENTARY's contributors and editors are their own, and do not necessarily express the Committee's viewpoint or position. The sponsorship of COMMENTARY by the Committee is in line with its general program to enlighten and clarify public opinion on problems of Jewish concern, to fight bigotry and protect human rights, and to promote Jewish cultural interest and creative achievement in America.

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
Sholom D. Comay, *President*

The Commentary Publication Committee

Howard I. Friedman, *Chairman*

Norman E. Alexander
Maurice S. Binkow
Donald M. Blinken
Theodore Ellenoff
Edward E. Elson
Stephen Friedman
Lawrence Goldmuntz
Mark Goodson
Robert H. Haines
Herman J. Obermayer
Robert L. Pelz
Ned Pines
Frederick P. Rose
Gordon S. Rosenblum
Michael Saperstein
Michael W. Schwartz
Nanette Scofield
Henry Sherman
John Slawson
Laurence A. Tisch

Letters from Readers

On Campus

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

There are many things that I agree with in Chester E. Finn, Jr.'s article ["The Campus: 'An Island of Repression in a Sea of Freedom,'" September 1989], but I am puzzled by some others, especially concerning my own role in the debate and my essay in the *Chronicle of Higher Education* to which Mr. Finn refers. Yes, we need to guard against conventional wisdom on matters like affirmative action becoming a prescriptive ideology that closes out further debate. And yes, I too have seen distressing examples of this in American academic life.

Two points trouble me, though. First, our cherished "right to be offensive" cannot be extended so far as to condone racial or ethnic harassment. Unfortunately there has been a rise in incidents of bigotry on campuses in recent years. I believe Mr. Finn would agree that this is morally as well as legally reprehensible. Why shouldn't colleges bear the responsibility of taking explicit positions against bigotry? This is in large part what I mean by "moral education."

The other part has to do with clear discussions about college affirmative-action programs. My own essay was triggered by some interviews with students who attributed racial tensions on campus to unjust racial-preference programs. For my own part, I have supported affirmative action insofar as it broadens the candidate pool but not insofar as it implements racial preferences. How many other college officials feel the same way? It is impossible for students to know, since these programs are carried out with little explicit explanation. This creates a source of moral confusion for students on campus.

There are three possibilities here: (1) college officials could enforce affirmative-action programs without explaining them to the community; (2) they could enforce them with a clear and principled set of justifications, open to community debate; (3) on the basis of such debate, they could revise such programs. Either the second or third possibility is consistent with a campus atmosphere that encourages students to explore and acquire ethical values around racial and ethnic issues. My complaint in my original essay was that too many colleges were following the first course, sweeping everything under the campus rug in a hypocritical and morally debilitating manner. Hence my call to put the moral education of our students ahead of unarticulated political ends.

WILLIAM DAMON
Brown University
Providence, Rhode Island

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Chester E. Finn, Jr. is correct in writing that mandatory courses that try to indoctrinate pluralism are self-contradictory; and his criticism of college administrations which censor student or faculty thought in order to "protect" any group from thoughts which it deems offensive is also well-taken. Many of his other assertions, however, are poorly supported.

Mr. Finn begins by criticizing "anti-bias codes" as contradictory to the Bill of Rights as well as to the tradition of freedom of thought and expression that has existed in American colleges and universities. But as the Supreme Court has so often noted, schools are not a microcosm of society, and rules and rights are altered in an academic environment. Certainly, at the college level, students object when the college acts *in loco parentis*, as Boston University students did this past year when the president of the college instituted a curfew to curb undergraduate sexual activity. Such interference in student life is a superfluous invasion of students' privacy and has no bearing on the educational atmosphere or process on campus. However, campuses are not, as Mr. Finn asserts, "shrugging off" responsibility with respect to drugs or illegal alcohol activity, both of which do affect the educational atmosphere and involve the breaking of state laws. Anti-bias codes also serve to protect the educational atmosphere and process, and they are not contradictory to pluralism.

To foster pluralism is to foster an environment where divergent ideas and cultures can be freely studied. . . . Conduct which "stigmatizes or victimizes an individual" disrupts the learning environment. It is inflammatory. Toleration of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

School of American Ballet student performance: Merrill Ashley, Gelsey Kirkland and Colleen Neary. Copyright: Martha Swope, 1967.

Thanks to the Library, American dance has taken great leaps forward.

American dance is more popular than ever, and one of the reasons is The New York Public Library's Dance Collection.

Choreographer Eliot Feld says the Library at Lincoln Center is "as vital a workroom as my studio." Agnes de Mille says, "the revival of any work is dependent on access to the Library's Dance Collection."

And they're not the only ones. For dancers and choreographers everywhere, over 37,000 volumes, 250,000 photographs, and an enormous film archive have been essential elements in the renaissance of American dance.

That's just one way The New York Public Library's resources serve us. The Library offers plays and puppet shows for children, programs for the elderly and disabled, extensive foreign language and ethnic collections, and scientific journals vital to the business community.

Again and again, the Library enriches our lives.

The New York Public Library

WHERE THE FUTURE IS AN OPEN BOOK

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

such behavior allows for the increase of physical violence among different groups on campus; it is in reaction to an increase in violent incidents on campuses across the country that college administrations have finally started to clamp down on disruptive behavior. Admittedly, the codes abridge one's freedom of speech, but this does not fall under what Justice Brennan calls the prohibition of "the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." . . .

First, the codes themselves come from the administration of the university, and it is the administration which judges what constitutes a violation of the codes. The complaints at Harvard against Professors Ian Macneil and Stephan Thernstrom, which Mr. Finn discusses, came from students, and did not mention the anti-discrimination and anti-harassment rules. Allegations of racial insensitivity—which, believe it or not, are sometimes deserved—existed on college campuses long before anti-discrimination and anti-harassment codes were drawn up, and it is foolish to think that the allegations will ever stop. I agree that the criticism of Thernstrom was too harsh, but it is not as though the university itself censored him. Mr. Finn complains that the allegations are "unremonstrated by the administration." Now there's an ironic complaint for Mr. Finn to make in an anti-censorship article. Does he think a student should be punished for saying that he doesn't like the way a professor teaches his class? The criticism is for Thernstrom to answer, if he chooses to do so. And don't blame student criticism for discouraging "scholars from even teaching courses on topics that bear on race and ethnicity." Academia is the wrong field to go into to be free from the scrutiny of others, and the "hard time" professors get from students is generally no worse than what they might face from fellow "scholars." . . .

Mr. Finn . . . also manages . . . to take a swipe at affirmative action. He complains about the fact that he has "run into" several political scientists who cannot find tenure-track teaching posts at colleges worthy of their brilliance, only because they suffer persecution for being white males and for having had the integrity to brush aside such unworthy subjects as revolutionary ideologies and the politics of feminism and racism in order to study the poor, forgotten gods of Western civilization—Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Burke. I don't buy it. . . .There happens to be a glut of people who study dead, white, European males, with no shortage of courses being taught on the subject—despite the fact that they are not mandatory. At Harvard, for example, where I am a junior, the only thinkers studied by sophomores in the social-studies department are dead, white, European males. And the Harvard administration is not "killing" for more minority and women faculty. Minorities—and women, particularly—are underrepresented on the faculty. . . .

Mr. Finn uses an incident from Harvard's race-awareness week—which I doubt he attended—to assert that there is now "little room for opinion that deviates from campus political norms or for grievances from unexpected directions." He gives the example of a white student at one of the race-awareness events who was given "short shrift and no sympathy" when she complained that she had experienced minority ethnocentrism. But that one incident is hardly sufficient grounds for saying that there is little room for disagreement on the idea of minority ethnocentrism. If Mr. Finn spent an ounce of time on the campus about which he makes sweeping generalizations, he would know that minority ethnocentrism is not an unusual topic of undergraduate conversations, and that a series of controversial editorials were printed in the Harvard *Crimson* about that very subject. I myself have "run into" several ethnic students who are alienated from their respective campus organizations because they feel them to be too ethnocentric. . . .

DAN MUFSON
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Chester E. Finn, Jr.'s article provided a true . . . description of a debilitating syndrome without, however, going very far in uncovering the underlying disease. . . . Mr. Finn implies a relationship between the suppression of free speech on our campuses and their institutional commitment to affirmative action in the hiring of faculty members. If this relationship holds true, what then needs to be examined is the commitment on the part of university administrators to an academically unjustifiable policy of preferential hiring. . . .

I am a white male with an excellent and unusually broad academic résumé; but having a family, I was prepared to accept almost any sort of teaching position. In the course of three years, applying for more than fifty varied positions each year, I discovered that I could get interviews only at schools of the first rank. I received immediate rejections from the least demanding institutions, often followed later by a notice to the effect that a woman or "minority member" had been hired. It seems that the refusal to consider my résumé was directly proportional to the institution's proximity to public funding, and inversely proportional to its "respectability," preferential hiring policies constituting both a preempting of any future government regulation and a cheap path to scholarly dignity.

The fervor of students in attempting to expunge all traces of racism and sexism requires little explanation. The young have always tended to be intolerantly moralistic, usually in obedience to the self-indulgent hopes of their more disaffected elders. . . . No less transparent is the unseemly timidity of even tenured faculty in the defense of their own academic freedom. Dignity becomes nervous with age, fearing unseemly brawls at faculty meetings, and age would appreciate that last soft bed of the position emeritus. What does require further examination, though, is the general conduct of educational administrators, their willingness to apply coercive measures against their own faculty in squelching open consideration of staffing policy (among other issues). . . .

JOSEPH KEITH WOODARD
Bethany College
Bethany, West Virginia

CHESTER E. FINN, JR. writes:

The timeliness and volatility of this issue are even more apparent now than when I wrote in early summer. Scarcely a day passes without fresh evidence—via the mail, the telephone, the media—that freedom of expression is in considerable jeopardy on the American campus.

I learned, for example, of an "anti-bias" code already adopted at Tufts (and suspended in early October after public exposure and student protest). A faculty correspon-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dent described such a policy nearing completion at Duke. The New York *Times* reported a compulsory "race-sensitivity" course at the University of Connecticut. A flurry of articles, editorials, and radio interviews indicated widespread interest and more than a little concern about this trend in American higher education.

One ray of good sense gleamed through. In late summer, Federal Judge Avern Cohn invalidated portions of the University of Michigan's "discriminatory harassment" policy relating to verbal behavior (and "verbal conduct") on grounds that they violate the First Amendment. "John Doe," a Michigan graduate student in psychology—who insisted on anonymity to protect himself from recriminations—was represented by attorneys from the ACLU. They contended that Doe's right to pursue his own research (which touches on such controversial matters as biologically-based gender and race differences) was impermissibly chilled by the university policy and sought to have that policy declared unconstitutional and enjoined as vague and overbroad.

Judge Cohn examined both the wording of the policy and a host of supplementary materials that Michigan authorities had issued to explain it, including an interpretive guide for students which gave, as examples of punishable conduct, displaying a Confederate flag on the door of one's dormitory room, declining to invite a fellow student to a party because "she might be a lesbian," commenting "in a derogatory way" about a "particular person or group's physical appearance or sexual orientation," etc.

Not all forms of expression are protected by the Constitution, the judge explained in his opinion. Campus authorities might legitimately have promulgated a narrowly drawn policy banning obscenity, threats of violence, speech "which has the effect of inciting imminent lawless action," and words "which by their very utterance inflict injury." What the university could not constitutionally do, said the jurist, was "establish an anti-discrimination policy which had the effect of prohibiting certain speech because it disagreed with ideas or messages sought to be conveyed" or "proscribe speech simply because it was found to be offensive, even gravely so, by large numbers of people." And that, of course, is exactly what the University of Michigan had done. Moreover, Judge Cohn cited several instances in which even "serious comments made in the context of classroom discussion" were considered sanctionable by campus authorities. While the court declared itself "sympathetic to the university's obligation to ensure equal educational opportunities for all of its students, such efforts must not be at the expense of free speech. Unfortunately, this was precisely what the university did."

As a sort of coda to his opinion, Judge Cohn cited the 1986 comments of the distinguished Yale historian C. Vann Woodward in a celebrated New Haven case concerning a sophomore placed on probation for distributing an anti-homosexual flier: "It simply seems unnatural," Woodward acknowledged, "to make a fuss about the rights of a speaker who offends the moral or political convictions passionately held by a majority. The far more natural impulse is to stop the nonsense, shut it up, punish it—anything but defend it. But to give rein to that inclination would be to make the majority the arbiters of truth for all. Furthermore, it would put the universities into the business of censorship."

In his letter, William Damon professes no sympathy for censorship or "prescriptive ideology," but if what he means by "taking explicit positions against bigotry" includes punishing individuals who state views that he (or I or someone else on campus) might judge to be nasty, mean-spirited, or even bigoted, he is clearly no defender of free speech in the only situations when it really matters: where one person's speech so angers another that sanctions and restrictions are sought.

Dan Mufson's prose is better than we have come to expect from undergraduates, but his ideas show the effect of breathing the Cambridge air. He makes one important point, though. How can I lambaste universities simultaneously for adopting codes that inhibit free expression on campus and for failing to deal severely with students who abuse faculty members for saying things in class that the students do not like to hear? (This is not, incidentally, a problem confined to *higher* education. In early October, students trashed a Brooklyn high school because a social-studies teacher had the temerity to suggest in class that there are other repressive regimes on the African continent besides the one in Pretoria.)

The point, of course, is that any meaningful defense of free speech and academic freedom on campus *begins* with the principle that the administration must create and maintain an atmosphere in which all classroom discussion is immune from censorship and vigilantism, whether from a congressional committee or a band of disgruntled students. The only exception I can think of—where a professor persistently engages in unprofessional or propagandistic discourse under the guise of instruction—calls for peer judgment by fellow scholars, not for student thought police. A college that cannot vouchsafe such an atmosphere for its entire faculty does not deserve to exist. Even if it has been around since 1636.

Finally, Joseph Keith Woodard's tale offers further evidence of the perniciousness of contemporary affirmative-action policies.

The Middle East

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Eugene V. Rostow's critique of Secretary of State James Baker's May 22, 1989 speech to AIPAC ["A False Start in the Middle East," October 1989] left some important and some not-so-important question marks in my mind. These stem from my serving as counselor of the Canadian delegation to the United Nations in the late 60's, especially during the two crucial years 1967-68 when Canada was a member of the Security Council; Canada's representative on the Security Council, George Ignatieff, played a key part, with Britain's Lord Caradon and with the U.S.'s Arthur Goldberg, in the intricate negotiations which gave birth to Resolution 242. My question marks stem also from serving under Lester Pearson on Canada's UN delegation in the late 40's, when the UN adopted the Partition Resolution which gave rise to the birth of the Israeli state and, in turn, to the Arabs' war to destroy it.

Mr. Rostow argues that "Legally, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are unallocated parts of the Palestine Mandate. . . . [T]he right of the Jewish people to settle in the West Bank under the Mandate has never been terminated. . . . Jewish settlement in the West Bank is therefore not an intrusion into

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

alien territory held as a result of war. . . ." Does Mr. Rostow believe the British Mandate's provisions are still operative? What happened to the Mandate's provisions when Britain turned over the Palestine question to the United Nations, and when the UN General Assembly adopted its Partition Resolution? Mr. Rostow makes no mention of these in his historical survey, jumping from 1921 to 1967 as though nothing occurred in between.

The Partition Resolution provided for a Jewish state and an Arab state in what is now the West Bank and Gaza Strip. I would have liked to have seen Mr. Rostow discuss the legal implications of the failure of the Arab side to create its state (instead, the Arabs were making war on Israel) and whether that failure legitimates Israeli settlement and, possibly, annexation. If, indeed, that failure legitimates Israeli settlement, it is surely a stronger legal (and political) basis for settlement than the now-defunct provisions of the British Mandate. . . .

Mr. Rostow states in a footnote: "Resolution 338, voted after the Yom Kippur War of 1973, makes 242 mandatory, and orders the parties to make peace 'immediately' through *direct* negotiations pursuant to its terms" (emphasis added). But in fact Resolution 338 did not order direct negotiations and fudged this question. The operative paragraph reads: "*Decides* that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East."

Mr. Rostow states that Resolution 242 "was drafted with the thorny problems of the West Bank in everybody's mind" and then goes on to say: "It was assumed at the time that Israel and Jordan would divide the territory between them, agree on security arrangements, an economic union, and a form of political cooperation as well, and then each country would annex the parts of the West Bank assigned to it by their agreement." But such an understanding is nowhere to be found in the language of 242 and, on the face of it, seems in violation of that resolution. If such an understanding were reached behind the scenes, this member at least of Canada's 1967 Security Council delegation was not privy to it.

Mr. Rostow describes as a "startling new proposition" a point that he discerns in Secretary Baker's speech to AIPAC, "namely, that Resolution 242 requires Israel to withdraw to the armistice demarcation lines as they stood in 1967. . . ." That was not a "startling new proposition" but the intent and the language of 242 which specified, *inter alia*, the application of the following principle: "Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." The word "territories" was deliberately not preceded by "the" or "all the," thus leaving open the possibility of border rectifications. With that proviso, 242 indeed called for "Israel to withdraw to the armistice demarcation lines as they stood in 1967," i.e., to relinquish (most of) the West Bank and Gaza.

Mr. Rostow claims that "Israel is vested by Resolution 242 with the authority to administer the occupied territories until the Arab states of the region make a just and lasting peace." Regrettably, there is no such specific language in Resolution 242. What it does contain, deliberately, is a balance, *viz*, that (a), on the one hand, Israel should withdraw and (b), on the other hand, belligerency claims should be terminated and the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area should be acknowledged. That balance indeed implies that Israel not be required to withdraw until (b) is fulfilled, but 242 does not specify what Israel would or could do on the West Bank pending withdrawal. . . .

I find myself in sympathy with the political thrust and intent of Mr. Rostow's article and wish only that he had put forward an unblemished argument to support his theses.

SIDNEY A. FREIFELD
Ottawa, Canada

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Eugene V. Rostow's article on the Middle East is enlightening and generally favorable to Israel and therefore welcome. Nevertheless, he repeats a . . . canard that must be challenged. He refers to the disputed territories of Israel as "occupied territories," yet gives no evidence to support this vile charge.

I bring this up because the term "occupied territories" is most pernicious, conjuring up images of Nazis raping France and the like. Hardly a day goes by that does not witness a press dispatch datelined "Israeli-occupied West Bank (or Gaza)," pitching the idea of Arab "freedom fighters" and Israeli storm troopers, strongly suggesting that the territories in question must be relinquished to their true owner, as if that true owner were not Israel. That the true owner is Israel is a fact which is supported by evidence contained in Mr. Rostow's article itself.

Mr. Rostow tells us that Israel's territories do not belong to "Jordan, to the Arabs who now live there, or to an inchoate state of 'Palestine'" but form an "unallocated part of the Palestine Mandate," lands which were not held as a trust for the indigenous people of the area but for the Jewish people who have a right to continued settlement within them. He further tells us that their final status is to be the outcome of peace treaties between Israel and the Arab nations, nations which, aside from Egypt, refuse to negotiate a peace.

Now, an "occupied territory" is an area which, while belonging to one nation, is illegally held by another. On the basis of the facts given by Mr. Rostow, this definition does not fit the Israeli situation. So where does he get his terminology?

It seems that the only place the term "occupied" occurs is in UN Resolution 242. However, even there the phrase "occupied territories" is not used. As actually written, 242 calls on Israel to withdraw from "territories occupied" in the 1967 war. Here "occupied" clearly is used in the sense of territories "having been taken into possession." . . . For some reason Mr. Rostow obscures this fact when he paraphrases the key part of the resolution.

Moreover, it is to be noted that Resolution 242 did not call on Israel to withdraw from "all" territories but from "territories," keeping the issue deliberately vague. In fact, by relinquishing the Sinai, Israel has already "withdrawn from territories" and thereby fully complied with the resolution. Israel today is thus in possession of the territory won in war—hardly the moral breach trumpeted today by Israel's enemies as well as its confused friends.

No doubt, to the Arab inhabitants of the territories, Israel is an "occupier." . . . But this is not a tragedy. These Arabs have the sta-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tus of a minority which dwells in a land under another national flag. If they choose to fight to destroy the rightful authority within the territories, that authority has the moral right to protect itself to the extent called for by the challenge.

In sum, Israel is not an occupier and such charges are scurrilous and designed to pressure it for ends that full-scale wars launched by the Arabs could not achieve.

DAVID BASCH
West Hartford, Connecticut

EUGENE V. ROSTOW writes:

Sidney A. Freifeld's letter raises a number of questions about the legal position of Israel in the West Bank.

First he asks, "What happened to the Mandate's provisions when Britain turned over the Palestine question to the United Nations?" The answer to his question is simple. A League Mandate is a trust—a "sacred trust"—having the status of a treaty. The right of the Jewish people under the Mandate to settle in Palestine is protected by Article 80 of the United Nations Charter. That article is often called "the Palestine Article" because it was urged at the San Francisco conference principally by supporters of the Zionist movement. It provides that until trusteeship agreements are agreed upon, nothing in the Trusteeship Chapter "shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments" to which member states may be parties; that is, the rights accruing to the Jewish people under the Mandate continue until they are specifically terminated by a trusteeship agreement or by the creation and general recognition of a new state within the territories of the Mandate.

What happened in 1947 when Britain gave up the task of administering the Mandate is therefore exactly what happens in private law when the trustee of an estate dies, resigns, or is dismissed by a court for wrongdoing: the trust survives and the court appoints a new trustee or winds up the trust in some other way which satisfies its terms.

Thus in the case of South Africa's Mandate for German South West Africa, the Security Council, on the advice of the International Court of Justice, found that South Africa's breaches of its duties as trustee constituted a termination of its status as mandatory power, but that the Mandate survived and had to be respected. The Western permanent members of the Security Council then engaged in several years of patient and successful diplomacy over the status of South West Africa, which has now resulted in the creation of Namibia.

The Palestine Mandate has been handled in the same way. The General Assembly's Partition Resolution in 1947 was the UN's first response to Britain's withdrawal as trustee. The resolution was labeled a "recommendation" to the states and to the Security Council; in any event, the General Assembly has no power to adopt legally binding resolutions on such subjects. Confronted by the Arab attack on Israel, the Security Council concentrated on stopping the war, and never ruled on the Partition Resolution except by implication. It achieved armistice agreements between Israel and its neighbors in 1949, and has urged and sometimes commanded the parties to make peace ever since. When Resolutions 242 and 338 were adopted after the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War, the Council went further, building on the armistice agreements and its earlier "decisions," and once more ordered the states of the region to make a just and lasting peace, this time in accordance with the more specific provisions of Resolution 242.

In effect, the Security Council ruled that the parties themselves should divide the unallocated territories of the Mandate, thus establishing secure boundaries, which would become the foundation of the peace treaties, and terminate the Mandate altogether.

Mr. Freifeld chides me (gently) for not having mentioned a number of relevant happenings between 1921 and 1967, including the Partition Resolution of 1947. Since I was writing an article on Mr. Baker's speech and the policy it represents, I hope my lapse in this respect can be forgiven, especially because the Partition Resolution had no legal consequences, being no more than a recommendation which was not accepted by the Security Council. It cannot be considered a legal (and political) source of the Jewish right of settlement in the West Bank or elsewhere, as Mr. Freifeld suggests, because the Security Council never adopted its territorial provisions, even in achieving the armistice agreements of 1949.

Mr. Freifeld is correct in noting that Resolution 338 does not order "direct" negotiations. But, as he observes, it does order that peace negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices "immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire." Against the background of Ambassador Jarring's disastrous efforts to conduct indirect negotiations after the Six-Day War, it was understood at the time that direct, face-to-face negotiations were intended. Remember, Resolution 338 was negotiated in the shadow of General Sharon's spectacular crossing of the Suez Canal and the Egyptian army's collapse. The Soviet Union and Egypt were desperately anxious to obtain a cease-fire quickly; paragraph 3 of Resolution 338, which deals with the question, was added to the Soviet draft by the United States.

Mr. Freifeld objects to my interpretation of Resolution 242 as contemplating a peace agreement between Jordan and Israel prescribing security arrangements, an economic union, as much political cooperation as the traffic would bear, and boundaries which modified the armistice lines and incorporated the territories affected into each of the states. I did not mean to suggest that there was any agreement to this effect in the back rooms of Washington, London, or any other capital. But it was much discussed—with the Canadian ambassador in Washington, among others, as I recall. And it was in rough outline the Israeli proposal put forward at Strasbourg in 1967 by Abba Eban, who was then the Israeli Foreign Minister, in behalf of a coalition government including Menachem Begin.

What cannot be said is that such a plan would violate Resolution 242. Mr. Freifeld comes close to defending the view that Resolution 242 calls for the restoration of the 1967 borders, although it says just the opposite, as he concedes in his next paragraph. There he points out that Resolution 242 leaves open the possibility of border rectifications but indicates that such border rectifications should be minor. There is nothing in the resolution to that effect, and nothing in its context, either. On the contrary, the armistice agreements themselves, which are the source in this respect of Resolution 242, specifically provide (except in the case of Lebanon)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the armistice demarcation lines are *not* political boundaries, but can be changed by the agreement of the parties when they move from armistice to peace. At the time Resolution 242 was debated and adopted, the Allon Plan was one of the peace proposals being actively considered. Its ideas would have required far more than minor border rectifications. In any event, the interpretation of Resolution 242, like that of any other legal document, is not bound by the detailed examples in peoples' minds at the time it was adopted. Broad policy purposes govern the growth of the law, not its footnotes. And it is absurd to suppose that any legal system would treat aggression as costless. The Arab states, having made war on Israel for forty years in the face of an endless flow of Security Council decisions demanding peace, cannot claim that aggression has no consequences.

Mr. Freifeld is a lawyer who examines documents line by line and word for word. In his preoccupation with the trees, he sometimes misses the shape of the forest. Resolution 242 calls for Israeli withdrawals only when "a just and lasting peace in the Middle East" has been achieved; that is, its language does not call for withdrawals from the territory of each country as it makes peace. Besides, such a procedure would be impossible in the case of Jordan, since Jordan's attempt to annex the West Bank and East Jerusalem was not generally recognized, and Israel's claim to the land is at least as good as Jordan's. The text of Resolution 242 would suggest that Israel's transfer of the Sinai to Egypt more than satisfies its principles.

Mr. Freifeld also points out that Resolution 242 does indeed allow Israel to stay in the occupied territories until the parties make peace, but does not specify what Israel would or should do on the West Bank pending withdrawal. Since very few countries recognized Jordan's attempt to annex the West Bank in 1951, it is difficult for me to imagine what on earth Mr. Freifeld means. The Israeli military forces legitimately in the West Bank are necessarily responsible for order and government. The rule of international law is surely that such a military presence *is* an "occupation," implying certain rights and obligations. The courts and chancelleries of the world have treated Israel as the occupying power ever since 1967. Israel itself says it is more than the occupying power but a claimant as well, having acquired and held the territories in the course of two wars of self-defense. That is true, but Israel has not yet undertaken to annex the territory. And it does respect the international law on the subject as a matter of grace, as the Israeli government has said and its Supreme Court has ruled.

David Basch's argument depends on a legal mistake. The term "military occupation" in international law is not confined, as he suggests, to the military occupation of territory belonging to one nation illegally held by another. It is a neutral term and has no implication of "vileness." After all, the Allies undertook extensive military occupations after both world wars and some of those occupations resulted in boundary changes before peace was made. In Israel's case, the fact that Israel has withdrawn from more than 90 percent of the territories it occupied in the course of the Six-Day War does not give it title to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as Mr. Basch seems to claim. Sovereignty in international law has to be recognized by the international community at large, and that step cannot be expected in this case until there is peace.

Democratic Capitalism

To the Editor of Commentary:

Michael Novak's "Boredom, Virtue, and Democratic Capitalism" [September 1989] does a splendid job of explaining how liberal democracy (Novak's "democratic capitalism"), while not itself a source of transcendent, life-ordering, and unifying significance, nonetheless depends decisively on a vision—a noble vision—of the meaningfulness of human life as a search for goodness and truth: the proper objects, respectively, of human will and intellect. Many unfriendly critics of liberal democracy, whether on the Right or on the Left, have long complained about its meaninglessness while simultaneously displaying the greatest unwillingness to learn anything from those enduring sources of meaning upon which liberal-democratic regimes rest and whose riches they transmit to us, even if in somewhat generalized and attenuated forms. Recent apologists for the 60's counterculture, to offer a case in point, recommend the "Woodstock Nation" (or some version thereof) as an alternative to the "air-conditioned-nightmare" of selfish, convention-bound, middle-class America. But this is to recommend a chimera to take the place of a caricature. Woodstock and the other social experiments of the 60's were not serious attempts at building genuine community, but only the playlands of vapid and coddled American youth. And the image of America as a vast, sterile shopping mall populated by a lonely crowd whose members hold nothing in common except their own emptiness and lack of real individual distinction is a gross distortion.

But a caricature is a distortion of something real, not a total fabrication. Consumerism, like the other implicit or explicit ideologies of radical human autonomy that grow along with it, is a threat to the spiritual health of the West in general and to America in particular. . . .

Given the record of liberal thinkers' theoretical failure, combined with liberal institutions' undeniable history of practical success in political as well as economic terms, Mr. Novak is right to supplement his initial account of liberalism . . . as a merely negative project, as pure liberation *from* (feudalism, oppression, the "dead hand of the past," etc.). For every liberation *from* something must also be a liberation *to* something else. Mr. Novak points to this something else near the end of his article when he discusses the Bible and quotes the Declaration of Independence, thus giving us a glimpse of the substantive vision—the truths or meaning—upon which liberal democracy is based. . . .

Our country's Founders knew that liberal democracy can—nay, must—fortify itself at the wellsprings of classical and biblical wisdom. . . . Mr. Novak, to his great credit, knows this as well. That is why he warns that the "future [of liberal institutions] depends precisely on the capacity to replenish the spiritual abundance that gave them birth," and that "[i]t would take only a generation of citizens [of liberal societies] who have forgotten their founding principles and all the lessons of experience to set in motion a precipitous and calamitous slide."

The joy of liberalism is that it can look for aid to sources of mean-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing above and beyond itself; the burden on liberalism is that it must do so, and hence must resist the temptation (fostered by contemporary relativism and its flip side, contemporary subjectivism) to collapse in on itself. . . .

PHILIP J. COSTOPOULOS
Journal of Democracy
Washington, D.C.

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Michael Novak proudly proclaims the virtues of capitalism, identifies characteristics of a successful society, and refers in a broad but ill-defined sense to future prospects. I share his pride. However, he bases his faith in the future on the natural proclivity of human beings as "social animals," who will rise spontaneously out of "frank and friendly association" to recognize and seek resolution for broad community-wide problems. All of Mr. Novak's emphasis is upon the individual. . . .

But how can we apply the same sort of framework . . . to strengthen the community? Perhaps Rabbi Hillel is relevant here: "If I am not for myself, who will be for me? And being only for my own self, what am I? And if not now, when?" The Torah is replete with examples of the devastating results of the inability of the Tribes of Israel to act responsibly as a community. They suffered repeatedly from the consequences of their abuse of the special privilege entrusted to them. Is not a capitalist democracy a similar trust?

Collective responsibility becomes the ultimate obligation of individuals in a free world. We have inherited the great privilege of individual liberty. It does not come without a price tag. We should expect of ourselves and it should be expected of us to develop a new model of collectivism which will be viable within the realm of individualism and capitalism. Standards and guidelines manifested both individually and collectively should be developed to meet this new set of responsibilites. Does it matter what name we give such a "new order"?

The challenge of collectivism within capitalist democracy is the ultimate gift.

DAVID M. BROWN
Dean, University of Minnesota
Medical School
Minneapolis, Minnesota

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Francis Fukuyama. . . . need not worry that ideological struggle has come to an end. Even in the restricted world of contributors to COMMENTARY, the lines of the next battle can be seen.

Compare Michael Novak's assertion that a free economy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the successful practice of democracy with Irving Kristol's statement that a free economy is *the* guarantee of human freedom ["Liberalism & American Jews," October 1988]. Contrast Mr. Novak's belief that democratic capitalism is not a religion with George Gilder's attempt to propagate the strange idea that business is really a form of philanthropy, an enterprise that makes no sense except as part of an effort to endow capitalism with a religious aura [Letters from Readers, COMMENTARY March 1987]. Mr. Novak may regard Chile under General Pinochet as "precapitalist" rather than admirably capitalist, but many will reject that view. And the old-line conservatives who emphasize inequality, hierarchy, and subservience to preordained authority will be out in force, proclaiming that, since they are the farthest away from socialism (whatever that means), the ideological victory is legitimately theirs.

The lack of real definitions makes meaningful discussion difficult if not impossible. Thus, the allegedly victorious ideology is variously described as liberal democracy, democratic capitalism, and capitalism, but there is no universal agreement about what these terms mean, much less that they all mean the same thing. . . .

The upcoming debate, in its polite form, will be between those whose ideal system is based on liberal democracy, with capitalism as a desirable but controlled adjunct, and those who emphasize a free economy, with democracy as a desirable but controlled adjunct. Of course there will be a wide middle ground, with people striking a balance in various ways. That is where I expect to find Mr. Novak. But make no mistake about it, should the political or economic stakes become high enough, the debate will turn into a full-scale struggle between liberal democracy and authoritarian capitalism, and people will kill and die in that struggle. . . .

Mr. Novak's definition of capitalism and his six propositions represent only his own ideology. There is as yet no victorious ideology. A significant struggle is beginning, with the outcome in doubt.

SAMSON M. ROSENZWEIG
North Brunswick, New Jersey

MICHAEL NOVAK writes:

I am grateful to Philip J. Costopoulos and David M. Brown for their instructive letters. To the latter, though, I would object that the word "collectivism" does not well express the social bond he has in mind. Our form of society (*novus ordo seclorum*) is a gift, a trust, and we should not wish to injure it with our sins and failures. In any case, the Soviets have ruined the word "collectivism." The word itself can mean collections of mere things, and also suggests (as it did for Orwell) herds, hives, and zoos. All these fall short of "community," which requires for its existence the consent of, and mutual respect among, free persons.

Samson M. Rosenzweig will find it harder than he thinks to drive a wedge between Irving Kristol and me on the subject of capitalism. While I have called capitalism a "necessary but not sufficient" condition for democracy, Kristol also considers it to be a necessary but not sufficient guarantee of human freedom. In his search for precise definitions, Mr. Rosenzweig might consult Peter Berger's *The Capitalist Revolution* or my own *The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism.*

I doubt that Mr. Rosenzweig's "authoritarian capitalism" will attract many takers; even General Pinochet has apparently given up on that notion. And for good reason. Authoritarian capitalist states (as in Singapore) face both economic havoc from arbitrary edicts by dictatorial rulers and severe uncertainties in the transition between regimes. Therefore, it now seems to be an equally solid empirical proposition that democracy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the long-term health of capitalism, which the recent reversal of capitalist reforms by totalitarian Chinese political rulers tends to confirm.

Finally, Mr. Rosenzweig misstates my aim. It is not to articulate my own ideology, but to put in propositional form the dynamic moral ideals already at work in our system, in a way that can be falsified by empirical evidence to the contrary, and revised and improved

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

upon by others. Mr. Rosenzweig is likely to be correct, though, about the continuing struggle to hold to empirical truth in such disputatious matters as political economy.

The Final Solution

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Lucy S. Dawidowicz is to be commended for her systematic demolition of the spurious arguments made by Arno J. Mayer and other revisionist historians concerning National Socialism in general and the Holocaust in particular ["Perversions of the Holocaust," October 1989]. Of special interest to me were her refutations of Mayer's interpretations of the role of anti-Semitism in National Socialist ideology and the motives which guided the *Einsatzgruppen* in their mass killings in the Eastern campaign in 1941.

That an educated, and I presume intelligent, scholar like Mayer could assert that anti-Semitism was not a salient feature of National Socialist ideology *from its inception*, but rather a byproduct of Hitler's ultimate motivation, the struggle against Bolshevism, simply runs counter to the evidence detailed so prophetically by Hitler in *Mein Kampf*.

While ruminating in his cell at Spandau prison following the abortive Beer Hall Putsch in 1923, the future Fuehrer laid out four major policy objectives which were to become the guiding cornerstones of National Socialist ideology. Briefly stated, these were: (1) undoing the Versailles Treaty; (2) a war of revenge against France; (3) securing and resettling European Russia (i.e., crushing Bolshevism and *Lebensraum*); and (4) the elimination of European Jewry (*die Endlösung der Judenfrage*). Once the National Socialists came to power in 1933, these policy objectives formed the ideological timetable which Hitler's minions followed with grisly efficiency.

What is significant about these policy objectives, a significance which Mayer chooses to overlook or dismiss totally, is that they were integral, mutually dependent elements of a complete ideological structure. In Hitler's mind they formed a logical sequence of events to be undertaken once he came to power. Further, to assert that any one of these objectives was *the* ultimate guiding principle fueling Nazi aggression, as Mayer regards Hitler's antipathy for Bolshevism, is absurd. Hitler regarded them all as extremely important components in the establishment of his Thousand Year Reich.

Finally, even a cursory examination of the *Einsatzgruppen* trial record, particularly the testimony of Otto Ohlendorf (who was, incidentally, an intellectual, as were the leaders of the other three *Einsatzgruppen*), proves unquestionably that these murder squads were ordered to liquidate both political commissars (i.e., Bolsheviks) and Jews.

I suggest that Arno Mayer go back and review the basic sources in his field of inquiry, and even take up the "fetish" of footnoting, since his "careful intellection and rumination" have thus far yielded such dubious results.

THOMAS D. GORDON
North Wildwood, New Jersey

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In her accustomed role of historian, Lucy S. Dawidowicz has done her usual professional job in her piece on Arno J. Mayer's *Why Did the Heavens Not Darken?: The "Final Solution" in History*. Perhaps it is asking too much of her to play (social) psychologist as well, exploring the motives behind Mayer's extraordinary attempt to rewrite the history of both the Holocaust and the modern world. Yet the man who has put his name to that book, by her own reading of it would seem to compel such an exploration. There is no doubt that Mayer possesses the credentials of a European historian, as his position at Princeton, if nothing else, testifies. Yet it is reasonably clear from his remarks about dispensing with the customary scholarly apparatus of the historian, as well as the striking omission from his book of those genuinely authoritative sources to which Mrs. Dawidowicz points, that Mayer did not wish or even perhaps expect his book to be judged by the same standards as professional historical works. . . .

Why then did Mayer do what he did, the non-historian finds himself wondering? For whom did he think of himself as doing it? Surely he realized that informed, serious historians would react the way they have (the book received unfavorable reviews in the *New Republic* and *Dissent* as well as COMMENTARY) and that he would find himself linked by them to the kind of merely clever men, functionalists and deconstructionists, who are out to make reputations regardless of whether the vehicle whereby they do so is the Holocaust or shrimp fishing in 19th-century Alaska.

Mrs. Dawidowicz links Mayer with Noam Chomsky, who has let himself be associated with some of the neo-Nazis that Mayer invokes among his "authorities" for the outrageous claim that the Holocaust had a different meaning (and Hitler a different intention for it) from what everyone had all along believed. Chomsky, in perhaps the single most notorious incident of its kind in the contemporary era, rationalized the mass murders perpetrated by Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge, although without the courage to admit to responsibility for his action. Perhaps Mayer, although he stops well short of saluting Pol Pot, nevertheless wants his readers to bracket him with the ineffable Chomsky as . . . a Jewish apologist for those who deny the most absolute evil that the world has so far witnessed. . . .

HAROLD J. HARRIS
Kalamazoo College
Kalamazoo, Michigan

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In her continuing war against the "functionalist" historians, Lucy S. Dawidowicz demolishes Arno J. Mayer for arguing that Hitler's policy was logical and again crushes Uwe Dietrich Adam for suggesting that other people besides Hitler had a hand in determining Jewish policies.

Mayer's view that footnotes are a "fetish" deserves her scorn. To make claims about the role of anti-Semitism in Nazi policy but not to cite sources indicates attitudes that befit a propagandist, not a scholar.

Additionally, for Mayer to include books by Arthur Butz and Robert Faurisson in a bibliography for a work that purports to be a serious investigation of the Holocaust indicates something worse. What Mayer is evidently after is to prove German policy rational, given Hitler's premises. Such an exercise does not appear useful to anyone who wants to understand what happened in the Third Reich—unless we first agree that mass murder can be a rational and acceptable response to perceived evil. Mayer has a long way to go before the rest of us will be convinced that Hitler's attack on Russia and the destruction of the Jews

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Free with your subscription to The Jerusalem Post!

THE JERUSALEM POST
INTERNATIONAL EDITION
New York talks focus on Egypt's plan; deep divisions in Israel over next step
Peace formula: search for agreement widens
ISRAEL scene
Israeli Humor
Israeli Democracy

ISRAEL SCENE

ISRAELI DEMOCRACY

Now you get two special magazines free when you subscribe to The Jerusalem Post International Edition:

Published nine times a year Israel Scene brings you reports and analyses of Israel's political and economic scene and a broad view of Israel's people and their culture...sports, food, travel, books, drama and more.

Israeli Democracy is published four times a year and features research and incisive analysis of Israeli politics and relations between Israel and the Diaspora by Israel's leading academics, writers and public figures.

Both complement The Jerusalem Post's reporting of news and events as they unfold. Together The Post, Israel Scene and Israeli Democracy give you a fully rounded and accurate picture of Israel as it is today... as it will be tomorrow.

Subscribe now and save over $40 off The Jerusalem Post International Edition's cover price and get Israel Scene and Israeli Democracy free!

Don't send money now, unless you prefer. We'll gladly bill you later. Simply fill in the coupon below and mail it today!

SUBSCRIPTION ORDER

YES!

Send me The Jerusalem Post International Edition for the term marked below:

☐ 52 weeks for $59.95. Save $44.05 off the Post's cover cost and get Israel Scene and Israeli Democracy free!

☐ 26 weeks for $34.95. Save $17.05 off the Post's cover cost and get Israel Scene and Israeli Democracy free!

☐ Bill me later. ☐ Payment enclosed. (Make checks payable to: The Jerusalem Post.)

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

MAIL TO: The Jerusalem Post International Edition, P.O. Box 282, Brewster, NY 10509-9981

Offer valid in North America only. For Canadian orders add US$11 postage for 52 weeks or $5.50 postage for 26 weeks.

S01CM

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were justifiable if ill-advised means to an end.

Adam and other "functionalists," however, argue from different premises and cite sources which can be examined. Their main points are not that Hitler was unaware of or indifferent to Jews or that bureaucracies were indifferent to Hitler's will but that there were power struggles among Nazis over such things as who would manage Jewish policies and who would get Jewish wealth. Hitler knew about these struggles—unless he was deaf and dumb, which even revisionists have not yet claimed—but, as was his habit in other areas, did not put his directives into writing. The misfits and human wrecks who ran Nazi agencies and ministries put the orders into writing after he told them what he wanted done. They then set about eliminating one another from Hitler's favor and getting to the spoils.

Beyond that, Hitler did not live in a vacuum. Consider an early example of the effect of public opinion on the Fuehrer. On April 1, 1933, a little more than two months after he became chancellor, Germany had an anti-Jewish boycott called "National Socialist Saturday." Hitler certainly knew in advance what would occur, since he met with Goebbels the night of March 26 to plan it. But we know that events on April 1 raised serious concerns among Germans who wanted to believe that they lived in a *Rechtstaat,* or society based on law and order. SA troopers running wild did not enhance an image that the Fuehrer wanted to project.

Immediately after the boycott, Hitler began to follow a procedure vis-à-vis the Jews that he had earlier used with devastating effect on centrist and leftist political leaders. At his instigation, the rump Reichstag passed measures "legalizing" persecution. Germans took inspiration from the new measures. Just as he wanted to eliminate Jews from government positions, they wanted to eliminate Jews from professional and trade associations. Although Hitler may have applauded the ousting of Jews as business competitors, we have no evidence that he ordered these subsequent actions.

Mrs. Dawidowicz herself suggests the importance of the anti-Jewish laws on pages 58 to 61 of her book, *The War Against the Jews.* Yet if we accept her definition of "functionalist," Hitler should not have taken into account the outlooks of ordinary people, the professional and trade associations should have awaited word from Berlin, and everyone should have operated strictly under the Fuehrer principle.

MILTON GOLDIN
Tarrytown, New York

LUCY S. DAWIDOWICZ writes:

I am grateful to Thomas D. Gordon for reinforcing my argument against Arno Mayer. Several readers wrote me privately expressing their astonishment at Mayer's tampering with the historical record and they too voiced Harold J. Harris's suspicion that dark personal motives underlay Mayer's attempt to rewrite history. Every careful reader of Mayer's book will surely recognize its misdirected rage. But in the absence of any evidence other than Mayer's published work, it would be futile to speculate about the origins of that rage.

Milton Goldin seeks to instruct me in the basics of Nazi history, but it's hard to learn from someone who, for starters, doesn't seem to know that long before the functionalists appeared on the scene, every historian dealing with the Nazi era wrote about the rivalries among party and government bureaucrats. H. R. Trevor-Roper, in *The Last Days of Hitler,* first published in 1947, portrayed Hitler's government not as a totalitarian machine but as a court operating like an Oriental sultanate. The courtiers often conspired against one another in order to win Hitler's favor, mainly by anticipating his wishes.

Though Hitler was the Fuehrer, he was not very attentive to all aspects of administering the German state or the Nazi party, being lazy and easily bored. Hence, in matters in which he had no interest and rarely intervened, state and party bureaucrats often engaged in competitive operations, seeking to enhance their standing in Hitler's entourage. But Hitler preempted two areas in which he himself directed state and party policies and made the ultimate decisions, once he actually embarked on operations. One area involved the conduct of the war, the other the fate of the Jews.

In *The War Against the Jews* I hypothesized that Hitler had been obsessed by a fantasy to murder the Jews as far back as 1918 and that, after the Nazis came to power, he converted his fantasy, step by opportune step, into an idea, then into a plan, later into a policy, and finally into nightmarish reality. The implementation of his plans was contingent on the opportunities of the moment or on the expedient need for delay.

The functionalists, given their mechanistic view of human behavior, cannot understand how intentions become transformed into decisions and then into actions. Consequently they have muddled three distinct stages in the decision-making process to murder the Jews:

1. The policy decision to murder the Jews, adopted by Hitler and his closest associates in the period between 1937, after they agreed on a policy of war, and September 1939, when the Germans invaded Poland.

2. The promulgation of executive orders, oral and written, to carry out that policy decision, by Hitler, Goering, Himmler, and Heydrich during the months of preparation for "Barbarossa," the code name for the invasion of Russia, which began on June 22, 1941.

3. The actual killing, carried out in two steps, with improvisations all along the way. The first step, the mass shootings by the *Einsatzgruppen,* the SS special-duty forces, began in the summer of 1941. The second step, the mass gassings in specially constructed facilities, began at the end of 1941, after the preliminary experiments at Auschwitz in September 1941 on Russian prisoners of war.

In the course of murdering the Jews, the SS, the agency charged with that task, frequently encountered opposition to its policies from the top officials in the German armed forces and also in Germany's agencies for industrial armaments and economic affairs who argued that Jewish slave labor was crucial to the German military effort. But all attempts to postpone the murder of the Jews in the interests of winning the war failed. The ultimate arbiter was surely Hitler himself.

Intentions matter, especially when the power of a state is harnessed to implement decisions to carry them out.

From Brandeis to Jerusalem

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In his review of Thomas Friedman's *From Beirut to Jerusalem,*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Daniel Pipes properly chastises Friedman for his superficial, even misguided, illusions about Israel [Books in Review, September 1989]. But beneath these apparently innocent "illusions" is the autobiographical myth of Thomas Friedman. Abetted by credulous colleagues, who have swallowed his autobiographical pronouncements whole, Friedman has created a myth of personal disillusionment with Israel that is designed to lend credibility to his indictment of the Jewish state and, not incidentally, to conceal its ideological sources.

As Friedman writes, and frequently reiterates, his is the story of "a Jew who was raised on . . . all the myths about Israel, who goes to Jerusalem in the 1980's and discovers that it isn't the summer camp of his youth." Gullible interviewers have embellished the tale. One of them, breathlessly anticipating Friedman's third Pulitzer Prize, listened deferentially to Friedman recount his "much deeper identification with Israel" after the Six-Day War, as the Jewish state became "a symbol of my own identity." Friedman's faith in Israel's moral rectitude endured, he claimed, until his "experiences as a reporter" in the Middle East finally undermined it fifteen years later. Then, according to another interviewer who was fascinated by his lost "illusion," Friedman experienced "a remarkable transformation," indeed "a personal crisis." He watched "an Israel he had deeply believed in while in high school and college recede from gilded, heroic mythology to the shadows of bleak reality."

In fact, Friedman has invented at least the timing of his conversion story, while remaining silent about the indisputable evidence of his own political bias that long antedated his journalistic career. If he actually did plunge into a Gethsemane of crisis and transformation, it occurred well before he went to the Middle East as a reporter. Friedman's adolescent infatuation with Israel was distinguished by its brevity (although Daniel Pipes accurately detects traces of it still). By the time Friedman graduated from Brandeis University in 1975, he was already expressing sympathy with the Palestinian national cause, offering apologies for PLO terrorism, and identifying with Breira, the single organization so reflexively critical of Israel that it quickly became a pariah group within the American Jewish community.

During his final year at Brandeis, after returning from a summer of study in Cairo, Friedman belonged to the steering committee of a self-styled "Middle East Peace Group." It vigorously opposed the mounting storm of protest among American Jews (to be expressed in a "Rally Against Terror") over Yasir Arafat's impending appearance before the United Nations General Assembly. In November 1974, on the day before Arafat's infamous declaration that Zionism is racism, delivered while brandishing a pistol on his hip, the Peace Group published a statement in the *Brandeis Justice*. Co-signed by Friedman, it called for Israel to negotiate with "all factions of the Palestinians, including the PLO" and stated that the issue of "Palestinian self-determination," a standard euphemism for a Palestinian state, was "one of the central issues blocking peace in the Middle East." The statement acknowledged repeated acts of PLO terror against Jews, but claimed they were "clearly not representative of the diverse elements of the Palestinian people," though the only evidence of such diversity presented was of those even more committed to terrorism than the PLO itself. It also asserted that "international condemnation of terrorist activities for which the PLO is responsible can have little effect. . . ." The group joined Breira, already notorious for its endorsement of Palestinian goals and for the blame it placed on the United States and Israel for Middle East instability, in urging "a more meaningful and constructive approach" than protesting against Arafat and the PLO.

The Middle East Peace Group continued to profess its "concern" for Israel by criticizing American "military and political elites" for reinforcing the strategic alliance with Israel. . . . Among all the impediments to peace in the Middle East, not the least of which was the unrelenting Arab hostility to Israel expressed exactly one year earlier in the Yom Kippur War, the group could only locate the "dangers of U.S. power as a tool for forging peace."

As a journalist in Lebanon, Friedman writes, he experienced "something of a personal crisis.

The Last Gold Coin of the Romanovs



The 1897-1911 "Czar Nicholas II" Gold 5 Roubles of Imperial Russia

Only $125
while supplies last

As the last gold coin of the Romanov dynasty, which ruled the Russian Empire for over 300 years, this 1897-1911 "Nicholas II" gold 5 Roubles is a real collectors item. The portrait of the ill-fated Czar and the double-headed eagle of the royal crest display superb minting artistry. After the 1917 Revolution, countless millions were destroyed in melts — today the survivors are elegant remnants of Imperial Russia. Each hand-selected coin contains 4.3 grams of .900 fine gold and is guaranteed to grade extra fine to almost uncirculated. You might expect to pay more for a gold classic in such excellent quality, but while supplies last you may order up to ten coins at the following prices:
1 coin, $125 **(Order #10846).** 3 coins, $365 (save $10). 5 coins, $595 (save $30). 10 coins, $1,150 (save $100).
To order by credit card, call toll-free 1-800-451-4463 at any time. Or send a check or money order to: International Coins & Currency, Inc., 11 E. State St., Box 218, Dept. 993, Montpelier, VT 05602. As our way of saying thank you, your order will be shipped postpaid. Certificate of authenticity included. **Satisfaction guaranteed:** you may return your order within 30 days of receipt for a prompt no-questions-asked refund.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

. . . The Israel I met on the outskirts of Beirut was not the heroic Israel I had been taught to identify with." Outraged, and determined "to nail Begin and Sharon" (a curious role for a reporter), Friedman wrote the article that won his first Pulitzer. A week later, he "buried" the Israeli commanding officer on page one of the New York *Times*, and "along with him evey illusion I ever held about the Jewish state." That surely qualified him for his assignment to Israel; furthermore, his editor wanted, in part, "to dispense with an old unwritten rule . . . of never allowing a Jew to report from Jerusalem."

Thus the myth of Thomas Friedman was born, to be nurtured after publication to propel his book up the best-seller list. His "personal crisis" of disillusionment with "heroic" Israel, by now a well-worked theme of leftist critics, was calculated to lend credibility to his updated version of Middle East Peace Group position papers. The confession of a conversion experience, after all, is far more compelling than the more mundane, if more accurate, revelation that Friedman the journalist was still following the old Breira party line.

Freedom of association, of course, is a constitutional right, which Friedman, no less than any other American, enjoys. But full disclosure of a consistent ideological bias, sustained over fifteen years, might be considered a minimal gesture of journalistic integrity. Friedman concedes—for he could hardly do otherwise—that he was "not professionally detached" when he wrote his prize-winning articles after Sabra and Shatila. But his self-serving claim that his outrage at Israel "made me a better reporter" is a preposterous assertion, which has yet to receive critical scrutiny from within his own profession.

Friedman, moreover, has virtually disqualified himself, in public, as even a remotely objective analyst. Back in 1985, after the Shiite hijacking of the TWA airliner, he vigorously attacked Israel (on Israeli radio) for not releasing the 700 terrorists whose freedom the hijackers were demanding. Israel's refusal, he claimed, "certainly contributed" to the hijacking (as, certainly, a victim's body contributes to rape or homicide). Again in 1989, after Israel's capture of the terrorist Sheik Obeid in Lebanon, followed by the grisly home movie of the hanging of Colonel Higgins, Friedman declared on *Nightline* that "both sides [*sic*] have really used Higgins . . . and exploited him in a very tragic way." For sheer vulgarity, such characterizations of Israel are exceeded only by Friedman's own description of the Jewish state, in his book, as "Yad Vashem with an air force."

As for the "old unwritten rule" at the *Times* about not sending a Jew to Jerusalem, that, too, is a myth. During the 1929 Arab riots in Palestine, the slaughter of more than 100 Jews in Hebron and Jerusalem produced a stream of *Times* articles as hostile to the Zionists as they were indifferent to the Jewish victims. The correspondent who wrote them was Joseph Levy, . . . an American Jew, conversant in Arabic and Hebrew, who had spent years in Beirut before coming to Jerusalem, where he wrote for the *Times*, conceding that if his efforts toppled the Zionist administration in power, so much the better. . . . But who remembers Joseph Levy?

As for Thomas Friedman, in reality if not mythology, he has followed the same ideological path that he chose as an undergraduate. . . .

Incidentally, a mere two weeks after the *New Republic* published a brief letter from me about Friedman's undergraduate enthusiasm for the Palestinian cause, the magazine took the almost unheard-of step of apologizing for having done so, claiming I had distorted the statement Friedman signed in 1974. To the contrary: I accurately represented his position and I have challenged the editors of the *New Republic* to print the 1974 text in full so that readers may decide for themselves. I have also invited them to acknowledge that the letter for which they apologized was solicited by the editor-in-chief, with advance knowledge of its contents and the supporting evidence.

JEROLD S. AUERBACH
Wellesley College
Wellesley, Massachusetts

DANIEL PIPES writes:

Thomas Friedman writes in his book, *From Beirut to Jerusalem*, that he had been for years a fervent and uncritical supporter of Israel. Then, according to his account, disillusion set in as a result of Israel's 1982 war in Lebanon. The key passage comes on page 164, where he writes that the massacre at "Sabra and Shatila was something of a personal crisis for me. The Israel I met on the outskirts of Beirut was not the heroic Israel I had been taught to identify with." The emotional language of the next two pages confirms Friedman's intense experience during the unhappy days of September 1982.

The timing of his disillusion is critical to Friedman's story. Coming at the nadir of Israel's international standing, and when the author was an eyewitness to atrocities, it validates his credentials among those who yet share his once-friendly feelings for Israel. Take away the drama of this disenchantment and Friedman becomes just another writer with an anti-Israel bent, though an unusually talented one.

As Friedman is a highly reputed journalist holding positions of great responsibility, it simply never occurred to me to doubt his autobiographical account. Further, I have talked with Friedman several times and he always struck me as trustworthy.

But Jerold S. Auerbach provides compelling evidence to establish that there is something disingenuous about Friedman's professed Zionism in the late 1970's. It appears that the disillusion he claims for himself in September 1982 took place long before he began reporting from the Middle East.

Mr. Auerbach uses the word "myth" to describe Friedman's rewriting of his past. But his evidence raises the question of whether Friedman has been guilty not of an innocent myth but of a significant deception.

A rewriting of one's own biography has devastating implications for anyone's integrity. It has even greater weight when perpetrated by a journalist—a writer who provides no footnotes and who nearly always has to be taken at his word.

The charges against Friedman call for an answer from him. Specifically, is it true that—as a member of the Middle East Peace Group, of Breira, and as a co-signer of a statement in the *Brandeis Justice*—he adopted his current highly critical attitudes toward Israel in the early 1970's? If so, how does he account for the claim that he lost faith in Israel only during 1982?

In the absence of a satisfactory answer to these questions, readers are forced to reconsider Thomas

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Friedman's continued credibility as a correspondent.

The Pollard Case

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Please let me respond to Bernard R. Henderson's slurs against me and my book on the Pollard spy case, *Territory of Lies* [Letters from Readers, November 1989].

My 336-page book was based on a very careful review of thousands of pages of documents made available by the U.S. District Court in Washington. These included papers filed by the Pollards, their lawyers, and U.S. prosecutors. Many other documents were obtained by me under the Freedom of Information Act. I also interviewed both Pollards, their families, and their lawyers. I spent three hours with Jonathan Pollard at the federal prison in Petersburg, Virginia, on November 20, 1986, and another three hours with him on January 29, 1987. I was the only reporter allowed in to see him while he awaited sentencing. Since then, only Mike Wallace of *60 Minutes* has been permitted to interview him. After Pollard was sentenced, I corresponded by mail with him. In addition, I interviewed dozens of U.S. government officials, including investigators, intelligence officials, and prosecutors. I also interviewed key Israelis with direct knowledge of the affair.

A reporter can receive one side of the story from the Pollards, another from the U.S. government, and a third from the Israelis. I was blessed with excellent access to all sides of this complex and tragic story. For any fair and responsible account, of course, this was essential.

Despite Mr. Henderson's complaints, many people have actually accused me of being *too* sympathetic to the Pollards. This is because I was not shy in the book, and have not been since, about expressing my personal views. Thus, I do not believe Jonathan Pollard should have received the maximum sentence. He did, after all, plead guilty and cooperate with the investigation. It was only as a result of his polygraph interrogations that the U.S. government came to understand the full extent of the espionage. I made it clear that he was largely motivated by his desire to help Israel. The money came into play only later. Pollard, in my opinion, would certainly have spied for Israel even without any money at all.

I also state that Mr. Henderson's daughter, Anne Henderson Pollard, should not have received a prison sentence at all. She also pleaded guilty and cooperated. She was motivated by a blind love of her husband. She was never operationally involved in the affair; she never passed documents to Israel or accepted payment. Wives of other spies generally have not been prosecuted.

Mr. Henderson did not accuse me of fearing "dual-loyalty" accusations when I was the first reporter to explain the Pollards' side of the story in 1986. As he well knows, it was that series of articles which began to turn public opinion around in some segments of Israel and the American Jewish community.

He also did not attack me when I wrote an article on the op-ed page of the New York *Times* on October 21, 1987, complaining about the lack of proper medical treatment for his daughter in prison. That article, entitled "No Way to Treat a Prisoner," was probably the single most important development in generating grass-roots sympathy for Mrs. Pollard. It quickly resulted in her being transferred from Lexington, Kentucky, to Rochester, Minnesota, so that she could be treated at the Mayo Clinic. On September 1, 1989, I wrote another piece in the New York *Times* . . . in which I said she should receive immediate parole. I am told by Bureau of Prisons officials that that article played an important role in their allowing Mrs. Pollard a subsequent furlough to spend the period between Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur with her family in New York.

Still, despite Mr. Henderson's attempts to justify his son-in-law's behavior, there was no excuse for Pollard's breaking the law by providing classified documents to Israel. As Pollard himself told Judge Aubrey Robinson III on March 4, 1987, there were other options available. "I have come to the inescapable conclusion," he said,

> that while my motives may have been well-meaning, they cannot, under any stretch of the imagination, excuse or justify the violation of the law, particularly one that involves the trust of government, and there is no higher trust than [for] those in the intelligence community. . . . In retrospect, I wish I had thought about alternative courses of action. They were available. If I saw something that was wrong, I should have exhausted the legal processes that were at my disposal. They are called the chain of command. I should have gone to the Inspector General of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretaries of the Navy and Defense, and even if I had to, the President of the United States, to make my case. But instead, I broke faith and took the law into my own hands.

Pollard is now paying the price for that mistake.

WOLF BLITZER
Jerusalem Post Washington Bureau
Washington, D.C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Read the magazine that shapes the minds of the people who shape our world.

Discover for yourself the excitement of exploring today's most critical topics with today's most articulate and influential writers and thinkers. Subscribe to Commentary, the magazine that has illuminated every aspect of America's political, social, and cultural life. The magazine for those who take the world, and their role in it, very seriously.

Commentary
The forum for today's most vital issues.

"COMMENTARY is very, very important for the life of the United States, for the West, and, I am convinced, for freedom."
–HON. JEANE KIRKPATRICK

"The affirmation of the West and its values, which was there in the first lines Norman Podhoretz wrote as Editor of COMMENTARY, has never faltered and has hugely strengthened both the West and those values."
–SENATOR DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN

"Norman Podhoretz and COMMENTARY have ennobled this society. They have asked the right questions. They have usually given the right answers."
–HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBSCRIPTION APPLICATION

Commentary
165 East 56th Street, New York, NY 10022

☐ Yes! Please enter my one-year subscription–12 monthly issues–to Commentary for just $39–a full $6 off the newsstand rate. Add $8 for foreign and Canadian subscriptions (U.S. dollars only).

Must reading for today's best informed people.

Name _____ (Please Print)
Address _____
City _____
State _____ Zip _____
Signature _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe?

Irwin M. Stelzer

We here in the United States, and people in the West generally, are exhilarated by developments in Eastern Europe. The "evil empire" of the Soviets seems to be in dissolution, as East Germans vote with their feet, and as Poland, Hungary, and now also Czechoslovakia replace years of Communist rule with new democratic institutions and move toward replacing central direction of the economy with market mechanisms. Even the Soviet Union itself seems to many observers to be headed down the path of political and economic reform in the direction of democracy and capitalism.

Unfortunately, formulating a Western economic policy in response to these developments is no easy chore, not the least of the reasons being a wide divergence of interests among the Western allies. West Germany, for example, has a clear stake in raising the living standards of ethnic Germans now resident in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Otherwise, they might take the Federal Republic up on its open-ended and until now virtually meaningless offer to welcome them as immigrants. Several hundred thousand highly trained, German-speaking, and easily assimilable young East Germans are one thing; hordes of Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs quite another.

Because of these (and other) differences among the Western allies, a fully coordinated economic response to the unfolding events in the East is unlikely. Nor is it necessary. This is one area in which America can quite sensibly go it alone.

I

The currency is worthless. Foreign indebtedness is high. The infrastructure is run down. Democracy is attempting to take root in the rocky soil of authoritarianism.

The USSR, 1990? Yes. But also Germany, after World War I. Then, America and the European democracies poured hundreds of millions of dollars of loans into the coffers of their past (and future) adversary, restoring real wages and output and creating the world's most modern road and marine transport systems.

That good deed did not go unpunished. Nor may the similar one we are being urged to perform for the Soviet Union by a mixture of humanitarians, academic economists with longstanding Greenback-party inclinations (wipe out debt), believers in the end-trend (the end of Communism, the end of history), and a broad spectrum of people who, commendably, think that we have an obligation to help the masses suffering under Communism establish more vibrant economies.

But before plunging in with assistance, or even ordinary venture capital, we should consider several facts, not the least of which is whether trying to aid the Soviet economy, after only the limited changes proposed by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, is at all feasible.

There is no longer any question that the Soviet economy is a mess. As two Soviet experts (Nikolai Shmelev and Vladimir Popov) have put it, "There is not enough of anything, anywhere, at any time." The government concedes that 1,000 of 1,200 everyday consumer goods are now in short supply. Only the supplies of useless rubles and unspendable savings have gone up.

Such facts are no longer state secrets. On the contrary, it seems to suit Gorbachev's purpose to trumpet them far and wide: he tells us that the Soviet Union is suffering from "economic deadlock and stagnation," from "slowing economic growth," and from "a shortage of goods." One of his chief economic advisers, Abel Aganbegyan, provides gory details about "the deep-seated deformations in the development of the Soviet economy," among which are "wage-leveling and neglected material incentives."

This litany of woes can be taken as making a good case for aid of various sorts, which is what Gorbachev intends. But a mere recitation of need is not enough to demonstrate that aid—credits, subsidized loans, investment guarantees, preferential access to markets—would be used to improve the efficiency of the Soviet economy. The continued Soviet refusal to move to a market economy, and the parallel unwillingness to address the nation's budget deficit, moot the question of whether we should help. We simply cannot, even if we choose to. For any assistance would disappear down what Shmelev and Popov call the Soviet "'black holes' that swallow resources."

Irwin M. Stelzer is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and U.S. political and economic columnist for the (London) *Sunday Times*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

That Gorbachev and his followers have no taste for what they see as the evils of a market system is demonstrated not only by their repeated statements to that effect but even more convincingly by their actions. Recent experience with the cooperative movement is a vivid case in point.

"Cooperatives"—really small, private businesses—were legalized in a move that Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Abalkin called "the first step toward the formation of a socialist market." The result was a burgeoning of mostly small businesses: restaurants, cafés, food shops, printers. Prices were high—perhaps three to eight times the level in state shops—but the goods were available.

In some instances, to be sure, this was because state officials diverted goods to cooperatives in return for bribes or a piece of the action. But mainly these small-scale operations thrived on the ingenuity of their owners, producing some 25-30 billion rubles' worth of goods and services in 1989—goods of tolerable quality, available without queuing, and at market-clearing prices. The cooperative movement, Abalkin told his fellow deputies in the Supreme Soviet, had brought many "businesslike, enterprising people, able organizers, well versed in marketing and capable of identifying production reserves and making the economy flexible and dynamic." Just the medicine, one might have thought, for the ossified Soviet economy.

But his fellow deputies disagreed, with Gorbachev leading the charge. How was it possible, Gorbachev asked, for soap, otherwise virtually unobtainable, to be available at a cooperative for 40 kopecks—eight times the state price? Obviously the cooperative must have stolen from state supplies. "Economic salvation cannot come out of the pockets of the working class," added Venyamin Yarin, a deputy from Siberia, to what one correspondent reported as "a murmur of agreement."

"You have to take public opinion into account," Gorbachev also warned. And public opinion was best expressed by the burning down of a cooperative pig farm that had provided a northern region with its first fresh meat in twenty years. The farmers were "making too much money," Soviet television reported. "Now the district has no meat," was the wry comment of the (London) *Independent*'s Moscow correspondent. Meanwhile, cooperatives were being subjected to progressively more stringent regulation: outright prohibition from some activities, controls on the prices they might charge, punitive taxes.

As THIS experience reminds us, Gorbachev believes that the creative forces which must be liberated if the Soviet economy is to thrive can (in the words of Marshall Goldman) "be mobilized within a system that continues to be centrally supervised by the state." Judy Shelton, author of the masterful *The Coming Soviet Crash*,* puts the same point more pithily when she says that Gorbachev's view is "that the system has gotten off track, not that the tracks were laid out wrong."

Hence, rather than adopt market-based incentives, Gorbachev has relied increasingly on command-and-control techniques to improve the functioning of his economy. The agricultural sector is now under the control of one of the most vocal opponents of economic reform. The problem of shoddy goods has been addressed not by unleashing market forces but by hiring an army of "quality inspectors." And the problem of shortages is being met by reimposing what Abalkin admits are "rigid state orders" and export controls—both emergency measures, he says. In short, centralized control is increasing, not decreasing.

Nor is there much hope that Gorbachev and his colleagues will reverse course, and suddenly realize the virtue of relying on market forces to allocate resources in their massive economy. Even the reformer Abalkin favors a comprehensive price-and-income policy (read: price and wage controls). The very best that can be expected, barring the always possible sudden change in policy, is that Abalkin's latest proposal will be adopted. He wants to begin creating a limited market in 1991-92 by allowing some auctions and trade fairs, and permitting firms to sell goods produced in *excess* of state orders (which planners can always increase) at free-market prices.

To offer aid to an unregenerate planned economy is to ignore our experience in lending to centrally directed Latin American countries and to Poland during the last thaw, when it all went down the drain. It is also to ignore the fact that the USSR's budgetary situation is one which would cause a zipping of the wallets of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Or, we think it would. For the fact is that we know very little about the true size of the Soviet budget deficit.

The Soviets now put it at 12 percent of GNP, about four times the U.S. level. And they swear that this time they are telling the truth. Yet not many months ago these same budget-makers issued a prospectus in connection with some international borrowings: it quite remarkably showed the Soviet budget to be in surplus.

But assume that the Soviets are now giving us accurate figures. Might it not make sense to lend to them anyway? After all, the American budget is hardly a model of fiscal probity, and foreigners lend our government billions quite regularly.

The answer is that there are budget deficits and there are budget deficits. Ours is distinguished from the USSR's, first, by its small size relative to the size of our economy: about 3 percent for us compared with at least 12 percent and perhaps twice that for them. Second, our deficit is declining, while the USSR's appears to be rising.

* Free Press, 246 pp., $22.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

More important, our deficit is grafted onto a market economy, theirs onto a centrally planned economy. As Judy Shelton points out, a budget deficit in any country is inflationary. In America, that means higher prices. In the Soviet Union, where prices are not free to rise in response to the increased money supply resulting from the deficit, it means greater strain on the central-planning system: shortages; queues; reallocations of resources in a doomed effort to meet first this shortage, then that one; and a piling up of useless rubles in savings accounts.

This ruble "overhang" creates a dilemma for Gorbachev. If he keeps the lid on prices, the distortions in his economy become exacerbated, production remains stagnant, and the overhang grows. If he takes the lid off prices, they will soar, until purchasing power and the supply of goods achieve some balance. This latter course he has specifically rejected, on the ground that "after two weeks of such a 'market,' all the people will be on the streets. And it will smash any government, even one which declares its devotion to the people."

GORBACHEV could, of course, reduce the strains on his country's resources by further cuts in his military budget. The Soviets, in what is probably an understatement, claim to be spending about 12 percent of their national income on defense, roughly twice what we spend. But the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London notes that the Soviet figure may well exclude military space and nuclear programs, and "existing military-assistance programs" (to Afghanistan, Cuba, and Nicaragua, among others).

Instead of reducing his military power in relation to our own, however, Gorbachev would much prefer to have the West provide the goods and cash he needs to soothe his angry consumers. And so he has proposed a latter-day version of his beloved Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP), a program inaugurated in 1921 in response to widespread unrest among the starving peasants. The essence of NEP, as the historian Theodore Draper characterized it, "was to use capitalists . . . against capitalism, to use capitalism against itself. This was the rationale for inviting foreign capitalism into the Soviet Union in the form of mixed enterprises and economic concessions." But the improvements NEP brought in economic performance were soon swamped by Stalinism and World War II. Four subsequent efforts at reform—by Khrushchev (1957), Kosygin (1965), and Brezhnev (1973 and 1979)—also proved disappointing. Now there is Gorbachev's *perestroika*.

Gorbachev has never asked for direct government-to-government aid. Like Lenin before him, he wants bank loans and capital investments by private parties. And Western bankers seem eager to lend, although a bit less so recently, since the pace of change in Eastern Europe has made the future more difficult to predict. In January 1988 the Soviets made their first trip to Western bond markets; they sold an issue totaling some $78 million with ease. In all, the Soviets have increased their debt to the West from $13 billion in 1983 to more than three times that level now, and could, over the next few years, borrow some $30 billion more to finance *perestroika*.

Yet bank loans today are no longer private capital, in the strict sense of the term. Like most Western governments, ours would be subsidizing most of the loans to the Soviet Union, either directly, by providing investment and deposit insurance, or indirectly, by serving as payers of last resort. Should Moscow prove unable to repay its mounting debts, the West's bankers are certain to ask for government bailouts, as they have already done in the case of Latin American loans that have gone sour. The least our government can do now, then, is inform the bankers that there will be no such bailout if these Soviet loans are not repaid.

That leaves the question of equity capital to be invested by private companies in the hope of making customers of the Soviet Union's 286 million consumers, or of developing Soviet products for export. American companies seem eager to give investment in the USSR a try. Although they have concluded only some 80 joint ventures (the total for all foreign companies is around 1,100) since the beginning of 1987, more are in the works, more than 300 if the Soviets are to be believed.

These ventures are not to be mistaken for examples of the free flow of investment capital. Rather, they represent the flow of American capital directed to uses that suit the Soviet state. The investment will have to be in the form of joint ventures with the Soviet state (only one of the ways in which *perestroika* borrows from NEP) or with cooperatives, and on stiff terms. The share of foreign capital initially was limited to 49 percent; that limitation has now been removed, *de jure*, but may well remain in force, *de facto*: only 4-5 percent of joint ventures entered into so far have majority foreign ownership, according to Business International, a firm that keeps close tabs on these deals. "Fundamental decisions" relating to the joint venture's activities must be made with the unanimous consent of the board, which board must include some Soviet citizens. Profits will be taxed at a rate of 30 percent, with an additional 20 percent taken if they are transferred abroad. But these taxes may be waived if the joint venture invests in products deemed of national importance by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. So—and contrary to the impression created by press reports about the opening of mobile pizza parlors and McDonald's—the Soviets are not confronting foreign investors with a neutral, free-market set of incentives. The areas in which foreigners will be encouraged to invest are those chosen by the Soviet government for their strategic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

importance to its economy and security. Capitalists are welcome; those willing to serve the interests of the Soviet state are more welcome than others.

Here too, as with loans, there is no justification whatever for the U.S. government to provide subsidies, either through insurance or through credits below market rates. If that is what Bush promised Gorbachev at Malta, Congress should say no.

II

The case of Poland is a more difficult one, both because the facts are more ambiguous and because large domestic ethnic and trade-union constituencies create enormous pressures for action—any action, no matter the likelihood of success. Unlike the Soviet Union, Poland has begun the difficult tasks of bringing its budget under control and making its currency convertible. And unlike the Soviet Union, Poland seems willing to move from a centrally directed socialist system to a market-oriented economy.

Indeed, on August 1, 1989, most government controls on retail prices were removed, as a consequence of which food prices rose sixfold in state stores, and by perhaps twice that much in private outlets. But since the price increases were offset by wage indexation, and since the higher prices did not find their way fully into farmers' incomes (the state-owned distribution system having absorbed most of the extra payments), shortages persisted.

Little wonder, then, that Poland's economy remains in a shambles, a testimonial to the horrors of centralized planning. The head of the Finance Ministry, Leszek Balcerowicz (an economist, trained at New York's St. John's University, and until recently on the staff of the Central School of Planning and Statistics), has inherited an inflation which experts estimate at 30-40 percent per month. To bring it under control, Balcerowicz will have to do some combination of three things: cut Poland's arms budget; reduce subsidies that have kept the prices of consumer goods low and queues long; and/or cut interest payments on Poland's $39-billion foreign debt.

The Solidarity government is privately passing the word that it is making every reasonable effort to cut its military expenditures. Thus, unnamed "American officials" have reportedly been informed that the new Polish government has refused to contribute to a Warsaw Pact fund being established by the Soviets to modernize the Pact's armed forces after current arms negotiations are completed. Against that must be set the fact that Moscow acquiesced in the formation of the government only after Solidarity agreed to leave control of the army and the police force in the hands of the Communists, unlikely advocates of cutbacks in military expenditures. How this tension—some Poles' desire to reduce defense costs, the Communists' desire to maintain or increase them—will be resolved, we cannot know.

The elimination of subsidies is equally difficult. Going "cold turkey" would exacerbate the round of price increases, and produce what economists call "corrective inflation." By that is meant increases high enough to discourage demand and, simultaneously, to encourage the production and sale of various commodities—to the point where demand and supply balance. As noted above, the Poles appear to have begun just such a process, by allowing some food prices to rise, and by reducing some subsidies to farmers. But we do not know just how much short-run pain Poland's consumers and farmers are willing to bear in order to obtain the long-run benefits of market prices. What we do know is that Farmers' Solidarity and the United Peasants' party, the latter a member of the coalition government, are already calling for the reinstitution of subsidies.

Furthermore, the established unions already have warned that they will adopt a militant stance on behalf of their six million members. If the unions succeed in wringing wage increases from the new government, or in postponing the slimming-down of the bloated public sector, the deficit will soar, reigniting the inflation that the subsidy cuts are intended to dampen. And if union demands are denied, the result, warns Harvard's Jeffrey Sachs, an economic adviser to Solidarity, could be "a wave of strikes, civil unrest, and violence."

Given these constraints, Solidarity's least painful course is to turn to the West for help. Sachs has summarized Poland's minimum needs, as he sees them: $1 billion immediately from "the central banks of the industrial countries"; $700 million from the International Monetary Fund; $500 million from the World Bank, to be followed by "a sharp cut in the $39-billion foreign debt that hangs heavily over its [Poland's] future"; further "U.S. financial support" to the total tune of about $3 billion; perhaps three times that from "America's allies"; and "further lending" by the IMF and the World Bank. That largesse, plus "economic reforms," would, Sachs feels, do the trick.

Sachs's plan for a dash to market freedom—"just say no" to controls and subsidies—has great merit and considerable appeal to many Polish officials, presumably including Finance Minister Balcerowicz, who is saying all the right things: Poland must impose budget austerity and privatize loss-making public enterprises. But Balcerowicz has also expressed doubts about the efficacy of cuts in defense expenditures, says he is "uncertain how they [Poles] will react" to an austerity program, and talks about the need for "social safeguards," i.e., more welfare payments, to ease the pain of austerity. Hardly the gritty determination of a dedicated budget cutter.

Tadeusz Syryczyk, the new Industry Minister,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

although reported to be a committed privatizer, also faces a bleak situation. Some 70 percent of the economy is in state hands, and the *nomenklatura*—defined by the *Economist* as "the mafia of political appointees who run the Polish economy as well as most other things"—will not easily give up control of those enterprises. Indeed, these bureaucrats have already begun to interpret "reform" as meaning that they should siphon funds from the state-owned firms they manage into enterprises they are now permitted to own personally—a kind of "privatization-by-theft" that may produce an unpleasant backlash.

None of this means that American economic policy toward Poland should remain frozen in a time-warp of the cold-war era. But anything beyond the assistance we have already decided upon should be based on a realistic analysis of what can actually work rather than a fear that Poles might again riot against Poles, Polish workers might again refuse to work in Polish factories, Polish farmers might continue refusing to feed Polish consumers, or Polish voters might reinstate a Communist government. Our aim should be to help Poland help itself.

Technical assistance—including large-scale educational and training programs in the technologies and ways of the free market—plus a reduction of any barriers to Polish imports, would constitute help of precisely that nature. This might be supplemented by in-kind contributions of seed, tools, farm equipment, and fertilizer, made by private American citizens and corporations to the 2.7 million private Polish farms that account for almost 80 percent of their country's farmland and produce three-quarters of its eggs, milk, grain, and beef, and 90 percent of its fruit and vegetables. By allowing such contributions to be deducted from income tax, our government would bear some of the costs of this in-kind aid.

But what about the knotty question of Poland's hard-currency foreign indebtedness? Of the $39 billion, $26 billion is owed to creditor governments (the so-called "Paris Club"), $9 billion to the commercial banks, and the rest to others, including some Eastern-bloc governments. To service all of these debts, Poland would have to use 90 percent of its export earnings, leaving precious little to pay for imported machinery and other items it must have if it is to build up its export potential.

What happens to the $9 billion owed to the banks can be of little concern to the U.S. government. The exposure of American banks represents a very small part of the total Polish debt, and of the banks' capital. The amount owed to the U.S. government is also minor, perhaps 10 percent of the $26 billion owed to all governments. *Consequently, we can do little, on our own,* to relieve Poland's debt burden.

This leaves open three possibilities. The first is a debt-forgiveness program, agreed to by all members of the Paris Club. But collectively to forgive Polish debt on such a scale would be to trigger a wave of requests for similar treatment from other non-poor countries. (After all, a recent memorandum by the U.S. Department of Agriculture concludes, "the Polish people are not starving." Per-capita meat consumption is "on a par with much of Western Europe. . . .")

The second possibility is to lend Poland more money, to be used in part to repay past loans. But such piling-on of debt has in the past only exacerbated the debtors' plight, both because it enables them to postpone reforms and the domestic austerity programs essential to eventual repayment, and because it adds to the debt burden that must eventually be repaid.

Finally, the creditors could reschedule Poland's debt payments, say by allowing interest due to remain unpaid, and to accrue as additional debt. This would mean that Poland's debt would increase annually by the amount of the unpaid interest. If Poland's exports do not grow by something more than that accumulation—i.e., do not increase by more than the interest rate—its debt burden will steadily mount.

None of these alternatives is painless. But the situation may not be as demanding of American intervention as it at first appears. Unlike us, the Germans, Poland's largest creditor, have a historic obligation and real incentives to be lenient. For one thing, the cost of a bit of debt forgiveness may be far less than the cost of assimilating a wave of non-German-speaking immigrants. For another, Poland represents a sound long-term investment for German industry. It is good business, therefore, for the German government to provide Poland with assistance, if only to help it create the stable economic environment which German industrialists need.

And indeed, the Germans have already begun to move in this direction. In an agreement reached in Warsaw this past November, West Germany promised to forgive $400 million in Polish loans from German banks and to convert another $254 million of that debt into investment capital. In addition, Bonn will provide loan guarantees and insurance amounting to $1.6 billion to finance industrial projects that are likely to earn foreign exchange.

Poland can also count on the private sector in other Western countries to provide capital where truly economic opportunities for the use of that capital exist. If it is really the case that food-price reforms and a stripping-away of centralized control of distribution will make Polish agriculture prosperous, there is no reason to believe that American, European, and Japanese venture capitalists will resist the temptation to make a dollar (not a zloty, however, until it becomes convertible). In fact, joint ventures are already taking shape. The Polish embassy says that its government al-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ready has approved 650 joint ventures with Western companies, and Hubert Janizsewski, vice president of the country's foreign-investment agency, expects that number will soon rise to 800, valued at $1 billion. Certainly these ventures are more promising than the special-development bank proposed by Felix Rohatyn. Such a bank would be nothing more than still another attempt at central direction of investment, this time by bureaucrats based in Paris instead of in Warsaw. There is little reason to believe that such a bureaucracy can more effectively pick winners than can the private investors who will be risking their own money.

This private money is far more likely to end up in goods-producing investment than is government-to-government aid, or grants allocated by disinterested bureaucrats with nothing to lose. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine an alternative more in Poland's long-term interest than one that combines the following ingredients: reforms that only the Polish government itself is in a position to adopt; German self-interested largesse; profit-seeking Western capital; and humanitarian and technical assistance from America. Certainly, our experience in Latin America and Africa suggests that the alternative—government aid and open-handed lending—results eventually in a cycle of default and impoverishment.

III

In sum, the arguments against any extraordinary aid to the Soviet Union seem overwhelming. Even if we accept Gorbachev as a true economic reformer—and his reliance on command-and-control rather than market incentives argues against that view—we cannot be certain he will survive. We are dealing with a system, not a man.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union's continued refusal to move toward a market economy, and its unwillingness to reform its currency or reduce its enormous budget deficit, make it doubtful that any assistance can be productively employed. Even by Latin American standards, the Soviet Union is a bad credit risk. True, it has substantial oil, gold, and mineral assets. But these are unlikely to be made available to creditors in the event of a default.

The case of Poland is more complicated, but the answer close to the same. Reform is in the offing, and if it comes, further carefully targeted aid might be effective. But it is far from certain that a government dominated by and beholden to trade unions will adopt the austerity programs that are the prerequisite to effective aid. And we should be alert to the danger that food contributions on too massive a scale might well wreck the vigorous farm economy by forcing it to compete with "free" products donated by us.

But perhaps the best thing we can do for Poland (and other reforming East European countries like Hungary) is fight to keep the channels of world trade open to their goods. For as Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher never tires of crying out in her increasingly lonely voice, Europe post-1992 might well become a fortress, repelling the invasion of goods from non-members of the European Community. If Jacques Delors and his socialist allies have their way, European producers will be encumbered with financing a series of expensive welfare measures. European industrialists are prepared to bear this burden—if they are given protection from lower-cost foreign competition, which competition will almost certainly include goods from Eastern Europe. Add to this the protectionist proclivities of Europe's farmers, who will very much want to keep cheap Polish (and Hungarian) agricultural products out of their markets, and coal-mining unions who see cheap energy from the USSR as a threat to their members' jobs. Such protectionism could in the end do far more to stifle the growth of the East European economies than a Western failure to pump massive new loans into those economies. Together with the British, the U.S can fight to prevent it from taking hold.

These, then, as matters now stand, are the things the United States can do for the East European peoples. They do not add up to the new Marshall Plan that Lech Walesa has called for, but unlike some of the other proposals that have been made, they do represent a program that can realistically be expected to do more good than harm.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Power, Powerlessness & the Jews

David Vital

ONE of the inescapable facts of modern Jewish life is that the destruction of European Jewry by the Germans in World War II led to no sea change in the ethos and mores of the Jewish people as a whole.

Here and there, small and scattered groups, and some isolated individuals, did try to take the measure of events. Some reordered their lives. Some, although very few, sought to reconcile their previously established private views and beliefs with what they had now learned and were now obliged to conclude. Certain issues and questions, hitherto ignored, or raised and discussed only in defined and somewhat limited sectors, took on enhanced importance. But by and large, the huge defeat the Jewish people had suffered in the course of the war waged against them led to no deep reappraisal. Not one of the great public institutions resolved on radical restructure, let alone dissolution. No individual personality of real note, no leader of real prominence, resolved on retirement from public life. And even beyond the "establishment," no really new diagnosis of the condition of Jewry emerged, no fresh ideas were offered to the public for consideration and reflection. Certainly none was taken up.

Such was the case even so far as the Zionists were concerned. It is perfectly true that they were able to argue—quite correctly—that their analysis of the Jewish situation had been tragically, but persuasively, validated by events. But even they—faced as they were in those days with the other great crisis of Jewry in this century, the fight for political independence in the Middle East—made no more than a simple and limited and, so to speak, pragmatic attempt to reorder their view of the Jewish condition as a whole and of the Diaspora in particular. As for that Diaspora, which is here my principal concern, there too little or nothing of real consequence changed, or indeed has changed to this day, although Jewish life in the Diaspora continues to flourish and, if anything, is more attractive than ever (to judge by the number and flow of migrants). In all this, the profoundly conservative character of the Jews is fully manifest—and not for the first time.

DAVID VITAL, who teaches international politics at Tel Aviv University and Jewish history at Northwestern, is the author of a three-volume series on the formative years of the Zionist movement. The present essay, in somewhat different form, was delivered at an international conference, "Lessons and Legacies: The Meaning of the Holocaust in a Changing World," held at Northwestern in November.

II

STILL, fifty years have now elapsed since the outbreak of World War II, and rather longer than that since the profundity of Nazi Germany's hostility to the Jewish people became clear, along with some true estimate of the support the Jews might expect to receive from other states and societies in the hour of their darkest peril. It is now only a little less than forty-five years since what actually occurred during the war passed into common knowledge. Time enough, in other words, to begin taking stock of the consequences for Jewry of the all-but-total elimination of what was unquestionably its heartland, its veritable core: the great East European mass.

It cannot be stressed too often or too strongly that in Poland and the Baltic countries, in Russia and Rumania, in Czechoslovakia and Hungary were to be found those communities that together constituted the Jewish people in its essential European form: the most homogeneous, the most coherent, the least assimilated, least self-conscious, most compact, and far and away the most lively and remarkable of Jewish conglomerations in modern times. It is not too much to say that to all intents and purposes these communities *were* the Jewish nation—all others, no matter how distinguished or ancient or prosperous, being peripheral to them. It was out of the human resources gathered in this great reservoir of people, talent, and energy that the two chief Jewish communities in our own times, in the United States and in Israel, were very largely constructed. It was within this society that the terms of virtually all the major internal issues in modern Jewry, both cultural and political, were set and once seemed likely to be decided, and it was upon the movement of ideas and people in and out of that great

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

network that the future of the Jews seemed most likely to depend.

The injury done to the Jewish people as such by the annihilation of that pulsating society is therefore beyond measure and imagination. After the war, the Jewish people could not be even remotely what it once had been. Worse, it could not be what many of its members had very reasonably hoped that it might become. For instance, it was always understood that from this pool the Jewish community in Palestine (the *yishuv*), and the Jewish state-to-be, would draw its future population.The problems and the afflictions of East European Jewry had precipitated, motivated, and nourished the Zionist movement in the first place, and it was Jews from Eastern Europe who had brought the *yishuv* to the point of economic and social take-off several years before the onset of World War II. The loss to contemporary Israel of that community from which the Zionists had always drawn their strength, and for which they had always believed they were laboring, remains incalculably vast.

In brief, the European catastrophe did more than leave a void in Jewry. It left it with an injury that will not be repaired. What, then, has contemporary Jewry learned, what might it learn, from its loss? I propose to approach this question indirectly, by asking a somewhat different and (it might seem) retrospectively useless question, namely, what could have saved the Jews in Europe?

We know what did *not* save them. The Jews of Europe were not saved by the mitigating effect of their persecutors' and murderers' cold self-interest. That is to say, the old, well-worn argument offered up by one generation of Jews after another to the ruling power of the day and place—to the effect that they would prove *useful* to state, economy, and society—and clutched at again by the desperate people of one ghetto after another in occupied Europe, this time by and large fell on deaf ears. Even the status of slaves was largely refused them—on principle, and as a matter of high state and social policy.

Nor were the Jews saved in any appreciable numbers by the civilized societies, polities, institutions, and churches of the day, even those which were declared enemies of Germany and all its works, or which at one time or another had had the opportunity to act in charity on the Jews' behalf. Some turned a blind eye; some shrugged; some prevaricated; some appealed to weighty political and social argument for doing this or refraining from doing that. Need one rehearse the hardly unthinking cruelties committed by the West European and North American democracies, from explicit requests to the Germans to imprint the passports of Jews with an identifying mark, the better to keep them out; through blanket refusals to alter by one jot or tittle the relevant immigration laws; to an essential ambivalence on the issue of the physical elimination of Jewry from the European scene?

Nor were the Jews saved or given material assistance by those indigenous forces who were indeed fighting the common enemy in the territories of the new German empire, and who had every military reason to enlarge their ranks and increase the scope and intensity of their otherwise admirable resistance. What could be more miserable than the response of the Polish Home Army to the pleas of the fighters in the Warsaw Ghetto for arms: not an outright refusal, to be sure, but a pathetic handful of weapons tossed to the Jews in barely disguised contempt and disbelief? What could be more horrifying than the fate that awaited Jews who managed to evade ghettoization, or who escaped from death camps into the surrounding forests, and, wishing no more than to pursue the fight, were unlucky enough to fall into the hands of the wrong group of partisans?

It is true that to every one of these generalizations there were exceptions: instances of the most remarkable decency and generosity, of commitment to the basic moral dictates of humanity—to say nothing of immense courage in circumstances of extreme danger. Many Jews owed their lives to individuals or small groups scattered throughout Europe, not excluding Germany itself, or Poland for that matter, who offered shelter and lifesaving assistance in a dozen forms. But they were just that: exceptions. The rule was otherwise. And the rule was plainly a function of the fundamentals of the Jewish condition. Not their wartime condition; rather, their condition from time immemorial. Indeed, one great singularity of the Holocaust (there are others) is that it tells us in stronger, clearer, less deniable terms than any other event in the history of the Jews what lies at the basis of the Jewish condition.

In a famous essay, *Galut* ("Exile"), the late historian Yitzhak Baer remarks on the great change that overcame the Jews in late antiquity:

> In the 7th century, the Jews still took an active military part in the struggle for control of Palestine between Rome and Persia, between Rome and Islam, which they interpreted in eschatological terms. But from then on, the nation definitely submitted to the admonitions of its teachers. God had made His will manifest; it was His will that the Jews should bear the yoke of foreign nations.

And Baer goes on:

> The Jews left the ranks of warring nations and put their fate altogether in the hands of God—a unique historical fact to which no historian has yet given its proper importance.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

These lines, originally written in German and published in Berlin in 1936, could stand as the epitaph for European Jewry. The war against the Jews was nothing if not supreme testimony to their powerlessness—to the direct and horrific consequences of their having "left the ranks of the warring nations and put their fate altogether in the hands of God." Except, of course, that God, or let us say Providence, was inscrutable; in practice, it was into the hands of their rulers that the Jews consigned their fate. Therein the tragedy and, at the same time, the paradox.

The ancient view, deeply ingrained in the Jewish psyche, was to regard what the redactors of the Mishnah called "the ruling power" (*ha-rashut*) with grave suspicion. The advice the ancient rabbis offered the people was to exercise all possible care in their dealings with that power, in fact to steer clear of it altogether if that were possible. But much of the force of this injunction came to be lost in modern times, notably in the West but in parts of Central Europe as well, as the twin processes of formal emancipation and cultural switch altered the terms of life for Jews out of all recognition.

The old, proud prudence and the underlying distrust that informed it gave way to a curious and historically unprecedented combination of dependence and humility. This can be seen at work in the singularly trustful and at the same time quite humble, not to say servile, spirit in which, in December 1942, the most prominent figure of the day in American Jewry, Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, approached his head of state. By that time, the essentials of what was happening to the European Jews were already quite well known, not only to Wise and his senior colleagues among American Jewish leaders but to the State Department and President Roosevelt himself. Wise wrote to Roosevelt apologizing for proposing to add to the President's wartime burdens and restating the basic facts of what he there and then defined as "the most overwhelming disaster of Jewish history." He went on to remind the President that, "together with the heads of other Jewish organizations," he had succeeded in keeping the reports of the "unspeakable horrors" taking place in Europe out of the press. Finally, he asked the President to receive a delegation. To what specific purpose? "We hope above all that you will speak a word which may bring solace and hope to millions of Jews who mourn, and be an expression of the conscience of the American people."

Solace and hope. . . . It is easy enough, especially in retrospect, to see the pathetic inadequacy of Wise's petition. But Wise's wartime conduct, along with that of others who failed to make an ultimate, consistent effort to muster their admittedly small and fearfully insufficient forces in the struggle on behalf of the Jews of Europe, can be understood only in terms of a profound and pervasive sense of weakness—an overwhelming, paralyzing conviction of the utter vulnerability and helplessness of the Jews wherever they might be, and thus of the extreme unwisdom of opposing or crossing or even merely irritating the "ruling power."

The deeper implications of the refusal of the American government to allow the war effort to be in any way compromised in the public mind by association with a Jewish cause or interest, even that of mere physical rescue, constitute a separate topic; in any case, it is now water under the bridge. What is surely not water under the bridge, however, is the continuing, contemporary difficulty of the Jews themselves in dealing with problems related to power—especially and crucially insofar as these bear on the collective affairs of Jewry itself.

III

A QUICK reading of the map of modern Jewry shows the most notable divisions of opinion and behavior corresponding to the fundamental contemporary division between the Jews of the state of Israel and the Jews who are citizens of other states. Israel is evidently, and by design, a power-political structure. To use Baer's terminology, it is one of the world's "warring nations." In contrast, Diaspora Jewry is in no significant, operative sense a coherent political entity of any description. Plainly, it neither provides nor permits a structure of power, much less a structure of power capable of sustaining conflict with hostile peoples and societies.

But this is only half the story. The deeper and much more telling distinction in contemporary Jewry is not geographical/political but philosophical.

In the contemporary West, generally speaking, respect for the rights of man and the citizen, the rule of law, certain well-tried methods of patient, peaceful resolution of conflict by negotiation—all these and more have come to be seen not only as immensely desirable in themselves and infinitely preferable to other, darker principles, techniques, and instruments, but as actually in evidence. They operate, they are available, and, all things considered, they are maintained in fairly good repair. Moreover, the Jews of Western Europe and North America have been among the notable beneficiaries of these principles and of the workings of their accompanying institutions. What could be more natural, then, than their attachment to a view of society which is intrinsically optimistic, altruistic, moralistic, legalistic, and above all *principled*?

But there is another outlook. To the east and to the south of the fortunate lands of Western Europe and North America things were, and have long remained, otherwise—and not for the Jews

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

alone, but for all. There is no need to recite even in abbreviated form the catalogue of afflictions which have overcome virtually all the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, of the Middle East and Central Asia, of both Northern and sub-Saharan Africa, and of Southern Asia and the Far East in our own times and before our eyes. The world outside the West is a hard world. In lands in which violence, cruelty, tyranny, and hatred are endemic, there is every reason for the ordinary person to conclude that safety does not lie in any reliance on the rules of law and common morality, perhaps not even on the native decency and good will of individual men and women. There, one tends easily and naturally to a much greater measure of skepticism and distrust of the "other" than is usual—or perhaps even necessary—in the West. In a hard world one relies, if one can, on oneself. In a hard world, it is no more than prudent to learn hard lessons.

But are these the lessons that the Jews as a people have learned from their very particular and very hard experience in the recent past? Or is it the case that those Jews who have found a place for themselves in one or another of the fortunate lands have learned—or taught themselves—a lesson very different from the one learned by those less fortunately situated?

As TIME elapsed after the destruction of European Jewry, as the initial shock wore off, different communities could be seen—and today can be seen still more clearly—not only to be very differently placed, but indeed to inhabit different mental and philosophical universes. The consequences of this split are visible everywhere, most ominously in disagreements over the aims and methods, and even the propriety, of collective action by Jews where such action must rely on the autonomous employment of instruments of influence and power. They also make themselves felt in an almost emblematic way in contemporary discussions of the meaning, for Jews, of the Holocaust.

It is not that there is anything in those discussions analogous to the political ferocity of the *Historikerstreit* (historians' conflict) in West Germany. Nor, so far as I can make out, is there any great public debate going on between explicit and identifiable schools of thought. Nevertheless, there are questions that do manifestly gnaw at thinking Jews, and to which very different answers are given.

Was the Holocaust one of a class of more or less comparable events? Or was it, on the contrary, unique? How to situate the Holocaust in the Jews' *own* history? Was it specific to its time and place? Or was it, on the contrary, characteristic of, perhaps a function of, the exilic condition itself—as Baer implicitly and later many others explicitly would contend? If so, was it then in some crucial sense not only an event in, but an event peculiar to, Jewish history, and comprehensible ultimately only in its terms—that is to say, in terms of the longstanding and immensely bitter conflict in which the Jews have been embroiled with their European neighbors and rulers for 1,500 years and more?

One can see why, in the West, the last view is likely to be unpopular. For one thing, it suggests that in one crucial respect Nazi Germany was less eccentric, more representative, than contemporary Westerners generally like to think. And many Jews in the Diaspora would similarly reject such a view. Their reasons for doing so were well illustrated a few years ago in the mixed response to Claude Lanzmann's extraordinary documentary film about the Holocaust, *Shoah*.

Reviewing that film for the BBC's *Listener*, a critic who described herself as "a British child of Jewish origin" began by citing an earlier review of the film by Pauline Kael in the *New Yorker*. Miss Kael had raised the following demurral:

> [Lanzmann] succeeds in making the past and the present seem one, and this appears to be an aesthetic victory. . . . It has another aspect, though; implicitly the film says that the past and the present are one—that this horror could happen again. See, the Polish peasants are still talking about how the Jews killed Christ and hoarded gold.

The British critic then drove this objection home:

> Kael has a point. Lanzmann's unwillingness to put the events of the Holocaust into historical context leaves him open to the accusation of pessimism. . . . Analysis which might have made the Holocaust understandable and specific to its era is missing.

All this is exceedingly telling. Take the terminology itself: Lanzmann is open to an "accusation" of pessimism, the inevitable corollary being that had he rendered the Holocaust "understandable," that is, by showing it to be "specific to its era," he would, in effect, have removed an obstacle to optimism. But is optimism the proper position to hold? And *was* the Holocaust an isolated event, or was it an event whose causal roots ran so deep and were so pervasive that they may run beneath and through contemporary society as well? Plainly, neither of these two critics, nor very many other members of the contemporary Western intelligentsia, would be prepared to tolerate such a view of the Jewish condition. Few, regardless of origins, loyalties, and political convictions, are even prepared to examine it.

Can one blame them? It is exceedingly painful to acknowledge that in a hundred different ways the Jews as a people are still beset by a seemingly ineradicable refusal to accord them such standards or status, or to ascribe to them such significance or qualities, as are normally and unquestioningly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

accorded and ascribed to other peoples and denominations. It is painful partly because it entails a profound disappointment. So many things have changed for the better in the postwar world, at least on the surface; surely we are entitled to believe that they have changed for good? It is painful, too, because the greater part of Jewry suffers today, perfectly understandably, from a kind of war-weariness: an intense desire for peace, for a relaxation of tension, for a condition in which all stress and conflict, to say nothing of the constraints and dictates of an exceptional status, might finally be consigned to the past.

But suppose one does venture to look beneath the surface; what does one find, and what is one to make of it? What are we to make of the endemic anti-Semitism in contemporary, *judenrein* Poland? Or of ostensibly anti-Israel but in fact manifestly old-style, Protocols-of-the-Elders-of-Zion-type propaganda mounted for decades now by the Soviet bloc and the majority of Arab states—both for domestic *and* for foreign consumption—and lately making its way into mainstream newspapers and magazines in Western Europe? Or of the particular edge that has been lent in recent years to the tension between American blacks and American Jews? Or of the never-ending reiteration of the belief that in some deep sense Jews are themselves responsible for all attacks upon them—as when in October 1980 the Prime Minister of France lamented the death of non-Jews in the assault on the synagogue in the Rue Copernic in Paris on the grounds that they, presumably unlike the Jewish victims, were "innocent"? Or when the Greek Minister of Justice determined recently that the killing of a little Jewish boy in a synagogue in Rome was an action that fell quite properly "within the domain of the struggle to regain the independence of the [killer's] homeland"?

It is not my purpose to offer a catalogue of charges, let alone a catalogue of woes, but rather to suggest that while the forms have changed and in some places the content as well, and while the intensity of hostility has diminished, there is still reason to doubt that the world has made its peace with the Jews in its midst, or that Jews are entitled to feel at peace with the world around them. It seems more likely that there has been a truce of sorts since the end of World War II, and that though the truce holds, more or less, signs of erosion are now beginning to be visible.

If these signs are not always apparent, it is only because the immediate object in view has changed. The villain is no longer so much the alien Jewish intruder into European and American society, cast as an incorrigibly vulgar and hateful agent of economic, political, or cultural corruption, burrowing under the old order, opening the gates of the city to carriers of moral plague. Instead, it is Israel and its people who play the role of whipping boy. The image is no longer T.S. Eliot's notorious

> The rats are underneath the piles,
> The Jew is underneath the lot. . . .

It is more likely to be the British poet Peter Reading's image of "a fat juicy jeep of Israelis" in Lebanon being shot at by a little Arab boy and shooting back because,

> . . . Well,
> nobody looks for a motive from these Old
> Testament shitters—
> thick hate is still in the genes.

How profound, though, is the difference? To what other national state or society is so much obsessive, venomous attention paid, so much evil ascribed, so little forgiven? About what other geographically remote people do serious Western literary lights write hostile *poetry*?

IV

The notion that the killing-off of the Jews of Europe ended the ancient conflict between the Jewish people and their neighbors appears to have less substance than many have thought. But if, on the non-Jewish side, the conflict has been renewed, on the Jewish side the capacity to resist may be weaker today than ever before. And this is so precisely because of the great slaughter. Firstly, the amputation of European Jewry from the body of the Jewish people drastically reduced it in numbers, in talent, and in what I can only describe as the *will* to collective life. Secondly, it accelerated the (already occurring) breakup of Jewry into ever less cohering communities, each imbued with a distinct culture and language, each subject to specific influences and needs and so, inevitably, each intent on social purposes of its own definition.

To all this has been added, finally, the paradoxical tendency on the part of many Jews in the Diaspora, and even to some extent in Israel as well, to think of the Holocaust itself as that event in the history of the Jews which necessarily overshadows all others—as, in short, an archetype. The tendency is so to magnify and particularize the Holocaust in Jewish terms, so to associate the Jewish people with it, so to fix the image of the Jews in terms of this vast and hugely injurious calamity as to drown out virtually all other voices and to smother virtually all other developments, facets, and qualities of Jewish life, history, and culture.

But if the Holocaust is the archetypical event in the history of the Jews, Jews themselves become archetypical victims. And this thesis is as damaging in its way as is the seemingly opposite idea that the Holocaust can only be understood as a specific instance of the all-too-numerous horrors

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which humankind has inflicted on itself. Actually, the two ideas, which appear to run counter to each other, in a crucial respect are mutually reinforcing; and both sap the foundations of Jewish collective life.

It is simply untrue that the long war conducted both against Judaism and the Jews in Europe (and the Middle East too), of which the events in Europe were the culminating and most horrible chapter, is of a class with other crusades, massacres, decimations, and slaughters. So to hold is to misconstrue not only Jewish but European history and the history of the Muslim world as well. There is nothing to be gained and much to be lost by such a gigantic exercise in the sweeping of unpleasantness into the capacious memory holes which societies retain for such purposes.

But for Jews, perhaps an even greater danger lurks in the opposite tendency. It is one thing to retain the memory of the Holocaust as a catastrophe whose causes need to be studied not only for their own sake but in the interests of finally reordering the life of the Jews as individuals and as a people. It is quite another to establish that memory as the primary reference point in the internal communal life of the Jews and in relations between Jews and other peoples. To do so is to make of the Jews a people of invalids, of victims, of death. Thus in the minds of others; thus, bit by bit, in their own minds as well. Little can be so destructive of the inner life and stability of Jewry, of its sense of itself as an old and, despite everything, honored member of the family of nations, or of its capacity to sustain the manifold pressures which the present and the future surely hold in store.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ABC and Me

Jessica Gress-Wright

On November 19, 1987, the day the Act for Better Child Care Services (known as the ABC bill) was introduced in Congress, I was busy throwing up in the bathroom sink. I was not aware of the bill's existence. I was just trying to get to work and I was two months pregnant.

The ABC bill was sponsored by Dale Kildee, a House Democrat from Michigan, and by Christopher Dodd, a Democratic Senator from Connecticut. It was "designed to improve the safety and quality of child care throughout the country and to help low- and moderate-income working parents pay for such care." A Democratic showcase, it was accompanied by major press coverage and boasted a huge list of supporters, including unions, religious organizations, "children's advocates," and even the Junior League.

Minus part of my breakfast, I quickly helped my six-year-old son Jonathan tie his shoes, handed him his lunchbox, and made sure he had his note to his kindergarten teacher. My second son, Thomas, two days past his first birthday, would stay in his playpen while I walked Jonathan to school.

The new bill, introduced simultaneously as HR. 3660 in the House and as S. 1885 in the Senate, had a number of features. It would provide federal assistance for day care to parents earning up to around $37,000 a year, and grants to states to expand Head Start and Title XX preschool programs. It would help to underwrite training of day-care workers and to set up state child-care resource and referral networks. It would also establish national standards, enforceable by the states, for the licensing and regulation of day-care centers and family day-care homes.

I came back from Jonathan's school, kissed Thomas goodbye, and headed off to work. I was just the kind of middle-class working mom the bill's proponents would rely on for support in the upcoming election year, except that I was luckier than most. Jolanda, our *au pair*, was looking after Thomas at home, and this one little fact had gained me precisely one-and-a-half hours' extra sleep. There were no breakfast dishes to wash, no diaper bag, bottles, and snacks to pack, no commuting to a day-care facility.

I knew just exactly how much time this saved because I had in my possession a time-and-motion study. This bizarre yet essential document told me all kinds of things that formed the nuts and bolts of my daily existence. It informed me that emptying the dishwasher took four minutes and thirty seconds a day, and that doing the laundry and otherwise caring for clothes took seven hours and forty-five minutes a week. It was the framework on which I hung my life. I had written it, all neatly computerized and appropriate to the ethos of Silicon Valley where I lived, the year before, when I was pregnant with Thomas.

That summer, Jonathan had been in day care, remarkably close and convenient day care right on campus at Stanford, and yet I had to be up at six to get out the door by eight-thirty. No skimping allowed. Jonathan's day-care mother was a licensed professional and she knew how to run a business. Once I forgot to pack his morning snack. When I came to pick him up at the end of the day, I was crisply informed that, while this one time she had given him something, it was not to happen again. You were docked a dollar for every five minutes you were late, and she expected to be paid for the holidays she took, although finding substitute care was the parents' responsibility. She also knew the laws of the state. When she caught two children playing doctor, she called the authorities. They sent a licensed social worker, trained to spot child abuse, to interview the parents. No smoke without fire. One family was let off, but the other little boy and his parents now had a record in Sacramento.

Heavily pregnant and working fifty hours a week, I had in desperation tried to organize my life with a rigor to match. Hence the time-and-motion study. Now, thanks to Jolanda, I no longer needed it, but it still served a purpose. It made me cherish her like the diamonds of the earth.

That same November day, the Senate version of the ABC bill was referred to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, chaired by Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, and then passed on to the Subcommittee on Children, Family, Drugs, and Alcoholism. Interested

Jessica Gress-Wright, a new contributor, is currently working on a book on family policy, of which a somewhat different version of the present essay will form the prologue.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

parties would have a chance to obtain copies of the bill and read it before the first hearings were held. And so the politicking began.

Or rather, it continued, since the opening salvo had actually been fired long before. On February 27, 1987 the State Board of the California branch of the National Association for the Education of Young Children (NAEYC) had published a list of priorities based on a survey of its members. Those priorities included the following:

1. Ensure the maintenance of high-quality program and services to young children through adequate funding, appropriate regulations, and monitoring.

2. Ensure adequate and appropriate licensing and credential standards for teachers, caregivers, and others who work with young children and their families.

3. Improve working conditions, salaries, professional and educational opportunity, public recognition, and accountability of child-care workers, teachers, health providers, family counselors, and others who work with and for young children.

4. Ensure basic protections for young children and their families: legal rights and equal opportunity, child care, education, health and nutrition services, housing, freedom from abuse and neglect, and the opportunity to grow up in a peaceful world.

5. Promote education to enhance the quality of life for young children and their families: education for parents, paraprofessionals, legislators, public administrators, business and community leaders, and others whose decisions affect young children directly or indirectly.

These goals were to become the basis of the ABC bill. Only the language about a "peaceful world" was dropped. Ellen Galinsky, president of the NAEYC, had longstanding contacts and a history of cooperation with the Children's Defense Fund (CDF) headed by Marian Wright Edelman. After consultation with NAEYC and other interest groups, a CDF lawyer wrote the bill, which so neatly incorporated the NAEYC shopping list, and Dodd and Kildee agreed to sponsor it. Prominent by its absence was any mention of direct aid of any kind to children and their parents, who could then decide on what form of day care to buy. Everything was to be channeled through the professionals.

Shortly after the bill was introduced, an editorial, appearing in the *Children's News*, a San Francisco weekly, presented key CDF themes that would be sounded again and again in the coming months: "The federal government's commitment to child care has diminished dramatically"; "new sources of money have not emerged"; "the Reagan fantasy of corporate support is not a reality"; "child care reduces later welfare dependence"; "with so many parents working, policy-makers agree child care is a vital service"; "child care is linked to high-school achievement"; "unavailability of and greater demand for child care." The solution: "With the polls indicating that the public is generally in support of child-care programs, now is the perfect time to initiate new legislation on a national level." This new legislation was of course the ABC bill. Again, familiar themes were sounded: it would "increase the number of day-care facilities and qualified providers," it would "promote parental choice and state flexibility," it would "protect children, strengthen families, and make child care more accessible."

Around this time, too, some members of the NAEYC were sent a special packet of materials. Essentially it offered a brief how-to course on lobbying, plus ideologically correct literature on ABC and on the general issue of pay and working conditions. The pamphlet carefully explained that the hiatus between the introduction of a bill and the first hearings was an ideal time to "gather support and begin advocacy strategy." Other vital tactics were to develop diverse coalitions in order to get the support of as many legislators as possible and, especially, to solicit the backing of state agencies likely to be affected. If these agencies were to testify against the bill in committee, it might be impossible to win legislative approval, so the key was to work with aides of both the agencies and the legislators. Meticulous attention was essential: the way to influence legislators was to get people in their own constituencies to inundate them with letters and calls; testimony to be presented had to be planned and rehearsed ahead of time with the legislative aide of the author of the bill. Last, there was a special section on "How to Use the Media."

I HAVE always dearly loved Christmas, and Christmas with children is wonderful. That year I took the children down to see my parents in Southern California. They lived so near Disneyland that, as a child, I could hear the fireworks on summer nights. Two days before Christmas, I took Jonathan there. Jolanda had come down with me and the children, but she was not with us at Disneyland. I wanted her to be able to go with a friend, and I made an extra present of the tickets. I didn't see how she could have a good time tagging around with me and Jonathan.

It was very important to me that Jolanda enjoy herself, because she had been unhappy lately. She said she couldn't sleep because of the noise in her loft bedroom. It was a beautiful room, but I had to admit that the acoustics up there were something special. They were magnificent, like a church choir. You could hear the tiniest whisper. I had called a specialist immediately to see about installing shutters to close off the loft. I was afraid that if I dallied, Jolanda would leave. He came and measured and then explained that only solid

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wood would do, and even then the benefit would be limited. The estimate was $5,000. I said thank you and sat down to think.

We had bought the two-bedroom condominium on campus just two years earlier, after months of calculation. We had wanted a three-bedroom at least, because we had to have a place for an *au pair*. We had spent weeks costing out child care and an *au pair* was the only option. But the price of a three-bedroom house was utterly beyond our reach. As it was, God loved us, because twenty-four hours before we met the mortgage officer for final qualification, I landed a job that put us over the top for the two-bedroom condo by $58 a year. With the bonus loft, we figured we had a functional three-bedroom for only $220,000, a $50,000 saving.

We had four mortgages, one from the bank, two from Stanford, and one from my father. We were only paying three of them. The fourth would come due as a $120,000 balloon payment in ten years. The three that we paid, plus taxes and monthly assessments, came to $27,000 a year. That was 90 percent of my husband David's after-tax income as a senior research fellow. We had no savings.

So $5,000 seemed too much for the soundproofing, especially since it might not even work. But something had to be done. If Jolanda left, she would be the second *au pair* in a row to quit because of the noise up in the loft, and I was afraid for my job if I had to take time off again to find a replacement for her. And to top it off there was the new baby coming. It was true that I had voluntarily spent three months, from July through September, working overtime to make up for the extra hours I had taken to nurse Thomas in the beginning. Nevertheless, when I told my boss I was pregnant again, he had suggested that maybe I should "do something about it before it was too late." I declined to take the hint.

But now all that was far from my mind. At six, Jonathan was the perfect age for Disneyland, full of wonder. We wandered from ride to ride and munched cinnamon buns to pass the time in line. He amazed me with his stamina and bravery. This was not the shy little boy I knew. He outlasted me on all the rough rides. I was surprised and delighted, and twelve rides later, by six in the evening, waiting to be picked up, I was also worried. It was only a small pain, but it was sharp and it was in my hip. I was now three months pregnant.

If I hadn't had a Danish friend who worked with pregnant women I wouldn't have known enough to be concerned. But there it was, just as the literature predicted. Danish is a plain language: hip loosening, they call it. Pelvic relaxation to an American doctor. A small but definite minority of women, perhaps 3 percent, produce too much of a pregnancy hormone called relaxin, which acts to soften and lengthen all smooth muscle fibers in the body, loosening the ligaments holding the hip bones so they can presumably expand during birth. The usual side-effect of the hormone is a common and mildly annoying one of pregnancy: it makes you constipated. But other than that it is nothing much—except for the 3 percent. Some have to take to wheelchairs, their pelvic bones so unstable that they are in constant pain, unable to walk or function. The problem grows with each baby, and the closer the babies are spaced the worse it is. "Most serious when there is less than nine months between pregnancies."

I already knew I was one of the 3 percent. With Jonathan it had been a sharp catch when I walked, starting at four months, but gone by the seventh month. At the end of that pregnancy I felt splendid. We were living then in Denmark, where my husband had grown up, and from the seventh month until Jonathan was born I was working eighteen-hour days restoring our little Danish house. Five years later, pregnant with our second child, Thomas, and living in the Bay Area, things were different. Again it started at four months, but the catch didn't go away. By the seventh month I ruefully acknowledged to myself that I had a very characteristic walk. I shuffled exactly like an ape. But within forty hours of Thomas's birth I was fine again. It was simply miraculous. The next Monday, when Thomas was only eight days old, I was hauling him in his Moses basket up and down the steep streets of San Francisco.

But now I was unexpectedly pregnant, for the third time, and there had been no five-year gap. Waiting at Disneyland, with Jonathan by my side, I did a quick calculation. It was nine months to the day.

CHRISTMAS was vacation for the ABC campaign, too. It resumed in January 1988, and by January 12 the bill had acquired dozens of co-sponsors in the House, and 110 organizations in support who collectively called themselves the Alliance for Better Child Care.

On January 18, Marian Edelman of the CDF spoke to a meeting of the chief school officers from the different states. She alleged that tax credits for day care were "a cosmetic approach." True, they would give important income to poor families, but the key point was that they would not "help build a child-care system." Her three basic principles were: "steps to ensure quality care"—i.e., licensing; "comprehensive programs funded directly"; and "trained caregivers who receive adequate compensation." She asserted firmly that to agree with these three principles was to put the needs of children first.

Yet all three principles were actually addressed not to the needs of children but to the needs of caregivers, and it was by no means obvious that there was a connection between the two sets of needs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What *was* obvious was that the service-sector functionaries had found their natural allies in the Democratic party, reeling (like them) from seven years of Reagan and determined to seize the initiative for the upcoming election year. "Strengthening the family" had always been Republican territory, but with so many mothers forced into the workforce to make ends meet, and so many divorced, it might just be possible to use the old big-government agenda and give it a new, family-oriented twist. But not directly. Things like tax breaks were classic Republican ideas. Democrats couldn't pay back their supporters with those kinds of dollars, which after all might (indeed, almost certainly would) be used to buy private informal day care. No, the Democratic method was to give supporters a secure position with a guaranteed income stream, one that flowed through their fingers, not the parents'. And the only means of doing that was a law establishing a new day-care infrastructure that could beat the competition by eliminating it.

Under the new system, private informal day-care mothers, who now provided 94 percent of all family day care, would be regulated out of existence with requirements enforced by a corps of specialist inspectors to be established in every state. Under this original version of ABC, not only could those unlicensed mothers not be reimbursed, they could not even legally exist. Any state which tolerated any infraction of its own or national standards, no matter how silly or nominal, would forfeit *all* ABC funds. All this despite studies showing that, on average, unlicensed day-care mothers cared for fewer children better and more individually than their businesslike licensed counterparts.

The big question, as one Democrat put it, was how to pay for the programs and yet still appear to be the party of fiscal responsibility. The answer was, enroll the middle class with promises of subsidies for its own children. As Democratic Congressman Stephen Solarz said, "Look at Social Security. Compare that to welfare. Programs for the poor don't fare nearly as well as those perceived to benefit the middle class."

THURSDAY, January 14, was not a good day. We had given up on soundproofing the loft. Without thinking about how we could ever pay for it, we had called in an architect who had remodeled several other units in our condominium complex. He took a look at a narrow strip of unused attic space, unfloored, that sprouted a veritable forest of pipes. Jonathan and I had discovered it by accident, just like Nancy Drew, when we removed the back of a built-in cabinet. Though the estimate was $10,000, David and I decided then and there to go ahead. If Jolanda had her own room she would stay, and if she stayed I could keep my job, something I was increasingly worried about. I was limping now and the small sharp pain was there all day. My boss was aggressive and fit and hated illness. As I got worse, he got more annoyed. I had eased off on the overtime and begun to go to the obstetrician for checkups. My boss resented it, and I was afraid that losing Jolanda could tip the balance. The job meant everything to me, because without my salary we literally could not eat.

That night when I got home from work Jolanda announced she was leaving. I said, what about the room? She replied that she didn't want to wait the months it would take to build. She had located a job weeks before, and was leaving now. I had been home for fifteen minutes.

The next day I learned everything there was to know about day care in the Bay Area. First I called my boss to say I wouldn't be in, then I sat on my bed and thought strategy. I decided that although live-in *au pairs* were wonderful, they were inherently unreliable. Someone who did day care in her own home was much more likely to stick around. As for centers, even if one teacher was gone the institution would still be there. I knew life would be different, because with two children, one a baby, the housework, cooking, and shopping took upward of twenty-five hours a week. To that I might have to add another ten hours a week just to pack up the kids and ferry them to and from day care. But now that I had a third baby on the way, I couldn't reject any solution, no matter what the workload.

Armed with that knowledge and a phone book, I began my hunt. First I called the Stanford Child-care Resource Center to ask about possibilities. They said, first, that babysitters who would come to the house, mostly childless spouses of students, charged $7 an hour, standard. I added it up. At fifty hours a week, it came to $17,500 a year. That was $2,000 more than our total discretionary income, after fixed expenses like housing and taxes. Next I was told that day-care mothers charged $3.50 per hour per child. With Jonathan part-time, and Thomas and the new baby full-time, that would be over $20,000 a year. Next I inquired about campus day-care centers. Jonathan would be in one, and Thomas and the new baby in another, but there was a waiting list, and in any case it would come to around $22,000 a year for three children (no bulk discounts). For that kind of money, I thought, I could get a proper English nanny. Next I called a very posh and expensive employment agency that supplied dedicated nannies and housekeepers. They would place only legal U.S. residents, and had over 40 positions begging, at a cost of $800-1,600 a month, or $14,000-19,000 per year, plus room and board. The nannies did limited cleaning. Cleaning ladies were $9 an hour, or about $2,000 a year. Still, you get what you pay for. Out of curiosity I asked, how long do nannies stay? A long silence. We refund fees up to six weeks after hire. No, but how long do these Mary Poppinses stay on average, for all

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that money? We don't have that information. I persisted a little, and then it came: maybe two years. I wondered if there was some sort of universal child-care law: a nanny should stay a whole childhood and stays one to two years, an *au pair* should stay one year and stays two months.

Two-and-a-half hours later, I had called every resource and day-care center in San Mateo and Santa Clara counties. I learned a lot, but I still didn't have child care and I still wasn't at work. Nobody would take Thomas because at fourteen months he was an infant, and licensing requirements were too stringent for infants. By assiduously following faint telephone trails and rumors I located three centers which did take infants, but one had a minimum age of eighteen months, while two refused all drop-ins because it was illegal to exceed their staffing ratios, even for half a day.

For the next week I put ads in the newspapers and cards on bulletin boards for an *au pair*—at $5,000 per year, an *au pair* was one-fourth the cost of licensed center care for three children. Christine joined us a week later. I had come full circle, back to the only type of remotely feasible or available child care. It was the best, cheapest, most helpful, and most convenient. It was the only care that left us enough money to feed our family. And most important to me, it was the only help that didn't leave me with twenty-five hours of cleaning and laundry and food preparation to do on nights and weekends. This was critical because after a mere ten days without help, I was now leaning on walls for support. An *au pair* wasn't very reliable but neither was a nanny. All in all, an *au pair* was the best solution, and the irony was that it was also the most unregulated. In fact, under the 1986 Immigration Act, it was illegal.

An even greater irony was that on February 10, when all of this was very, very fresh in my mind, I received the Bing newsletter. Bing was the Stanford nursery school. It had an excellent program and a wonderful staff. It was a research facility linked to the School of Education and the Department of Psychology. It was nonprofit and thoroughly elite. It should also have been apolitical.

But that week the newsletter was in fact very peculiar. It ran a two-page feature on day care, maternity leave, and family policy that I later discovered came straight out of the ABC campaign. Prominent among the other features was a piece on Ann Zonder, a young Bing teacher who was now a registered "child advocate" affiliated with the NAEYC and the Democratic party, operating officially out of Bing. As I read through the material and considered the implications, I became more and more alarmed.

For one thing, half the piece consisted of enticing "facts" about maternity leave in other countries. I knew France, England, and Denmark at first hand and I knew that the rosy presentation was terribly misleading. I had never been exposed to lobbying before, and I was surprised at the carefully orchestrated and manipulated information. More than surprised, I was furious. More than furious, I was panic-stricken. I had just received, two weeks before, an object lesson in the limitations of licensed care in California, whose child-care funding, licensing, and referral systems were a national ideal to day-care advocates. Regulations designed to ensure good care for infants only ensured that infants had no care. Requirements designed to prevent child abuse stigmatized the very children they were intended to protect. Rules designed to improve the quality of family day care diminished the very warmth and flexibility that made such care desirable and prohibited the simplicity that made it affordable. Only the fluid, informal market had saved us from this brave new world, yet with a crippling condition and a job at risk, I'd already had to defy one law to use it. Now, with a new law in their hands, it was precisely this market that the lobbyists were out to destroy.

So I sat down and wrote Bing an impassioned letter in which I outlined the facts about Scandinavian child care one by one. Did they know that the Danish Social Minister had admitted that the economy could not survive without unlicensed underground day care? Did they know that just a handful of years before, Sweden had been notorious for having the highest rate in the world of children removed from their parents?

But I also started to ask myself what was the source of all this pressure I was feeling. Could we have lowered our standard of living and found more time for me to rest and be with Thomas and Jonathan? No. There were cheaper places to live, but either they were so far away that we would have to spend all we'd saved on a new car, or so dangerous that we would have to spend all we'd saved on private schools. Jonathan wore thick glasses, was shy and physically awkward and always had his nose in a book. I doubted he'd survive his first day at school in a tougher neighborhood. I was willing to put up with a lot but I refused to jeopardize his physical safety. Nor could we rent, because nice apartments had strict occupancy limits, and soon we would be six, counting the *au pair*.

As a young feminist, I'd been taught that the 50's were hell. But to me now, they looked more and more like paradise lost.

I finally realized that Bing was trading on its prestige, and on parents' natural trust in its expertise, to persuade them to support something that was not at all in their interest, but was very much in the self-interest of the teachers. I believed then, and do now, that it literally never occurred to the Bing people that this might be the case. This impression was confirmed a couple of weeks later when I had dinner with Ann Zonder and two

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other Bing teachers to discuss the issue. She supplied me with a summary of the ABC bill and other materials in the hope that my fears would be relieved. But what I read confirmed my worst expectations. I formed the distinct impression that her personal experience in a terrible unlicensed center had caused her to dedicate herself to regularizing her profession, and that she herself, idealistic and single, had no notion of the harm that could come of this new system for people struggling to support dependents. But I also doubted that the politicians in Washington and California were either so principled or so innocent.

ON THE home front, things went better in February. Christine was there, work on the new bedroom began. The Architectural Committee signed off, and on February 10 the Board voted to approve construction. The Stanford housing office was enormously warm and supportive, and got us a loan within days. We were going to have *two* rooms! Christine hit it off with the young carpenter and work went smoothly. More and more I realized what a difference this was going to make. Christine could have a quiet room far from the rest of the family, a place to rest and recharge her batteries. Jonathan would eventually get the other room so we wouldn't have to have three children in one bedroom. My parents could sleep in the loft when they visited instead of on the living-room floor. More than all this, a room meant child care, child care meant my job, and my job meant not only our house but David's entire career at Stanford.

Soon, however, a whole new problem cropped up. One day in early March at the pool, I confided to my neighbor and best friend how much this remodeling meant to us. As a self-deprecating joke, I said we were going to have six people in a two-bedroom condominium and that it was a little like Vietnamese refugees. I wanted to convey a sense that we were being good sports and making the best of a situation my parents, with their easily afforded comfortable house, would have found unthinkable. I noticed that his eyes went curiously flat, and he didn't smile, but that was all. I thought no more of it until the end of the month.

Then suddenly one night a Board member came to our door with a list of fourteen "concerns" about remodeling. She asked David, since he was Board President, to prepare a reply. After much research and discussion with our architect and the Architectural Committee chairman, the document was delivered. Nevertheless, with every new reassuring fact about inspections and responsibility, the Board became more upset and angry. One day, that best friend told me, point blank, "You have too many people, you will lower my property values with your children, and you will make an unfair profit." What could I say? The Board majority, supported privately by one Stanford housing official, ordered David to tell the workmen to stop immediately. "A moratorium to study the situation" had been imposed.

In despair, David wrote to the official, describing the bind we were in. We were elated when he offered to discuss the issue in person, but the conversation quickly soured. "You shouldn't be having children in your apartment. It was designed for one or none." But if we couldn't move, we couldn't remodel, and if we couldn't squeeze in three to a room or make space for an *au pair*, what could we do? Ah, the kicker: "People have to realize that if they can't afford to move into a house, maybe they just can't come to Stanford."

During this same month, on March 15, hearings began on ABC in the Subcommittee on Children. By now, the conservative opposition was making itself heard. Robert Rector of the Heritage Foundation, for example, charged that the new bill threatened to do real harm to families by a combination of the carrot and the stick. The carrot was the promise of handouts to the middle class for child-care costs. Yet even a fully-funded ABC, at $2.5 billion for the first year, would only work out to an estimated $120 per year per eligible child. Ed Zigler, a professor at Yale, estimated that actually to pay for all the promises in the bill, ABC would have to cost between a staggering $75 and $100 billion per year.

The conservatives also charged that ABC, by insisting on subsidizing centers rather than paying parents, automatically eliminated religious day care as an option because of the requirement to separate church and state. Catholic schools risked having to hire Jewish teachers and taking in Buddhist children in order to receive funding.

But what most upset the opposition was the inflexible rules, "minimum national standards." ABC was supposed to avoid bureaucracy yet would require the establishment of a new bureaucracy in every state. ABC was supposed to give parents more choice, yet under the bill as formulated, as much as 90 percent of current day-care arrangements—including all unlicensed day care, a good deal of care by relatives, and a good deal of care in church-run centers (which were 30 percent of all center service)—would be effectively barred from receiving any aid.

ABC proponents may not have been aware of these awful consequences, but they should have been, because it was liberal researchers who documented them. The truth was that parents of all classes favored family day care or in-home care for infants and school-age children. Such care was far less expensive than center care. In fact, it was all most parents could afford. Advocate organizations might cite horrifying anecdotes to show that the lady down the street was ignorant and dangerous, but the best study of family day care concluded that she provided "generally safe, homelike . . . positive environments for children."

Rector claimed that licensing could and did depress supply. Recognizing this, several states

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had already lowered their requirements from licensing to simple registration. Yet ABC deliberately forbade states to make just this sort of accommodation to reality. Permanent shortages were likely to result in the type of care parents wanted most.

In brief, ABC's licensing requirements would not guarantee the quality of care or the happiness of children. Instead, they would permit professional organizations to use the weapons of federal funds and state control to eliminate competition, depress supply, and raise salaries at the expense of children and their parents.

THROUGHOUT the spring of 1988 the debate over ABC raged. I still worked, though I had to hand myself from desk to desk to cross my office. I reckoned that without Christine I would have been immobile months earlier. It was just as well I could work because we could not have lived on the half-pay of disability. In June, Katie was born at last.

The 1988 version of the bill died in the fall of that year, killed by the aggressive language restricting the participation of church centers and by rigid licensing requirements.

Through the winter of 1989 I was in physical therapy for my hips, and for the past four months I no longer take painkillers to get through an ordinary day. This summer I successfully switched to a new job. Our margins are still razor-thin, but for now the children are thriving and our *au pair* is wonderful and showing every sign of staying the year. Through ingenuity and sometimes desperate effort, we have come to terms with the market that rules our housing and jobs.

In 1989, ABC was resurrected. It metamorphosed into three competing child-care bills, marred by bitter quarreling not just between Democrat and Republican but between Democrat and Democrat. The House Education and Labor Committee version is actually far worse than the 1987 ABC, for it forbids the use of vouchers or aid to religious centers, proof that the hostile provisions of the original bill were no oversight. ABC's course in the Senate was given new impetus by the defection of Orrin Hatch of Utah, who had long presented himself as the chief foe of the original 1987 ABC. Without gaining real concessions in the bill, Hatch publicly announced his support of ABC in a June 15, 1989 speech. His office now shamelessly promoted virtually the same tissue of half-truths about "affordability, accessibility, and quality" he had once condemned so strongly. True, the Senate bill, "ABC III," did incorporate mitigating amendments. Nevertheless, these amendments were there despite, not because of, the efforts of the original supporters. It remains an arrogant, deceitful, and destructive piece of legislation.

Through the law, the proponents of ABC, like the NAEYC and the National Association of Family Day Care Providers, go on seeking from the government what the free market has failed to give them, a restricted profession with high pay. If they succeed, they will exacerbate a sinister dynamic of increased taxation and severer pressure on young families like mine, whose economic, emotional, and even physical health depends so greatly on our freedom to make the best possible use of the resources we have and those we can find. The market is often harsh. But only politics can be implacable.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Scandal of the Boat People

William McGurn

FIFTY years ago a group of more than 900 Jewish refugees set sail from Nazi Germany to Cuba aboard the liner *St. Louis,* only to be turned away by officials there. The ship then made for the United States; it was intercepted off the coast of Miami, where the frightened passengers pleaded for admission. But the U.S. authorities refused, and the *St. Louis* was forced to return to Europe. More than half its passengers would be lost in the Holocaust.

Today the world shakes its collective head over the treatment of the *St. Louis,* but the underlying lesson has yet to be taken. For almost fifty years from the day the "Voyage of the Damned" was turned away, 65 nations were gathering under UN auspices in Geneva to contrive a legal means to send the boat people back to Vietnam, a country they had been fleeing ever since 1975 when it was unified by the Communist regime in Hanoi. The task in Geneva was a somewhat tricky one since there are international conventions, absent in 1939, that today prohibit the *refoulement,* or forced return, of refugees. But the countries of Southeast Asia had grown tired of the continued exodus out of Vietnam and wanted it stopped. They came to the conference determined to find a way around the new conventions, whatever it might take.

What it took, as things turned out, was nothing more difficult than a redefinition of the boat people—from "genuine refugees," who could not be returned against their will, to "economic migrants," who could. This distinction was invented by Great Britain, whose colonial government in Hong Kong had already used it unilaterally in screening new arrivals from Vietnam. With Britain again in the lead, Hong Kong's screening philosophy was adopted in Geneva and enshrined in a six-point comprehensive plan of action.

Reading this document, one might well conclude that the boat people represent the largest refugee problem in the world. In fact, they are today a relatively tiny percentage of the world's more than 14 million refugees; among those 14 million, Afghans, Ethiopians, and even Cambodians outnumber the Vietnamese. The reason the boat people have become so important has less to do with them than it does with the response of the countries upon whose shores they continue to land; in addition to Hong Kong, these countries include Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Now that they have succeeded in getting the rest of the world to consider forced repatriation as a solution in the case of the Vietnamese, we can expect the same policy will sooner or later be applied to other groups of refugees as well.

THE story behind this cruel development begins with the fall of Saigon to North Vietnamese troops in April 1975. At that time about 130,000 South Vietnamese who had served the Thieu regime in either the army or the civil administration were evacuated; most of them resettled in the United States. Between then and mid-1978, another 30,000 or so sneaked out of the country, also resettling primarily in America.

But the real flight did not begin until mid-1978, when the new Communist government instituted harsh policies directed against the sizable Chinese minority who made up much of the merchant class in the South. Their predicament was exacerbated by Hanoi's growing ties with the Soviet Union and its concomitant estrangement from China. By mid-1978, the trickle of refugees leaving Vietnam had swelled into a torrent; even though ethnic Chinese accounted for only about 3 percent of the country's 50 million people, they were the majority of those fleeing, mostly by sea and mostly in leaky boats.

It was known almost from the start that many of these original boat people were bribing their way out. But what authorities in the region did not at first know was that the Vietnamese government itself (and not merely corrupt officials) was directly involved in the trafficking of refugees. By July 1979 when more than 200,000 boat people, mainly ethnic Chinese, had arrived on the shores of the nearby countries of Southeast Asia, it became clear that Hanoi not only was forcing them out but was running a profit on the side.

The reception was not friendly. Boat people were often killed or raped or robbed by Thai pirates. Singapore refused to allow them to land—Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew spoke of the need to grow "calluses on your heart"—and Malaysia

WILLIAM MCGURN, who formerly worked in Hong Kong for the *Asian Wall Street Journal,* is now Washington bureau chief of *National Review.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

began towing them back out to sea. Thousands perished.

In response to this horrid situation, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) called the first conference on the boat people. It was held in July 1979 in Geneva and was attended by 65 nations, including Vietnam. The deal negotiated there was relatively simple. The nations of Southeast Asia agreed to grant temporary refuge, or first asylum, to the boat people arriving at their borders. In return, Western governments such as the U.S., Great Britain, Australia, France, and Canada agreed to accept these refugees for permanent resettlement. In addition, a promise was extracted from the Vietnamese government to make "every effort to stop illegal departures" and to allow the foreign governments to set up an Orderly Departure Program (ODP) that would give Vietnamese a legal alternative to illegal boat departures.

For a time the Geneva solution interrupted the crisis, since refugees now at least had places to land. But since this arrangement did not address the root cause of the problem—i.e., the nature of the Communist government of Vietnam—the conditions that had precipitated the massive exodus were never dealt with. Consequently, beginning in 1986 the number of Vietnamese refugees began once again to increase dramatically, outstripping the pace of resettlement. This in turn created a growing population of "long-stayers" in the camps that had been set up in the region to accommodate the refugees under the terms of the Geneva agreement.

Looking at conditions in Vietnam, the rest of Asia correctly concluded that there was no end in sight to the potential outflow. The response this time was even uglier than before. Malaysia threatened to shut down all its refugee camps and send the Vietnamese packing. Singapore reasserted its policy of not allowing any refugee to set foot on its soil unless he could produce written acceptance for resettlement elsewhere. Indonesia fired on refugee craft, and Thailand started to push the boat people back to sea until an international outcry forced an official, though not always de-facto, reversal.

Yet the raw brutality of these stands pales beside the anti-refugee lead taken by British-ruled Hong Kong, the most prosperous enclave in the Orient. In fairness, it should be acknowledged that Hong Kong was initially one of the most open ports of asylum, but the colony had come to feel that its earlier generosity served only to attract ever more boatloads of people and thus to magnify the problem. Now Hong Kong began putting all its efforts into discouraging new boat people from coming and forcing back those who did arrive. It was in aid of this purpose that the British government invented the new category of "economic migrant." Although the term had no meaning in law, it provided a basis for cheating many refugees out of their international protections and stigmatizing them with the taint of opportunism.

It is a great irony that the local populace of Hong Kong should have been so unsympathetic to refugees at a moment when they themselves—fearful of what will happen when the colony is handed over by the British to Communist China in 1997—were arguing for immigrant rights abroad. But given that the colonial British government was already sending back three or four dozen people a day to Communist China, most of them relatives of Hong Kong locals, it might have been expected that similar treatment of strangers from Vietnam would arouse no great objection.

A further irony is that until now Communist Vietnam had habitually cited Article 13-II of the UN Declaration on Human Rights—which states that "[e]veryone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country"—to justify the forced departure of the ethnic Chinese. But now the carrots dangled by London (financial aid, improved relations with others in the region, possibly a promise to pressure Washington to resume diplomatic ties with Vietnam) evidently had their effect. The face-saving solution was a new euphemism for forced repatriation: "orderly return." Under this formula, refugees were to be given a choice between prison in Hong Kong or voluntary return to Vietnam with a cash grant. But as many as 44,000 will be forcibly sent back, with Britain reportedly paying Vietnam $600 per person to cover the cost of resettlement.

At any rate, other Asian countries, seeing in the new British approach a chance to get rid of their own Vietnamese refugees, eagerly signed on. The result was the six-point comprehensive plan of action drafted in the spring of 1989 in Kuala Lumpur. This was adopted without revision in Geneva in July.

A fundamentally anti-refugee document, the plan represents the interests of the host nations who drew it up and not those seeking asylum, who had no say. Its six main provisons call for Vietnam to crack down on boat departures, for an expansion of the Orderly Departure Program, for a reaffirmed right to first asylum, for region-wide adoption of Hong Kong's screening policy, and for the return to Vietnam of those "determined not to be refugees."

In plain English the gist is that Vietnam should step up its repression to make it more difficult for boat people to leave, while the rest of the world redefines most of those who do manage to get out in a way that will allow other countries to send them back.

This last point is the critical one. Screening *without* forced repatriation for those who fail the test makes no sense; as Britain's then-Foreign

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Minister, Sir Geoffrey Howe, told the assembled in Geneva, this is "the logic of screening." The conference did stop just short of explicitly endorsing forced repatriation, as the British wanted, but in section 6(c) it implicitly accepted Sir Geoffrey's hard logic: "If, after the passage of reasonable time, it becomes clear that voluntary repatriation is not making significant progress toward the desired objective, the alternatives recognized as being acceptable under international practices would be examined." The acquiescence of the UNHCR provided the moral imprimatur.

The response of the United States was jumbled. On the plus side, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger told the Geneva conference that "the United States will remain unalterably opposed to the forced repatriation of Vietnamese asylum-seekers," a last-minute insertion included over the objections of many others in the State Department. It was a welcome, even heroic, move, as was the behind-the-scenes pressure on Great Britain not to return the boat people now in Hong Kong against their will. Recently President Bush reiterated his opposition to forced repatriation before an Asian-American audience at the White House.

But in the same speech at Geneva, Eagleburger unfortunately also endorsed the thrust of the plan. "The balance that has been struck is delicate," he said, "we should not seek to alter it." In this way, Washington put itself in an impossible predicament: opposing the obvious conclusions of a document whose logic—Sir Geoffrey's logic—it accepted. In practice this meant that the administration had abetted a process it was now powerless to stop.

WHERE the Bush administration ought to have objected is on screening itself, a policy that rests on a slippery slope of questionable assumptions. Even from a practical point of view, it is riddled with problems, beginning with the antipathy that exists between those arriving in Hong Kong (now mostly ethnic Vietnamese from the North) and the local translators (mostly ethnic Chinese). Even translators not hostile to the arrivals are unacquainted with the situation in Vietnam and of the people being interviewed. The Vietnamese themselves, moreover, do not distinguish between interviews and interrogation, and so their tendency is to clam up. For these reasons alone, various organizations of lawyers have objected to the Hong Kong program even without objecting to screening *per se*. The UNHCR, whose approval Britain is constantly citing in international forums, also is decidedly uneasy about the process.

There are problems as well with the way screening is administered. For example, no record is kept of the original responses in Vietnamese, in the event of an appeal. More importantly, people in the camps are not provided with adequate pre-screening counseling, or an explanation of refugee criteria and of their rights. They are not given enough information or guidance about their right to appeal, or how that appeal would be managed.

In the particular case of the boat people, there is a further complication posed by Vietnamese law. Those who escape are considered criminals, and under Vietnam's National Security Articles 85, 88, and 89 they are subject to harsh prosecution. A piece in the *South China Morning Post* in March quoted the immigration director for the Vietnamese Interior Ministry, Nguyen Can, as saying that anyone who in Vietnam helped organize illegal departures would face thirty years in jail, and that any escapee who upon failing the screening test did not opt for voluntary repatriation would be punished if forced back later. Whatever the status of people before they leave, these laws make them refugees once they have gone.

The most serious objections to screening, however, are philosophical. They start from the fact that screening began not as an effort to help "genuine" refugees but to pin the label of economic migrant on as many boat people as possible so that they could be subjected to forced repatriation. The British made this clear when they announced before screening even began that 90 percent of those arriving on Hong Kong's shores were not genuine refugees. Is it any surprise that the screening results conform to this preset figure? Is there any doubt that the results could be made to conform to *any* other figure?

The deepest question of all is whether the new distinction between genuine refugees and economic migrants has any validity when it comes to people who have escaped from totalitarian states. American law, following the lead of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, defines as a refugee anyone "who is outside any country of such person's nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to . . . that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."

Such language may be appropriate to old-style authoritarian regimes, where most people are left alone unless they belong to a specific group or have otherwise attracted the government's attention. But being singled out for "persecution" has no real meaning in totalitarian societies, where *blanket* persecution is the norm. The Convention's emphasis on the dispute of an individual (or his group) with the government unconsciously bases refugee criteria not on oppression but on discrimination, and leads to all manner of contradictions.

Just last year, for example, a judge in San Francisco granted asylum to a Chinese man who had been arrested at the airport while traveling on a phony Singaporean passport. The man asked

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for asylum because his wife had defied China's one-child policy; he said he would be persecuted if he returned. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) opposed granting him refugee status. The judge did so anyway, but at least in part because the man was Catholic and hence opposed by religion to contraception and abortion. The implication appeared to be that non-Catholics subject to the same persecution would not be entitled to the same rights.

Or what about Ethiopia, where mass starvation has been brought about by Marxist-Leninist agricultural policies? Are those who flee that regime because they cannot feed their children any less genuine refugees than those who flee because of other objections? Indeed, trying to separate the economic from the political in a totalitarian society is like trying to separate the blue from the sky.

It is a symptom of our own overly politicized century that the only claims to refuge we accept are overt political statements or accidental membership in some ethnic or religious group, rather than the actual circumstances of repression. The more innocent the refugee, the less eligible he is for asylum, so long as everyone else is treated as wretchedly as he. This, in fact, is a chief argument used against the new wave of Vietnamese boat people from the North, where Communism has been established for decades. Presumably this means that they have had more time to grow accustomed to it.

PRIOR to becoming a party to the UN Protocol in 1980, the U.S. did take into account the special character of totalitarian oppression; it did so in a clause of its refugee law that referred to those fleeing "from any Communist or Communist-dominated country or area." Interpreted liberally, as it was, this meant that those coming from such countries were allowed in. The figures today suggest that U.S. policy would benefit from a return to that interpretation. For of the 14 million refugees in the world, the lion's share are those running from Communist regimes: 6 million from Afghanistan alone; at least 1 million from Ethiopia; more than 630,000 from Mozambique; almost 400,000 from Angola—not to mention the more than 450,000 from Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. These are not people with a "well-founded fear" of *individual* persecution. These are people fleeing a *system*.

This is neither to diminish nor to deny the claims of refugees from non-Communist countries who fit the present definition. Were there no Communism there would still be thousands of refugees with claims on our attention. But there is something perverse about a world that insists on solving the refugee problem while refusing to acknowledge the major driving force behind it.

Such an acknowledgment, of course, would be anathema to the United Nations, where a large chunk of the membership is made up of totalitarian states. It would also, by extension, be anathema to the UNHCR, a hideous international bureaucracy that has forfeited all respect among workers in the field because its greatest fear is offending a host government. (Recently the High Commissioner for Refugees, Jean-Pierre Hocke, was forced to resign; among the controversies during his tenure was his burning two years ago of an issue of *Refugees*, the official UNHCR publication, because it contained an article West Germany did not like.) It would also be anathema to an affected nation like Great Britain, which simply wants the boat people sent back, period.

Thus, instead of trying to pressure Vietnam into opening up its system so that people would no longer be so desperate to leave (something even East Germany recently began to do), the Geneva program tells Hanoi: get tough, and rewards will follow. To this message Hanoi has responded eagerly. Vietnamese officials report that in the first half of 1989, some 3,224 persons were arrested trying to leave, and 413 of these were sentenced to jail for up to twelve years. The Vietnamese navy has also been instructed to fire on boat people who refuse to stop. It is a safe bet that if Vietnam decided to collect its bribes and then sink all outgoing craft on the high seas, there would be no serious outcry from Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, or Hong Kong.

The U.S. has shied away from criticism of screening *per se*, which is understandable since the INS uses much the same sort of rationale for denying entry to refugees from south of the border. This again points to an inherent problem in refugee policy: its complete dependence on the open doors of third countries. The different treatment accorded escaping East Germans and Vietnamese demonstrates that, in practice, UN guarantees of the right to leave are meaningless without a concomitant right to arrive. This further helps explain why even avowedly pro-refugee organizations such as Oxfam and UNHCR have signed onto the screening program: they believe that unless the numbers are reduced to appease host governments, the rights of all refugees will be jeopardized.

Others hope an expanded Orderly Departure Program will provide an alternative to risky escape on the high seas. But ODP is a specific program for a specific group of people, and most of those leaving by boat are not eligible for it. In July ODP was given a boost when Hanoi agreed to allow former reeducation-camp internees to apply for the ODP exit visas, after an earlier agreement to let out Amerasian children. This is welcome, but with a twenty-year backlog of perhaps 500,000 people, it is a fig-leaf solution.

FOR all the attention and debate they have attracted, the boat people—to say it again—represent neither the largest nor the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

most critical refugee problem in the world. Nor do the 107,721 boat people now languishing in various countries of Southeast Asia represent the kind of drain on resources that we see in Africa—in Malawi, for example, where 600,000 refugees from Mozambique appeared almost overnight. The sole reason there is a refugee "crisis" in Southeast Asia is that the assorted nations of the region no longer wish to take the boat people in.

The importance of the boat people, and the danger, thus lies in the precedent. In Geneva the world bowed to pressure from a few nations to rejiggle criteria in a way designed to scale back drastically the number of those who will be granted protection from oppression. There is no reason that Pakistan or the Sudan could not invoke the same principle to deport the large numbers of Afghans or Ethiopians there, moves that would likely also be very popular politically. Taken further, this principle might even be used by countries like Nicaragua to have their own escapees declared economic migrants as a means of getting international monies to bring them back home, as well as discrediting charges that people are leaving because of oppression.

None of this is to romanticize the refugees. In times of trial a given number of human beings will act with grace and dignity, just as another percentage will succumb to baser impulses; the Vietnamese are no exception. Every camp in Southeast Asia suffers from its share of prostitution, drug dealing, extortion, even murder, perhaps exacerbated by the miserable conditions in which the refugees are forced to live.

But these same refugees come off rather well when set against the actions of the states that want them out, whether it be Indonesian forces firing on their craft, Thai government officials ordering that boats be pushed back to sea (the new euphemism is "redirection"), or the British in Hong Kong taking advantage of ignorance to define the refugees out of sanctuary. Mrs. Thatcher's justification of this position before Parliament and on her recent visit to America reawakened eerie memories of a similar British argument over the forced repatriation of Russians after World War II. In Foreign Office minutes from June 1944, Sir Patrick Dean put it bluntly: "In due course all those with whom the Soviet authorities desire to deal must be handed over to them, and we are not concerned with the fact that they may be shot or otherwise more harshly dealt with than they might be under British law."

The boat people are not angels. They are human beings whose homeland has become so unlivable that they will leave behind everything they know and have to brave leaky boats, vicious pirates, uncertain seas, and possible arrest—all for the slight chance of starting life over again in another part of the world as complete strangers. If history teaches us anything, it is that average people do not make such a decision lightly; and indeed, although Vietnam has been invaded over its long history, never before was there such a flight out. The term "economic migrant," with its odor of money-grubbing opportunism, is a deliberate slander invented by free people to keep out others desperately seeking that same freedom. Its acceptance by the nations of the world at Geneva sadly illustrates that not much has changed since the *St. Louis* was turned around. Where refugees come from seems not to matter. What matters is where they are going.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What Heidegger Wrought

Mark Lilla

In the early months of 1988 rumblings began to be heard in the United States about a new controversy over the immensely influential German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) that was setting Paris afire. Some spoke of "scandal," others of an "affair"; there were whispers that "it's the Dreyfus case all over again." The New York *Times* published an early article about the controversy, soon followed by the London *Times Literary Supplement*, then by the *New York Review of Books*, which ran an exhaustive account of the facts by Thomas Sheehan. Those facts seemed clear enough: a new book on Heidegger had just appeared, leaving little doubt about his intimate involvement with the Nazi party in the 1930's.

Why these new revelations about a dead German thinker should have caused scandal among the French would have been less clear to American readers. But the translation of several books involved in the dispute should finally give English-speaking readers an opportunity to judge the matter for themselves. At the very least, such readers will have at their disposal a relatively complete dossier on Heidegger's political activities, the first such treatment in English since the publication a decade ago of George Steiner's helpful introduction to the philosopher's works. But more important still, it will permit Americans to see that, as is so often the case in France, the "scandal" was not really where it pretended to be.

I

The book that originally set off the controversy, Victor Farias's *Heidegger and Nazism*, has a history as complicated and questionable as the one it recounts. Farias is a Chilean Jew, currently teaching philosophy at the Free University of Berlin. It has been reported that he once worked with Heidegger, but ended his studies when the philosopher coolly rejected the idea of having his masterwork, *Being and Time*, translated into Spanish. This offhand snub is said to have disillusioned Farias about Heidegger's philosophy and to have set him off on his biographical investigations.

The resulting book, which appears to have been first written around 1984-85, was drafted in Spanish and rejected by a number of publishers in Germany—whether because of resistance from Heideggerians or (more plausibly) because Farias's charges and evidence were already well-known to the Germans. In any case, Farias finally turned to France, where the book was published (in French) in late 1987, and this is the version on which I have mainly relied for the present essay. Only after it had set off the French "affair" was the book finally brought out in Germany in 1989, in an expanded and corrected German-language version and with a long, sympathetic introduction by Jürgen Habermas. The English-language edition, which has just appeared, is a hybrid of the French and German versions.*

Heidegger and Nazism has been criticized by Heidegger's devotees on predictable counts: that it is unoriginal; that what is original is untrue; and that what is true is insignificant. They have also attacked the book for slander by association, for reporting hearsay as evidence, and for a tendency toward cheap psychologizing. All these charges are to some extent true. Most of what we know about Heidegger's Nazi involvement in the 1930's comes from the original work, in the 1960's, by the Swiss scholar Guido Schneeberger, and the more recent (and more accurate) work of German researchers, foremost among them Hugo Ott. Farias relies heavily on these, and his own limited contribution to the dossier seems attributable to the fact that, as a Chilean, he had access to East German archives currently closed to West Germans.

It is also true that Farias's manner of proceeding is irresponsible and borders on the dishonest. The book is neither a complete biography, nor an exhaustive history of the period, nor a careful study of Heidegger's philosophy—and to the extent that it attempts each, it fails. Farias's narrative

Mark Lilla, formerly managing editor of the *Public Interest*, is now living in Paris. Mr. Lilla delivered a different version of this article as a paper at the Philosophy Institute of the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, Poland, in October.

* *Heidegger and Nazism*, edited, with a foreword, by Joseph Margolis and Tom Rockmore; French materials translated by Paul Burrell, with the advice of Dominic Di Bernardi; German materials translated by Gabriel R. Ricci. Temple University Press, 349 pp., $29.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

begins and ends with unconvincing accounts of Heidegger's imagined devotion to the 17th-century German Catholic xenophobe, Abraham of Sancta Clara. He also raises questions about the psychosomatic roots of Heidegger's youthful heart trouble, and examines suspiciously his choice of courses in school and university—all in order to paint the portrait of an unstable youth already given to anti-modern and anti-Semitic Catholic tendencies. Farias's failure here is compounded by his distorted treatment of Heidegger's philosophy and his cavalier manner of quotation and citation. One is seldom sure who is speaking, and the references are difficult to hunt down.

Nevertheless, precisely because Farias's work is fundamentally unoriginal and relies on already well-established documentation, the most important facts of the case as he presents them cannot be challenged. If nothing else, a large public now has access to the details of Heidegger's activities in the 1930's—found in his speeches, letters, journalism—that were hitherto available only to scholars.

The portrait Farias offers is an ugly one. What makes it particularly unsavory is that it reveals just how consistently Heidegger covered his tracks after the war, and how cleverly orchestrated were the few public statements he made to minimize his personal culpability. Until quite recently we have had to rely heavily on Heidegger's own account, which was given to the German magazine *Der Spiegel* in 1966 and published, by prior arrangement, in a highly edited form after his death in 1976. This account, more or less, has been the widely accepted explanation of Heidegger's otherwise inexplicable descent into the Nazi tempest.

As Heidegger tells the story, it was as an apolitical professor that he returned to the University of Freiburg in 1928 to replace his philosophical mentor Edmund Husserl, a Jew, after having spent five years as a teacher in Marburg. While in Freiburg he devoted himself to further elaboration of the work begun in *Being and Time* (which had been published in 1927) and to selfless university labors; he even turned down a prestigious offer from Berlin in order to remain at his beloved Freiburg. His first encounter with the politics of his time would not come until April 1933, just at the moment when the Nazis were consolidating their grip on German institutions.

It then became evident (Heidegger's account continues) that the rector of the university would no longer be tolerated by local and national party officials because of his social-democratic leanings. Worried that a party hack from outside would be appointed to replace the rector, Heidegger's colleagues approached him about accepting the post in the hope that his growing fame would guarantee his independence from the Nazi party. After much hesitation Heidegger agreed, on the acknowledged condition that he join the Nazi party himself. It was at this point that Heidegger delivered the now-notorious Rector's Address (*Rektoratsrede*), his inaugural lecture as rector, titled "The Self-Assertion [*Selbstbehauptung*] of the German University."

Although in later years Heidegger confessed that he had once honestly believed in what he called in that address "the greatness, the nobility of this national awakening," his real concern, he continued to insist, had been the reorganization of the university, which he saw divided into rival disciplines that lacked an overarching philosophical and social purpose. And this, according to him, was why he accepted the rectorship: to save the university from self-destruction from within due to purposelessness, and from without due to the Nazis' "politicized science." His ten-month tenure was, he later said, a constant attempt to do battle against these two threats: he prevented book-burnings in Freiburg, defended Jewish colleagues, and forbade the posting of the "Jew notice" drawn up at the insistence of the SA and posted in other German universities.

To no avail, Heidegger went on. He met resistance from within and without, from professors opposed to reorganization and from a party disturbed by his independence, and he finally resigned as rector in February 1934, to return to his philosophical labors and teaching. But his courses were monitored and he had trouble publishing his books. Finally, at the end of the war, he was judged "expendable" and was sent out of Freiburg to dig trenches. When the French occupying forces finally arrived, his house was requisitioned, his library nearly sold, and, one year later, he was banned from ever teaching again in a German university. The ban was lifted in 1951, but he remained an unfairly tarnished, mistreated man.

Thus far Heidegger's own account. How, then, did he judge his ten-month involvement with the Nazis? He admitted that he had been mistaken in not seeing the Nazis immediately for what they were; he also admitted that he had made some compromises during his rectorate, such as praising Hitler in speeches or removing the dedication to Husserl from the second German edition of *Being and Time*. But who, he asked, did not make mistakes and compromises in those nightmarish years?

II

The Farias book, whatever its other failings, allows us to recognize this story for the self-justifying lie that it is. And it is a lie—a bald suppression of the most important facts of the case, and a sly distortion of those that were allowed to escape. To see this we must descend into the squalid file Farias has amassed.

The key document was and remains the Rector's Address itself. Heidegger always sought to minimize the Nazistic allusions in this cleverly indi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rect speech and their echoes of his philosophical vocabulary, hoping that his proposed university reforms would be interpreted as a critique of the Nazis' "politicized science," and thus as a defense of scholarly independence. A recent retranslation of the address—along with Heidegger's private explanation of it, prepared in 1945 for his denazification hearings and only now released by his son—offers us the chance to reexamine this interpretation.*

The university, Heidegger announced, should not be treated as an inherited institution; its "essence" must be "willed" and "asserted" by a German nation that submits itself to the power of its spiritual-historical "being." (Heidegger uses the word *Dasein*, also a technical term in *Being and Time*.) Mere academic freedom, which is just a negative concept, gives rise to meaningless specialized research. Real freedom is achieved only in the discovery of an essence that lies in the German student body itself, which is "on the march." Heidegger then, in the most scandalous part of the speech (but its most popular section at the time), formulates the three "bonds of service" that will guide German students toward this discovery. The first is "labor service" (*Arbeitsdienst*), which calls them to serve the community from within; the second is "armed service" (*Wehrdienst*), binding them to the nation's external destiny with a readiness to "give all." The service listed third—reflecting its rank as either the most or the least important—is "knowledge service" (*Wissensdienst*). Knowledge service is not a "dull and quick training" for a bourgeois profession, but rather the pursuit of the "highest and essential knowledge of the people concerning its entire being [*Dasein*]."

Heidegger's attempts, in his 1945 private essay and his 1966 *Der Spiegel* interview, to make of this address a strategic defense of academic freedom are now fully exposed by Farias's documentation. By placing the Rector's Address in the context of Heidegger's other speeches at the time and his official correspondence as rector, Farias allows us to see Heidegger for what he was: an active supporter of the Nazi party intimately involved in its university activities during, and for some time after, his rectorate. The Rector's Address is just one example, and not the worst, of the enthusiastic abandon with which Heidegger threw himself into what he kept calling "the movement."

These pages of the Farias book are bone-chilling. We read a speech given in Tübingen, November 1933, halfway through the rectorate:

> This process is an inexorable movement, almost violent, one of the great necessities to which the human heart submits. . . . It is precisely because the new students are primitive that they are called to bring before us the new right to know. . . . It is not enough to greet the new order. It is rather a question of choosing one or the other, of deciding to put ourselves under the authority of the new reality or of disappearing together with a world now in decline. . . . The former type of coexistence, [university] "collegiality," will disappear as something negative. By obedience, teachers and learning are integrated with the state. . . .

We read about his campaign to establish himself as Fuehrer-rector of the university, a position permitting him to answer only to Nazi ministers in Berlin, circumventing his faculty senate. We read his first letter to the Freiburg student newspaper, again in November 1933, asserting that "the Fuehrer, and he alone, is the sole German reality and law, today and in the future." We read his speech that same month at the "Assembly of German Science" in Leipzig, where he solicits academic support for Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations, and we learn of his simultaneous private telegram of support to Hitler. We also read his letter to colleagues asking for signatures on a published version of this speech, adding, "Of course, it is clear that no non-Aryans should appear on the signature page." We follow two cases of political denunciation for which Heidegger's responsibility can no longer be denied: the first, of one of his colleagues, Hermann Staudinger, a future Nobel laureate in chemistry; the second, of a former student, Eduard Baumgarten. We learn that even after his resignation as rector he signed a petition of professors supporting Hitler, and that he paid his Nazi-party dues faithfully until the end of the war. Perhaps more striking still, we read all his official university correspondence of the period, unfailingly signed, "Heil Hitler! Yours, Heidegger."

And so one comes away from the Farias book feeling somewhat soiled, and with a monstrous portrait of Heidegger's behavior. Farias's documentation leaves little doubt that Heidegger's assumption of the Freiburg rectorate in 1933 unchained something within him, that he threw himself into the labors outlined in the Rector's Address and the other speeches with uncommon passion. It is true that he resisted a good number of Nazi directives, many having to do with institutionalizing the new "politicized science" and chasing out the Jews. But it is also true that, during his tenure as rector, the following steps were taken: all Jewish teachers were eventually expelled and a racial-origin questionnaire was distributed; obligatory courses on racial purity were established; the Nazi salute was introduced at the end of lectures and at commencement; and a department of racial studies was founded under direction of the SS, with courses taught by specialists from Eugen Fischer's infamous Racial Hygiene Institute in Berlin.

* Both texts were translated by Karsten Harries of Yale, and published in the *Review of Metaphysics* in March 1985.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Can we consider all these to be merely the compromises of a man in difficult times? Despite his exaggerations, Farias succeeds in showing that Heidegger was a real party enthusiast. As Thomas Sheehan has put it, the question is not "what did Heidegger know, and when did he know it?"; the fact is that, what Heidegger knew, he generally liked. Hardly separating himself from the "blood-and-soil" rhetoric of his times, he employed it with numbing frequency in his speeches and articles. His contempt for "cosmopolitanism," commerce, and the kind of people associated with them was bald. Throughout the rectorate year he encouraged the Nazi students' primitivism, applauding their indifference to "negative" liberty and "mere" democratic form. Asked by a fellow philosopher, Karl Jaspers, in 1933 whether he thought an uncultured man like Hitler could govern Germany, Heidegger responded, "Culture doesn't matter. Look at his marvelous hands!"

III

Since much of the evidence Farias presents had been known to scholars for some time, and was considered common public knowledge in Germany, it is not surprising that orthodox Heidegger loyalists in France were prepared to respond. The defense was carried out by François Fédier, who, since the death of Jean Beaufret, has served as unofficial leader of the school. Fédier's *Heidegger: anatomie d'un scandale* corrects many of Farias's errors of fact and does manage to cast doubt on his objectivity, but Fédier himself seems incapable of weighing the moral significance of the authentic documents that remain. In France, at least, he has been unable to lift the widely shared condemnation of Heidegger's actions.

A second common line of defense has been to accept the evidence that Heidegger "the man" made moral mistakes during his rectorate, while denying their relevance to Heidegger's philosophy. This is by now an old argument that was first publicized by the late Hannah Arendt in an article in homage to Heidegger on his eightieth birthday in 1971. Disdaining to mention his party involvement until the very end, she then criticized in a footnote those who would try to implicate Heidegger's philosophy in his actions, hoping to "dress up the horrible gutter-born phenomenon with the language of the humanities and the history of ideas." The origins of totalitarianism, Arendt insisted, were to be found in the street, not in an absent-minded professor's study.

Setting aside whatever personal affection Arendt may have felt for Heidegger "the man," there are good reasons why her insistence on separating philosophy from questions of personality should appeal to us; one can only wish hers was a more widely shared instinct today. Yet what makes the Heidegger rectorate a singular event is that it was *not* an "extracurricular" activity, and precisely because the line between the university and the "gutter-born phenomenon" had been effaced—to no small degree, by Heidegger himself. Heidegger, we now know, eagerly opened his university's doors to its Nazi conquerors, although under the illusion that he would be able to "save, purify, and strengthen" what was positive in them. The fact is that Heidegger considered the reorganization of the university to be the culmination of his philosophical labors, a chance to undo all the damage that had been done since Socrates by the "forgetting of Being." This is why we have to judge Heidegger's "philosophical" act from the standpoint of his philosophy.

After the war, many of Heidegger's students asked him to account for his actions, or, at the very least, to make sense of that epochal event in the "history of Being" the world had just witnessed: the Holocaust. Heidegger's stony silence haunted even his most devoted followers, and more than one of them left his postwar retreat in the Black Forest in despair, never to return. But in a sense they did get their answer, even if it was not the one they were hoping to hear.

The answer first came in 1949 in one of Heidegger's most influential lectures, a short gospel of anti-modernism that has been translated as "The Question Concerning Technology." Here he puts matters in perspective: "Agriculture is now a motorized food-industry—in essence, the same as the manufacturing of corpses in gas chambers and extermination camps, the same as the blockading and starving of nations, the same as the manufacture of hydrogen bombs." This obscene comparison was followed in 1953 by the publication of lectures dating from 1935, collected under the title *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. Here we read, in the context of a critique of the idea of "values," a reference to "works that are being peddled about nowadays as the philosophy of National Socialism but have nothing whatever to do with the inner truth and greatness of this movement (namely, the encounter between global technology and modern man)."

Germans were scandalized when this sentence first appeared, and the newspapers were full of debate over it. But many of Heidegger's followers have always commended him for retaining the sentence, as if he were admirably refusing to falsify the record in his own defense. Yet it now appears that both extracts are excellent examples of his tireless campaign to cloak the true nature of his early judgments. The first citation, comparing the Holocaust to mechanized agriculture, does not appear in the printed German text, or in any translation; it was removed by Heidegger at some point, and has only recently come to light in the original typescript. The second, referring to "inner truth and greatness," was changed by Heidegger in 1953 on the advice of a friend—though, oddly enough, not completely; Heidegger had the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

opportunity to delete the whole reference to National Socialism and chose not to, deciding only to explain what he meant by it by adding the parenthetical reference to technology. It is an invitation, of sorts, to pose the question: what was the "inner truth and greatness" that Heidegger saw in Nazism?

This can only be answered by a study of Heidegger's complete philosophical *oeuvre*; Farias's psychological imaginings will get us nowhere. But here we run into a number of difficulties that render the task somewhat delicate, for Heidegger is no common philosophical writer. The first difficulty is that *Being and Time*, Heidegger's prewar masterwork, whatever its political effect, is not a political book, in the sense that we cannot hope to find a clear political doctrine outlined in its pages. A second problem, to which I will return, is that during the 1930's and 1940's Heidegger began what he later called a philosophical "turning" (*Kehre*) that would eventually place him at some distance from the argument, and even the style, of *Being and Time*. This "turning" makes it all the harder to discern the political trajectory of his philosophy.

Still, the phrase "inner truth and greatness" invites us to try. And beginning in the 1940's there has been an enduring attempt to reconcile the "early" and "later" Heidegger with the "middle" Heidegger, the Nazi. In the United States, for example, Karsten Harries of Yale has insisted that Heidegger's political involvement has its roots in the *kind* of apolitical stance he took before and after the war. Two central concepts in *Being and Time*—authenticity and resolve—seem to sanction any kind of blind commitment that rises above the naive subjectivity of ordinary politics, as long as such commitment is authentic.

This sort of "decisionism," however, would appear compatible with almost any extreme political alternative, so the question remains: why Hitler? The Rector's Address and the later writings permit us to see that Heidegger had a particular kind of resolve in mind, the sort exhibited by any artist, poet, or statesman who brings a people closer to its own "essence" through violent creativity. Politics became a purely aesthetic phenomenon for Heidegger, with both the poet and the statesman serving as existential warrior-creators.

On this account, Heidegger's political engagement was not an aberration, and neither was his later withdrawal into increasingly obscure examinations of Greek and German poetry. Hitler failed Heidegger just as Wagner had failed Nietzsche, both impostors pretending to overcome the corruptions they only embodied. Thus Heidegger came to view Nazism as yet another expression of the West's ineradicable deafness to the voice of Being, a condition that had reached its culmination after the war in modern technology, Communism, and "Americanism." From these developments he could only recoil, stating in the 1966 *Der Spiegel* interview, "Only a god can save us now." A demiurge, that is, not a redeemer.

Whatever one makes of this sort of interpretation—I find it very persuasive—we at least know that it is on the right track, trying to put the three Heideggers together. There are no short-cuts to Heidegger, and no summary of his philosophy, or even of the main interpretations of his philosophy, will suffice. The one "philosophical" contribution Farias has made is to have assured us that Heidegger's deeds and writings during his tenure as rector of Freiburg must take their place alongside his formal works. Had Heidegger's political activities truly been "extracurricular," had they simply been regrettable mistakes, we would be obliged to treat them as a parenthesis in the work of a great thinker. But they were not. We now know that Heidegger cannot be understood—philosophically—without them.

IV

Yet if the stakes in the recent French "scandal" were limited to the proper interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy, why the passionate confrontation that eventually took place? It is certainly true that the French are more given to public intellectual dispute than Americans are, and it is also true that their public education gives them an introduction, however superficial, to the history of philosophy. But this would hardly be enough to generate a debate that covered magazines and newspapers for nearly a year, and even spilled over onto several popular television shows.

The fascination with Heidegger's Nazi experience is even more peculiar in that it had already been debated twice before in France. The first controversy began in January 1946 in one of the first issues of Jean-Paul Sartre's magazine, *Les Temps Modernes*. There Sartre ran an interview with Heidegger in Freiburg while the city was still in ruins and the philosopher's fate had not yet been decided by the occupying forces; Frederic de Towarnicki, an early disciple and one of the first to seek out Heidegger after the war, also contributed a glowing article. A much darker picture of Heidegger's "existentialism" and his war record was offered in a subsequent number by Karl Loewith, and this article immediately set off a two-year-long debate between Heidegger's partisans and his critics. Virtually all the questions raised recently about Heidegger's rectorate were aired then, given the information available at that time.

The same is true of a second Heidegger debate, which erupted in 1966. That was when François Fédier decided to defend Heidegger's record against a few recent German books. Fédier's article triggered yet another two-year-long dispute, even

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

though essentially the same historical ground was being covered.

So one wonders: why this twenty-year itch? What can possibly be at stake in the continuing French fascination with Heidegger?

The answer is that neither of these Heidegger debates, nor the present one, was really about Heidegger. They were about Heideggerianism, which is a different matter altogether. Heideggerianism is a home-grown French product only distantly related to the German original, the one constant presence in French intellectual life since the war, beginning with Sartre's existentialism and culminating in the so-called post-structuralism of the 1960's. Each rediscovery of Heidegger's Nazi past coincides with what may be called a crisis in French Heideggerianism. And this is true of the "scandal" today. But to understand why Heideggerianism is in crisis today, and perhaps in its final one, we must go back to the 1940's to see how it first departed from Heidegger's philosophy and became a vulgate.

The word "vulgate" is precise. For the astonishing fact is that Heidegger's masterwork, *Being and Time*, was not published in French until *1985*! This means that Parisian intellectual discourse for the past forty years has been dominated by a book very few Frenchmen could read. Its ideas had to be inferred from translations of Heidegger's later writings, which were quite different from those before the "turning," or they had to be absorbed indirectly through thinkers such as Sartre and Jacques Derrida, who were influenced by Heidegger without becoming his loyal interpreters. These figures are the real fathers of the Heideggerian vulgate, and we must look to them if we hope to understand the recurring "scandals." This will involve leaving Heidegger's philosophy behind for the flatter plains of French intellectual dispute, and taking up a distinctly French preoccupation: the question of "humanism."

THE humanism question may be traced at least back to 1946, when it was first introduced by Sartre in a short published lecture on the nature of existentialism. After the war, Sartre's success—his plays, his philosophical treatise *Being and Nothingness*, and now his magazine *Les Temps Modernes*—had made "existentialism" the closest thing to an intellectual household word. Its definition was less than clear to most people, though, and it had come under many contradictory attacks. Sartre chose to respond to those attacks in a short essay expressing the essentials of his doctrine, whose message is summarized in the title: "Existentialism Is a Humanism."

This essay may be the only clear exposition of existentialism ever given. In it we find all the technical terms of Heidegger's *Being and Time*—anxiety, authenticity, being-in-the-world, projection, existence, the absurd, action, alienation—but taken out of Heidegger's ontology and fashioned into what Sartre called the "hard optimism" of French existentialism.

Against the Communists, to whom man is determined by the forces of history, and against the Catholics, who find man's essence in God, existentialism (according to Sartre) sees man as free to make himself in history and to decide his own essence. Man is the irreducible subject of all existence, not its object. Existentialism, says Sartre, is nothing more than the purest, most consistent humanism ever imagined.

Sartre's essay was enormously popular because, even though he never defined the word "humanism," he did offer an easy entry into existentialism. It had an immediate effect in France, and even in the United States, among people wanting a tourist guide to the newest fashion in French intellectual life. (No doubt it inspired Delmore Schwartz's quip that existentialism simply means "no one else can take a bath for you.") But the orthodox French followers of Heidegger were less amused. Their then-leader, Jean Beaufret, immediately sent a letter to Heidegger asking, indirectly, whether Sartre's "humanism" was what the master had in mind.

Heidegger chose to respond in a long letter he soon expanded and published as his "Letter on Humanism," certainly one of the most important documents in modern philosophy. With regard to Heidegger, it reveals what the "turning" in his philosophy really entailed. With regard to Sartre, it shows how a truly profound thinker compares to his popularizers. And with regard to us, it uncovers the philosophical source of much that later took place in France, and then elsewhere, including the United States, in literary criticism, history, art and architectural theory, and psychology.

To the question, "How are we to restore meaning to the word humanism?," Heidegger answers that it is precisely the notion of humanism, of "the human," that must be challenged. Man, he writes, has been the center of Western philosophy since Socrates, and "humanism" arises through the decadence of this notion—first in Hellenistic thought, then among the Romans, and finally in Enlightenment figures such as Winckelmann, Goethe, and Schiller. But all such humanism is based on unexamined metaphysical assumptions regarding man's essence, assumptions that cover over the fundamental questions Heidegger tried to unearth in *Being and Time*: Why is there something rather than nothing? What is the truth of Being?

Until these questions can be answered, Heidegger insists, man's place in Being—and therefore his essence—cannot be determined. Sartre, and any facile existentialist who claims to find man's value in his capacity for "action" or "commitment," misses this point and thus merely re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

peats the metaphysical mistake embedded in all Western philosophy.

The history of the West, Heidegger now declares, is the history of a growing human subjectivity that makes man the master of nature instead of the "shepherd of Being," a user and destroyer rather than one who knows to "let beings be." Nationalism, internationalism, capitalism, Communism, modern science and technology—these are nothing but varied manifestations of our mistaken metaphysics, our "anthropologization" of Being. "Humanism," "logic," and "values" (all in quotation marks) fare no better; as Nietzsche saw, they are just expressions of a nihilism that must be overcome. And to overcome them, without making Nietzsche's own metaphysical mistakes, the "thinking that is to come" will find itself far beyond the "mere cosmopolitanism" of a Goethe, and much closer to the primordial poetry of Hoelderlin and the Greek pre-Socratics.

Taken together, the elements of this short essay—the contempt for the merely human, "the end of philosophy," the idolization of Greek and German poetry, the obsession with a historical "fall," the indifference to distinctions between Communism and democracy, the demonization of modern science and technology, the apocalyptic tone—announce everything we associate with the later Heidegger. In Sartre's defense, it must be said that no one reading *Being and Time* in the 1930's could have predicted that this was where Heidegger was heading. The book as published was in fact only part of the first half of a much longer work Heidegger had planned, and later abandoned. Whether this critique of humanism would have appeared in that completed work is something we will never know; all we do know is that the postwar Heidegger was a convinced anti-humanist. Between the two Heideggers lie the rectorate, a decade-long study of Nietzsche, the war, and the occupation. Only after those events did he look back on his work in the 1930's and discover there what he would call, with characteristic immodesty, "a turning [*Kehre*] in the history of Being."

After the publication of "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger seemed to many in France an increasingly unreadable and mystical figure, inexplicably absorbed in Greek and German etymologies, a quietistic prophet of "revealing" and "letting beings be" rather than "action" and "commitment." To others, Heidegger's "turning" went a long way toward explaining his behavior as rector at Freiburg, his adhesion to Nazism now appearing as a pitiful attempt to harness the movement in order to roll back the history of Western metaphysics and open a new epoch of Being.

Yet to a small but influential band of devotees, Heidegger remained an important refuge from the Marxism and structuralism of the postwar period. Increasingly marginalized in Germany, the new Heidegger found a receptive audience in France and began visiting regularly, often giving informal seminars in Provence. He continued to have an impact on thinkers like Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Lévinas, and also acquired able commentators and a small clique of filmmakers and poets including Alain Resnais and René Char. It was an important group, if cultish and private.

V

All this changed in the mid-1960's when a new brand of French Heideggerianism was born. Its arrival was sudden, beginning in 1966 with the publication of a series of books by Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, and Jacques Derrida. These books sent a shock wave through the French intellectual establishment, which had grown rather accustomed to the war of attrition between Marxism and the school of structuralism that had grown up around Claude Lévi-Strauss's anthropological writings.

That Heidegger and the question of humanism were at the bottom of this revolution everyone understood. Derrida himself made it explicit in a lecture on recent trends in France titled "The Ends of Man" and delivered in New York (with exquisite timing) in May 1968. The ambiguity of the title—"*les fins*" in French, like "the ends" in English, meaning both "termination" and "aim"—reflected the ambiguity of the message: does the idea of man indeed have a future?

It is an altogether extraordinary lecture, revealing as much about the times in which it was delivered as it does about how those times have affected ours. It begins—apropos of nothing, but predictably enough—with an attack on American actions in Vietnam. His conscience cleared, Derrida then asks, "Where is France today with respect to man?" His answer is that, whether Marxists by way of the party, Hegelians by way of Alexandre Kojève, or Husserlians by way of Sartre, postwar French intellectuals seem incapable of overcoming the "anthropological" assumptions of Western metaphysics. Worse still, in existentialism they have even tried to humanize Heidegger's *Being and Time*, making a syncretic German humanism to replace their native one.

This is all very much in the line of Heidegger's own "Letter on Humanism." But then Derrida turns on Heidegger himself, claiming that *he* never fully overcame the humanism of Western metaphysics, even in his later writings. These later works, Derrida writes, came back to man "as if by magnetic attraction," giving him the central role in history as (in Heidegger's words) the "shepherd of Being." By searching for man's essence, even in a Being that is not just human, Heidegger stayed well within the humanistic tradition. For Derrida, this blindness on Heidegger's part is a good example of how any philosophical discourse

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deconstructs itself: by trying to pronounce the "end" (termination) of man as traditionally understood, Heidegger only succeeded in giving him a new "end" (aim).

By 1968, then, the French had come a long way from Sartre's easy-to-digest existential Heidegger, and were now even prepared to go beyond Heidegger's own amateurish attempt to purge our language of its metaphysical assumptions. They were eager to practice Heidegger's "destruction" of metaphysics, but without joining him in a search for Being, or for anything else. Theirs would be a decidedly leftish anti-humanist movement rejecting traditional Western "discourse," contemning Western "anthropological" values, and refusing to engage in the reasoned argument that the West claimed to prize. It would be a new, more radical, Heideggerian vulgate, a Heideggerianism to end all Heideggerianisms. It is what the French now call *la pensée 68* ("'68 thinking").

We owe the label to two young French philosophy professors, Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, whose book by that title is about to be published in English.* Theirs is the best guide available to the latest wave of French Heideggerianism, and it also goes a long way toward explaining why the new vulgate should have been rocked by the recent "scandal." Ferry and Renaut contend that what grew up in France in the 1960's was a highly unstable mixture based on irreconcilable philosophical contradictions, but one whose message could be simply summarized: the end of philosophy has been reached; the idea of universal truth is a myth; all seemingly universal ideas must be historicized; and, consequently, if one can no longer speak of truth one can only give a genealogy of interpretations.

Difficult as it is to criticize a self-contradictory mélange like this, Ferry and Renaut manage to make sense of it by finding its roots in Heidegger's anti-humanism. This emerges most clearly in their treatments of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. Particularly scathing is their chapter on Derrida, whom they consider an artful poser simply reworking a number of well-known Heideggerian ideas into his own, admittedly inimitable, style and his own special vocabulary.

Michel Foucault is a different case, and is treated with far more respect. Here the central question is again humanism. In his history of the human sciences, *Les Mots et les choses* (*The Order of Things* in English), Foucault seemed to be writing for a whole generation when he announced that man is "no more than a kind of rift in the order of things. . . ." For what Foucault claimed to have discovered in his "archeology" is that our idea of man is a product of our "discursive practices," and not of a constant, transhistorical human subject. Man, as we know him, is a 19th-century invention who could be disinvented.

It is true that Foucault later seemed to switch course, announcing that "the subject is the general theme of my work"; but as Ferry and Renaut show, even so his "subject" was less an autonomous human being capable of universal judgments than a product and victim of social power. The history of the "subject" was, for Foucault, the history of its "subjugation." And the only possible response to such subjugation today was an "aesthetic ethics of existence," whose masters, Foucault imagined, were once the Greeks.

What unites these ideas is the rejection of any transhistorical standpoint from which man can understand himself as a subject. This is hardly a new development in Western philosophy, which is why *la pensée 68* is lacking in any real novelty. But its difficulties and contradictions do take us back to the original problem of Heidegger and humanism. In a sense, Heidegger has been both the alpha and omega of *la pensée 68*, its original philosophical inspiration and now, perhaps, its undoing. Ferry and Renaut, at any rate, are convinced that we have reached a dead end in the Heideggerian flight from the human subject, and that it is time to raise the possibility of a modern "humanism" formulated along the lines of Kant and Fichte.

The book by Ferry and Renaut caused an enormous stir when it was first published in 1985, for the fact is that by the mid-1980's the French themselves had already begun to tire of the "dancing" *philosophes* of '68. Foucault and Lacan were dead, Derrida increasingly predictable and long-winded. The Heideggerian vulgate of *la pensée 68* had lost its daring quality and had become institutionalized—which meant, in French terms, that it was ready for dethronement.

More important still, the political assumptions originally underlying the popularity of *la pensée 68* had all but disappeared. A decided shift had taken place in French public opinion during the 1970's and early 1980's, following upon those world events—first among them the publication of Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag* books, the revelations of the Cambodian horrors, and the military coup in Poland—that put the Left's political program to rest and revived traditional republican instincts. It came to be accepted in France that there was a difference between capitalism and Communism, between Coca-Cola and Mao's Little Red Book; that the Third World was not a tropical paradise before being contaminated by the West; that there was no comparing social "subjection" in the West to totalitarian political oppression. The French Communist party went into a steep and continuing decline, and with it all the unarticulated

* *French Philosophy of the Sixties: An Essay on Antihumanism.* Translated from the French by Mary Schnackenberg Cattani. University of Massachusetts Press, 248 pp., $35.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

passions that had offered such fertile ground for *la pensée 68* seemed to plunge. It once again became respectable to speak of "humanism" and "the rights of man" with a straight face.

Thus the Ferry-Renaut book ratified what was already becoming a new political and intellectual consensus against totalitarianism and in favor of humanism. Unfortunately, however, the *penseurs 68*, who still wield great power in the French social institutions they continue to attack, did not deign to respond to Ferry and Renaut's philosophical argument, so their book, though a success, failed to trigger the necessary reexamination of Heidegger's philosophy and his anti-humanism. It is altogether likely that the French never would have confronted the question again, had the Farias book not been published.

VI

But it was published, and the "scandal" was immediate. Everything Ferry and Renaut had intimated about Heidegger's anti-humanism and its influence on *la pensée 68* was suddenly thrust into a harsh fluorescent glow. That few of the revelations were new was immaterial, for the real defendant in this trial was not Heidegger himself but the latest school of French Heideggerianism. This is why the debate was so bitter. The stakes were, in French intellectual terms, unusually high—probably too high. For to implicate Heidegger in the crimes of the century risked implicating, however indirectly, a whole generation of French thinkers as well. In the French popular imagination, ever touchy about charges of wartime collaboration with the Nazis, the question was whether the German philosopher they had been persuaded to adopt was, after all, just another Nazi.

Perhaps understanding this, most of the *penseurs 68* immediately conceded the charges regarding Heidegger's actions during his rectorate and his shameful silence (or semi-silence) after the war. Although they did attack Farias's methods, and not without reason, they never followed the orthodox Heideggerians in trying to whitewash the master's record. Instead, in a number of books and articles appearing during the "scandal," some of which are now coming out in English, the strategy was to accept Heidegger's guilt—and then to blame it on the very humanism *la pensée 68* was trying to subvert.* This was the predictably clever response of Jacques Derrida and some of his followers.

Derrida seems hard-pressed to decide of which sin Heidegger should be judged more culpable: of justifying Nazism as such, or of justifying it by invoking the "spiritual" language of Western metaphysics. It is a trap Derrida confesses to finding himself in as well, since it is very hard to criticize "biologism, racism, and naturalism" without invoking a "humanist teleology." If not absolved, then, Heidegger is at least understood by Derrida as yet another victim of the Western tradition that ensnares us all, since "Nazism was not born in the desert" but rather popped up "like a mushroom" in the rich loam of European metaphysics.

Derrida's breathtaking equation (in an interview with *Le Nouvel Observateur*) of Western "liberty of the spirit" with "all Nazisms" is made even more baldly by one of his eager young followers, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, who criticizes Heidegger for not going far enough: he never realized that "Nazism is a humanism."

In their own book issued during the "scandal," *Heidegger et les modernes*,† Ferry and Renaut focus long and hard on this perverse phrase, and try to explain how a whole generation of French intellectuals could have come to equate humanism with Nazism. They are good guides to the recent history, and to the psychology of its present unraveling. They explain how the French Left took an anti-modern and anti-Western turn after the war, latching first onto Marxism, then onto structuralism during the break-up of French colonialism, and only finally falling upon Heidegger as its last philosophical refuge after the other alternatives had been abandoned. The Heidegger presented by *la pensée 68* was not the Heidegger of the Rector's Address or even of the untranslated *Being and Time*. Instead he was the Black Forest sage who condemned everything modern—technology, Americanism, philosophy, reason. It is this anti-modernism that Ferry and Renaut examine and criticize, using the furor over Farias's book to try, once again, to reopen a French philosophical debate over the human subject. For them, a philosophical solution to the Heidegger problem must begin with some sort of return to Kant. But there is even a kind word to be found here for Sartre and his "Existentialism Is a Humanism," the essay that started the "humanism" debate over forty years ago.

Perhaps a French reexamination of Sartre would not be such a bad thing. First snubbed by the German philosopher he tried to popularize, Sartre was later snubbed again, or ignored, as a retrograde humanist by the hip cynics behind *la pensée 68*. Yet whatever his manifest political failings, especially in his later years, Sartre did at least try to clear his philosophical accounts when he realized he had been misled—something most French Heideggerians today still refuse to do. After reading Heidegger's response to his own lecture on humanism, after publishing the charges and counter-charges over Heidegger's Nazism in *Les Temps Modernes*, and after realizing where

* The notable exception is Pierre Bourdieu, the anti-Heideggerian French sociologist whom Ferry and Renaut consider the most representative example of the Marxian strand in *la pensée 68*.

† To be published in March by the University of Chicago Press under the title *Heidegger and Modernity*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Heidegger was heading after his "turning," Sartre drew conclusions. Yes, indeed, he now acknowledged, Heideggerian existentialism was not a humanism; it was an anti-humanism that could be manipulated for the purposes of any radical political program, of Left or Right.

VII

No one familiar with the American university needs reminding that the spirit of this new humanistic mood in France is hardly the prevailing temper on our own campuses, and that it is the American version of *la pensée 68* which currently sets the tone. But it is hard to characterize that temper as "anti-humanist," either, since Americans bathe even the most menacing ideas in a soft "humaneness." Allan Bloom does better in describing it as "nihilism with a happy ending" (though I, for one, do not see much smiling in the quad). *La pensée 68* was cynical, clever, urbane, somewhat dangerous—a distillation of Paris intellectual style. Transplanted to the United States, it has become earnest, moralizing, part of the college curriculum—in short, a creed.

In such a setting it is hard to imagine what effect the American publication of the French "scandal" books will have. One can only hope that they will distract attention from the French Heideggerian vulgate and force a direct and long overdue confrontation with Heidegger's philosophy. Such a confrontation, though, is unlikely, to judge by the recent furor over the late Yale literary critic Paul de Man.

In 1987, just as Farias's revelations about Heidegger's past were being broadcast to the French public, it came to light in the United States that, as a young man, de Man had written anti-Semitic articles for a Belgian newspaper. The parallels were immediately drawn, since de Man's own theories of deconstruction were very close to Derrida's, and derived ultimately from Heidegger. But instead of serving to open a debate over de Man's ideas and their relation to Heidegger's, the affair quickly degenerated into triumphant attacks and incomprehensible defenses. Leo Strauss once characterized this style as the *reductio ad Hitlerum*, and the same fate probably awaits the Heidegger "scandal" in America as well.

But there is another dimension to the "scandal," one relatively ignored by the French commentators, that also deserves American attention and will probably get it. This is the question of Heidegger's actions as teacher and university administrator. Because the French university system is so highly centralized and state-controlled, the French themselves seem resigned to political intrusion into academic life, which may be why Heidegger's *trahison de clerc* had no special resonance there. But the American university tradition, like the German one before the war, is founded on an ideal of academic independence we so take for granted that Heidegger's speeches and his treatment of colleagues and students cannot but horrify us. To confront them, however, we must leave the French behind and return to Freiburg in 1933.

We are now able to transport ourselves back without moral anachronism thanks to the publication of Karl Loewith's recently discovered private memoir, *Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933* ("My Life in Germany Before and After 1933"). Loewith is generally known to American readers as the author of a grand study of 19th-century German thought, *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, and an introduction to philosophies of history, *The Meaning of History*. But in the 1920's at Marburg, Loewith was also a prized Heidegger student. Half-Jewish on his father's side, raised as a Protestant, Loewith was a decorated war veteran whose career in the German academy seemed assured—until 1933. He then entered the labyrinth of the Nazi racial laws. As a veteran he was considered a "good Jew" until 1935, when the promulgation of the Nuremberg laws dashed any hopes he had of continuing his career in Germany. He then began a hapless flight from fascism that took him first to Italy, then to Japan, and finally to the United States, where he remained until 1953. It was in Japan in 1940 that Loewith wrote his memoir, only recently discovered in his papers.

It is a profoundly moving document, made all the more poignant by the conditions under which it was written. And it played an important, if limited, role in the French "scandal" because of the details it offers about Heidegger. Loewith describes him as a hypnotic teacher whose philosophical seriousness and monkish existence impressed his youthful followers immensely. Concerning Heidegger's Nazism Loewith had no illusions, at least by 1940. On receiving a copy of his teacher's Rector's Address in 1933, he remembers wondering if it meant he was supposed to study the pre-Socratics or "march with the SA."

Loewith was finally convinced of the political import of Heidegger's philosophy in 1936, when he met his former teacher in Rome. Two years after resigning the rectorate Heidegger was lunching in the Alban hills with a Nazi-party insignia still affixed to his lapel. When told by Loewith that his philosophy had been unfairly tarnished by his party activities, Heidegger corrected him, explaining that the concept of "historicity" as outlined in *Being and Time* had been the real inspiration of his political engagement.

But it is Loewith's portrait of the politicized German university that has the most to teach us today. What we witness is the quick slide into capitulation by professors convinced that they could still maintain their scholarly independence

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

once the saluting began. "Nothing is easier for the Germans," Loewith writes, "than to be radical about ideas and to remain indifferent before the facts." Books were burned, courses in "politicized science" introduced, "bad" Jewish colleagues dismissed, then the "good" ones, and still the professors thought their work could go on. Mercifully, Loewith points no fingers. It is human nature, he knows, to deny the obvious when it arrives in small doses, and between 1933 and 1935 he himself was still under the illusion that things would somehow work themselves out. But it was an illusion. In 1933 the New Testament verse carved over the entrance to Freiburg University, "The truth will make you free"(John 8:33), was taken down, replaced by the motto "*Dem deutschen Volke*"—"To the German people." The university ceased to exist from that moment.

Of course, the last thing the American university needs at the present moment is to be compared to the Germany of 1933. Passions, both political and intellectual, are running high enough without introducing another *reductio ad Hitlerum*. What ought to disturb in this memoir is rather the haunting sense that we are no more capable of articulating the purposes of the university than were Loewith's colleagues. German professors were not so much physically defenseless against Hitler's agents, who would have succeeded anyway; nor were they less courageous than other men and women in dark times. Theirs was not a "moral surrender." They were simply intellectually defenseless against Heidegger's bewitching Rector's Address and its call to arms. The century-long effort to establish the political independence of the German university was overthrown in a moment, for at the first roll of the drums the doors were flung open and the professors went marching out. They saw no reason not to.

And so we return, once again, to Heidegger's address and the question of humanism, both as a philosophical idea and as a university ideal. Heidegger's great insight in that address was to have understood that the purposes of the university must be revealed, not assumed, and that its aim has something to do with the aim of philosophy itself. His conclusion was that both must serve something extra-human, perhaps even inhuman. If we in turn sense that he was wrong, we still face the task of discovering why. What is the human? What is philosophy? What does the university serve? If the recent French "scandal" fills us with a sense of foreboding, it is simply because we have so far failed to answer.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From "Lolita" to "Piss Christ"

Carol Iannone

RECENT uproars over Salman Rushdie's novel, *The Satanic Verses,* Martin Scorsese's film, *The Last Temptation of Christ,* and the work of Robert Mapplethorpe and Andres Serrano have raised again the vexed question of how society should treat offensive or shocking content in art.

In one of his hard-punching, voice-of-the-common-man columns, Patrick J. Buchanan mocked a critical establishment that had permitted works like Serrano's "Piss Christ"—a photograph of a crucifix immersed in a jar of the artist's urine—so much as even to lay claim to the status of art. Although Buchanan may not have been in command of all the aesthetic ramifications of this issue, he intuitively put his finger on one of the weak spots of the criticism that has arisen in this century in conjunction with artistic modernism.

To be sure, offensive and obscene elements have always existed in art, but modern criticism especially has had to deal with the insistent and progressive artistic exploration of the forbidden frontiers of the human experience. In their efforts to justify such explorations, however, critics have not always carefully and systematically thought out the full implications of the aesthetic claims they were making.

The current debate often polarizes around what could be seen as two extremes—either one is a moralistic yahoo, eager to impose his own impossibly lowbrow tastes upon society, or one is a defender of absolute artistic freedom and the sacred integrity of the artist *tout court.* In the dinner-party discussions in which one may find oneself embroiled nowadays, the case of Vladimir Nabokov's novel *Lolita* is often cited as a vindication of the necessity for total artistic freedom. *Lolita* at first had trouble finding a publisher and, once published (in 1955), ran into censorship problems both here and abroad. The subject of a two-hour debate in the British Parliament, *Lolita* was assailed by public figures and reviewers and pronounced by John Gordon, chief editor of the London *Sunday Express,* to be "about the filthiest book I've ever read." But the novel also attracted notable supporters like Graham Greene in England and F.W. Dupee and Lionel Trilling in America, where it became a huge best-seller and managed to achieve the status of a literary masterpiece and, for some, a permanent place in the canon.

Against this backdrop, the recent publication of a collection of Nabokov's letters* provides an occasion to address at least certain aspects of the question of offensive content in works of art. Some reviewers, indeed, have read in these letters yet another enactment of Nabokov's noble aesthetic stand against the philistines. Yet here and there emerge hints that the lessons of the *Lolita* episode may not be so self-evident after all.

OF COURSE we must begin by acknowledging that, offensive content notwithstanding, with Nabokov's *Lolita* we are a long way from photographs of crucifixes submerged in urine. Nabokov was a master prose stylist, and the forbidden but thoroughly consummated love of the middle-aged and preposterously named Humbert Humbert for his twelve-year-old stepdaughter Dolores, a.k.a. Lolita, is narrated not only with exquisite artistry but with a meticulous intensity and a high, arching, piercing humor as well.

Nevertheless, a purely aesthetic defense of *Lolita* proves insufficient. For one thing, Nabokov himself was not always consistent about it. It is true that from the heights of artistic hauteur, he on more than one occasion assailed the "common scolds and old philistines" who branded *Lolita* obscene, and in the essay that is now appended to all editions of the novel, his defense certainly rests on purely aesthetic grounds. For Nabokov, *Lolita*'s stylistic elegance and formal integrity were what set it apart from pornography. Furthermore, he reiterated in that essay his disdain for didactic fiction and has insisted that *Lolita* had "no moral in tow."

Yet elsewhere Nabokov did attempt a moral defense of *Lolita.* His biographer Andrew Field reports that when the subject of the novel came up, "Nabokov would have only two things to say about it: that it was a work of art, and that it had a high moral content."

In a remark from the present collection that has impressed several reviewers, Nabokov seems to clarify the confusion: "I never meant to deny the moral impact of art which is certainly inherent in every genuine work of art," he wrote in 1945, long before the *Lolita* imbroglio. "What I do deny and am prepared to fight to the last drop of my ink is the deliberate moralizing which to me kills every vestige of art in a work however skillfully written."

One gets the impression from these letters that Nabokov would very much have *liked* the aesthetic to be a sufficient sacred world unto itself, but was often drawn willy-nilly into the confusions and

CAROL IANNONE *teaches writing and literature at NYU's Gallatin Division and is a senior editor of* Academic Questions.

* *Vladimir Nabokov: Selected Letters 1940-1977,* edited by Dimitri Nabokov and Matthew J. Bruccoli. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 582 pp., $29.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

messes of the real world which the novel, "bright book of life" (in D.H. Lawrence's phrase) that it is, must after all portray. Some of his references to Boris Pasternak's *Dr. Zhivago* reveal this ambiguity. Nabokov frequently insists in his denunciations of that novel that he is "not concerned with any but the artistic aspects of the book. From this point of view," he claims, "*Zhivago* is a sorry thing, clumsy, melodramatic, with stock situations and trite characters." But it is not long before he is wandering into the "novel's historical background," which he finds "muddled and frequently quite false to facts (thus his ignoring of the liberal revolution and its Western European ideals in the sequence of events leading to the Bolshevik coup d'état is quite in keeping with the Communist party line)."

At any rate, for all his mocking of the "stuffy philistine," Nabokov's resolution in *Lolita* of the extreme behavior he has depicted is morally quite conventional—Humbert's lustful obsession for Lolita turns into a deep, unconditional love as he achingly repents his wickedness in having destroyed her childhood and ultimately her life. Thus any purely aesthetic defense is undercut not only by some of Nabokov's own pronouncements but by the novel itself—presumably the "aesthetic bliss" of rendering Humbert's intoxication with Lolita was not, finally, sufficient even for the author. In the end, it is the moral element that for Nabokov rescues *Lolita* from the charge of obscenity, and the same element would also seem part of any claim the novel might make to greatness. By contrast, the purely aesthetic defense turns out to be something of a pose, a dialectical riposte to what Nabokov saw as the narrowness and bigotry of Main Street America.

Given Nabokov's evident seriousness about the moral dimension of *Lolita,* it is especially interesting that even some of its admirers who did not find this dimension truly convincing nevertheless celebrated the novel as a major work of art. F.W. Dupee, for example, staunchly opposed the idea that "*Lolita* is no more than a very brilliant joke or literary burlesque" and insisted that the novel be taken seriously, pointing to the depth and intensity of Humbert's remorse. But then in a strange twist, the implications of which he did not fully acknowledge, Dupee almost seemed to see in this aspect of the novel the kind of clumsy moralizing Nabokov himself deplored:

> It is the author's intervening on Humbert's behalf and playing the role straight in order to make a vital point. So, too, with Humbert's belated love cries for his Lolita, which seem to be dictated by some principle of compensation and ring a little false (to me).

Likewise Lionel Trilling insisted that

> the legitimizing of *Lolita* must not mislead us about its nature. It must not tempt us into taking the correct enlightened attitude—"Well, now, what was all the fuss about? Here is the book brought back into the full light of day, and of course we can very plainly see that there is nothing shocking about it." The fact is that *Lolita* is indeed a shocking book. It means to be shocking and it succeeds in its intention.

Even further, Trilling contended,

> we find ourselves the more shocked when we realize that, in the course of reading the novel, we have come virtually to condone the violation it presents. . . . But we have only to let the immediate influence of the book diminish a little with time . . . we have only to move back into the real world . . . to feel again the outrage at the violation of the sexual prohibition. And to feel this the more because we have been seduced into conniving in the violation, because we have permitted our fantasies to accept what we know is revolting.

Although he acknowledged that Nabokov might have simply "wanted to shock us merely for shocking's sake," "to make us uneasy with ourselves, less sure of our moral simplicity than we have been," Trilling argued that "the real reason why Mr. Nabokov chose his outrageous subject matter is that he wanted to write a story about love"—not our present-day, sanitized, rationalized, healthy-marriage, good-relationship kind of love, but mad, scandalous, obsessive, erotic, abject, quivering "passion-love." The only way Nabokov could expound this type of love, in an age like our own, said Trilling, was through the still-forbidden attraction of a mature man for a young girl.

Like Dupee, Trilling did not entirely trust Humbert's moral transformation at the novel's end, and wondered if it might not have been intended ironically. Yet Trilling went Dupee one further by refusing to take his own "uneasiness with the tragic Humbert" as reflecting a flaw in Nabokov's presentation:

> Indeed, for me one of the attractions of *Lolita* is its ambiguity of tone . . . and its ambiguity of intention, its ability to arouse uneasiness, to throw the reader off balance, to require him to change his stance and shift his position and move on. *Lolita* gives us no chance to settle and sink roots. Perhaps it is the curious moral mobility it urges upon us that accounts for its remarkable ability to represent certain aspects of American life.

Without taking anything away from the brilliance of Trilling's essay, it is possible to see in it an example of the values of modernist criticism—with its emphasis on the unexplored, the forbidden, the anti-social—fastening themselves fatally onto the critical consciousness and extinguishing all other critical values. Thus for Trilling, Nabokov chose a shocking subject in order the better to bring us to an extreme experience of the kind generally unavailable in our contemporary existence, while Nabokov's awkward handling of the moral transformation of his main character translates into a rich plethora of modernist "uncertainty" and "ambiguity" and "uneasiness." The moral difficulties raised by the novel—described so well by Trilling as "the fact that we have been seduced into conniving in the violation [of a child], because we have permitted our fantasies to accept what we know is revolting"—are resolved in favor of the critical values of modernism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Before discussing *Lolita* specifically, Trilling had digressed to reaffirm that "the explicit representation in literature (or the graphic arts—or music, for that matter) of the actual sexual conduct of human beings . . . is a perfectly acceptable artistic enterprise," and "that, if it is carried out with some skill, it will raise lustful thoughts in the reader," and "that this in itself provides no ground for objection."

Trilling wished

> to be entirely clear on this point. I am not taking the position of liberal and progressive lawyers and judges. I am not saying that literature should be permitted its moments of pornography because such moments are essential to the moral truth which a particular work of literature is aiming at; or because they are essential to its objective truth; or because, when taken in context, they cannot really arouse the normal mature reader to thoughts of lust. I am saying that I see no reason in morality (or in aesthetic theory) why literature should not have as one of its intentions the arousing of thoughts of lust. . . .

But following D.H. Lawrence, to whom he acknowledged himself indebted for this discussion, Trilling conceded that "there are discriminations to be made among kinds of lust, of which some tend to humanize, others to dehumanize us." Since this "gives society an unusually high stake in sexuality as a literary subject," Trilling was willing to let the distinction be made by the courts, even at times to the point of censorship.

Although Trilling insisted that *Lolita* would pass any court test of censorship, he never made himself clear on the question of whether *Lolita* is humanizing or dehumanizing. Moreover, his discussion, in which Humbert's passion for Lolita is a variation on the courtly-love tradition of a man's adoration for an unattainable and indifferent mistress, quite blithely ignores certain immensely unsavory aspects of the novel.

It is true that Lolita does not return Humbert's passion, and remains emotionally remote from him, but it is also true that she is in virtual captivity to Humbert through most of the novel, that she tries repeatedly to register her childish protests against the "filthy things" they do together, that she sobs herself to sleep at night. Nabokov also does not shrink from portraying the truly corrupt dimension of their coupling in which her vulnerability, her helplessness, even her tiny size against Humbert's bulk give rise to a cruelty which is not incidental but part and parcel of his enjoyment of her, as when in bed he tussles with her, rolling her head on his knee, her face "bright with tears," or when he quietly but forcibly separates her from her playmate "for a quick connection before dinner," or when he laughs heartily at her hysteria after lovemaking.

Many have implied in the recent debates that it is as much the aesthetic impoverishment of a work like "Piss Christ" as its presumed moral offensiveness that should have debarred it from any claim to the status of art. But this skirts the problem that something can be well done and still be morally repugnant, in fact be even more morally repugnant because so well done. We have only to think for a moment of Leni Riefenstahl's *Triumph of the Will*, a film which glorifies not only Nazism but actual Nazis, and not only Nazis but Hitler, and not an actor impersonating Hitler but Hitler himself. The fact that such a mesmerizingly haunting movie could be made to extol so evil a philosophy tells us something about the limits of pure aestheticism, for *Triumph of the Will* is magnificently executed, and rest assured that no awkward moral revisionism is trundled in at the end.

One of the wonders of modern criticism has been its ability to see art on its own terms, as a "sacred wood," a separate universe, a self-contained sovereignty; this approach has yielded some superb criticism, and is certainly an excellent way to teach literature in the classroom. When asked if the artist was responsible to society, Nabokov loftily replied that the artist was responsible to no one but himself, and of course such a sentiment is meant to contain the idea of a responsibility that is really larger than that embodied in the question—the poet as unacknowledged legislator of humanity. But there may be something of a delusion behind this notion, the same delusion evidenced in these letters when Nabokov sings of "the inherent morality of uninhibited art," the same romantic delusion about the inherent morality of the uninhibited person freed from social constraints from which so much suffering has arisen.

At its best, modernist literature has itself criticized the aestheticism that it so often embodies; the possibility that an excessive emphasis on beauty and form may actually be dehumanizing is dealt with by Henry James, by Thomas Mann, and even at times by Nabokov. Yet modernist *critics* have often surrendered the very duty that a perhaps naive Patrick Buchanan seems to feel belongs to the critical enterprise—distinguishing between good and bad, or good and evil, or the humanizing and dehumanizing elements in works of art.

Simon Karlinsky of Berkeley once declared that the publication of *Lolita* in America and England signaled the final "collapse of the Victorian moralistic censorship that had persisted in Western countries till the end of the 1950's." But it might be added that the critical discussion of *Lolita* signaled the collapse of a certain type of Victorian critical authority as well. Would Matthew Arnold have surrendered to the courts his judgment of the humanizing or dehumanizing effects of a work of art, as his disciple Lionel Trilling was prepared to do?

No wonder, then, that the government has now stepped waist high into the critical gap.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Gardens and Ghettos

André A. Aciman

On a cold December night in 1926 a band of anti-fascists gathered in the small northern Italian sea town of Savona to help Filippo Turati flee the country aboard a motor boat. The dean of Italian socialism and a former member of the Italian parliament, Turati was now old and demoralized, and unwilling to risk a confrontation with the fascists; he had been persuaded by friends and sympathizers to seek asylum in France. Along the escape route, as he was whisked from one hiding place to the next, he had stopped at the home of Camillo Olivetti, the founder of the famous typewriter company, and, a few days later, at the home of Professor Giuseppe Levi, the renowned histologist and neuro-anatomist. "One evening," recalls Levi's daughter, now known to literature as Natalia Ginzburg,

> I heard my mother talking to someone in the hall. I heard her open the linen cupboard. Shadows moved across the glass panels of the doors. In the night, I heard someone coughing in the room next to me. . . . "He has to escape from Italy. He is in hiding. You must not tell anyone. . . ."

Turati was not the first Italian socialist to run to France for political exile. Two of his closest party friends, Giuseppe Modigliani and Claudio Treves, both with distinguished parliamentary careers, had also fled that same year. By a strange coincidence, both Modigliani and Treves had something else in common, being related to two famous 20th-century Italian painters: Giuseppe Modigliani was the brother of Amedeo; and Claudio Treves was the uncle of Carlo Levi (a writer as well as a painter).

All four were also Jewish. As were Camillo Olivetti and Dr. Giuseppe Levi. As were two of the younger anti-fascists now organizing Filippo Turati's escape: Adriano Olivetti, Camillo's son and heir to the Olivetti fortune, who served in the Italian parliament after the war, and Carlo Rosselli, who devoted his life and a good portion of his family fortune to anti-fascist activities in Italy and Spain and who, together with his brother, the historian Nello Rosselli, was assassinated by fascist thugs along a highway in France in a manner that recalls only too vividly Bernardo Bertolucci's film adaptation of *The Conformist*, the novel by Alberto Moravia (a half-Jew).

The Rosselli assassination left deep scars in the Italian consciousness, and there is scarcely a city in Italy today that does not commemorate the Rosselli brothers with a street name. In previous centuries, it all but goes without saying, such testimonials would have been totally unthinkable. Indeed, if only because Jews had lived there longer than in any other European land, to Italy belonged the distinction of the most enduring history of anti-Jewish persecution in Europe.

Still, if Italy's record vis-à-vis the Jews was no better than that of other European countries, it was also certainly no worse. The word *ghetto* may be Italian, but *auto-da-fé* is Spanish. In Italy as elsewhere, fluctuations occurred between tolerance and repression, freedom and confinement, even survival and extinction. In Italy, however, those fluctuations tended to assume an extreme form—and it is in keeping with this fact that when Jewish emancipation and integration came in the 19th century, in no other European country were they as sudden and overwhelming as in Italy after the unification in 1870.

The fluctuation between extremes is what gives Italian Jewish history its volatile and contradictory character, and that complex, elusive character has been the subject of a panoramic exhibit mounted at the Jewish Museum in New York this fall, *Gardens and Ghettos: The Art of Jewish Life in Italy* (September 17, 1989-February 1, 1990). The exhibit was launched with a two-day conference, and is accompanied by a meticulously researched and lavishly illustrated catalogue containing a number of very informative articles.* In its historical sweep it is nothing if not comprehensive, spanning the legacy of Italian Jewry from Roman times through the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, all the way down to the present, and covering almost every aspect of Italian Jewish culture from the religious to the social, political, artistic, and even terpsichorean.

The exhibit, which occupies two floors of the museum, divides neatly into two major sections: pre- and post-emancipation, with emancipation falling somewhere between the Napoleonic invasion of Italy and the final unification. The first-floor displays thus open with a cast from a detail of the Arch of Titus, showing captives carrying spoils from the ransacked Temple in Jerusalem, and proceed through a colorful array of scrolls, manuscripts, incunabula, prints depicting life in the medieval ghetto, marriage contracts, circumcision ensembles, and other objects of devotional and ceremonial art. The second floor is devoted to paintings by 19th- and 20th-century Jewish artists and to documents relating to modern Italian Jewish history. Together, both floors provide a necessarily selective yet nonetheless faithful and representative account of Jewish life in Italy.

That life, in the centuries prior to the modern era, could best be described as one of abiding discomfort. Documents in the exhibit include a decree expelling Jews from Naples (1504), another expelling them from Bologna (1590), and an edict of 1553 calling for the burning of the Talmud. Nor were Jews in

André A. Aciman *is a specialist in 17th-century comparative literature. He is currently working on a book about growing up in Egypt.*

* *Gardens and Ghettos: The Art of Jewish Life in Italy*, edited by Vivian B. Mann. University of California Press, 354 pp., $55.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Italy immune from blood libel: on display, for example, is a late 15th-century painting by Gandolfino di Roreto d'Asti, *The Martyrdom of Simon of Trent.* Of the Jews blamed for the death of the lad Simon (who was subsequently canonized), many were tortured, some "confessed" and were executed, while others were forced to convert to Christianity.

But there were also golden years, in which Jews were able to lead fulfilling religious and communal lives. Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen as well as several Popes and heads of famous families—the Sforzas, the Medicis, the Estes, the Gonzagas—granted rights and privileges which, though tentative and subject to immediate withdrawal, permitted Jews to thrive tolerably well. One does indeed have a sense that, within limits, they flourished richly; they had their businesses and their academies, and many could travel where they pleased. They also had a certain access to the mainstream. Jewish doctors were coveted, Jewish translators were respected, and, with the Renaissance, Jewish learning was sought after by Christian Hebraists and by philosophers like Ficcino, Pico, and Bruno.

UNLIKE other Jewish communities around the world, which by and large kept to themselves, Italian Jews were drawn to Italian culture and were eager to participate in it. One proof of this lies in the number of beautifully illuminated Hebrew manuscripts shown in the Jewish Museum exhibit, particularly in those manuscripts that were illuminated by, or in collaboration with, Christian artists. Jews were also very quick to take advantage of Gutenberg's invention, and a Jewish printing house, the Soncino Press, was established before the end of the 15th century.

A Hebrew book published by Soncino in 1492 and included in the exhibit illustrates quite vividly the degree to which Jews had integrated Italian culture and turned it to their own creative purposes. The book is the *Notebooks (Mahberot)* of Immanuel of Rome (ca. 1265-ca. 1331), an extravagantly gifted poet whose verse pulsates with the ribald vitality of a Boccaccio or a Chaucer. Immanuel was not only the first poet to write a sonnet in Hebrew, but he composed respectable Italian verse as well, including a *stil nuovo* tribute to Dante (whom he may have met) upon the great poet's death.

In later times, pious Jews would be forbidden to read Immanuel's poetry, no doubt because of sentiments like these (the translation is by Allen Mandelbaum):

> I'm an errant Jew, yet not a Muslim,
> And I don't set my ship toward Christians.
> But of every law I'm willing to observe a part:
> The Christian's gobbling and guzzling,
> Good Moses' seldom fasting,
> And the wantonness of Islam
> Which keeps no faith from the waist down.

On different but related grounds, Jews would also be forbidden even to own a copy of another book shown in the Jewish Museum exhibit, Azariah de' Rossi's *Me'or Einayim* ("Enlightenment to the Eyes"). By using non-Hebraic sources, and by subjecting Hebraic sources themselves to critical examination, Rossi (ca. 1511-ca. 1578) was able to compute a chronology of Jewish history that contradicted established tradition. A man of the Renaissance who had read all the classics, Rossi was also the first to translate into Hebrew an important Greek pseudepigraphical document, the *Letter of Aristeas,* relating to the translation of the Holy Scriptures into Greek under the ancient Ptolemies.

THE musician and composer Salamone de Rossi (17th century)—some claim he may have been Azariah's son—is an equally significant figure in this show, as is the 15th-century dance master Guglielmo da Pesaro, who was attached to the Medici court and was the author of a famous Renaissance dance manual. (Rossi's music can be heard at the Jewish Museum on audio tape, and Pesaro's dances can be seen on video.) Dance instruction, indeed, was a profession to which more than one Jew turned; the great Venetian rabbi Leon da Modena (1571-1648) may himself have been a dance instructor, and was certainly an enthusiast of Salamone de Rossi's music, which he wanted to include in Jewish religious services. Modena's *Historia dei riti hebraici* ("History of the Jewish Religion"), written on request for King James I of England, is on exhibit next to the text of Azariah de Rossi—no accident, since Modena admired de Rossi's book and was deeply influenced by it.

Leon da Modena was a man of many trades and many skills; he had a very agile mind and was no stranger to ambivalence, perplexity, and indecision. He was a compulsive gambler who denounced gambling, an anti-kabbalist who defended the Kabbalah, a religious free-thinker who vigorously defended established religious practices. As a boy, he wrote a poem (*Kinah shemor,* or *Chi nasce, muor*) which when read aloud makes sense in either Italian or Hebrew: an emblem, perhaps, of the beguiling contradictions, and instabilities, inherent in his cultural situation.

Modena's *Autobiography*—not in the exhibit—tells a tale of the most lamentable existence. At the same time, it gives a very clear picture of the animated intellectual and religious climate which prevailed among the Jews of Venice, a community huddled together in unthinkable numbers, persecuted, denounced, periodically banished, readmitted, robbed, cheated, and interned, yet still enjoying greater comfort and a far richer cultural life than their Eastern European or Levantine co-religionists.*

In the city of Leghorn, which unlike Venice did not have a closed ghetto, Jews at about this same time were free not only to practice their religion but also to convert back to Judaism after they or their ancestors had forcibly embraced Catholicism in Spain or Portugal. The same privilege was granted to the Jews of Ferrara. But it hardly prevailed throughout Italy as a whole, then or later. One of the most disturbing

* My review of the new English translation of Modena's *Autobiography* appeared in the May 1989 COMMENTARY.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pictures in the exhibit is a small print by the Swiss artist Hieronymus Hess entitled *The Conversion of the Jews*. Dated 1823, it depicts a jowly priest delivering a conversion sermon to a congregation of terrorized if passively defiant Jews, one of whom has a finger thrust in each ear to fend off the hateful message.

Yet less than fifty years after this print was made, while Russia was still busy slaughtering Jews in a succession of pogroms, compelling them to flee to other lands, the Italian Jewish community had thrown in its lot with the forces of liberation. As Dan Vittorio Segre writes, Italian Jews at that period "felt themselves not only citizens but also founding fathers of a new nation."

THE history of the *Risorgimento* is summed up in the careers of four men—Mazzini, Manin, Cavour, and Garibaldi—and in all four careers Jews played unusually prominent roles. Manin, who became president of the revived Venetian Republic in 1848, was half-Jewish and appointed other Jews to his cabinet, among them a Rosselli and a Moravia ancestor. Carlo Rosselli's great-grandparents, the Nathans and Rossellis, supported, financed, and indeed cared for the aging Giuseppe Mazzini, who died in their house in Pisa. Ernesto Nathan, a personality very reminiscent of Charles Haas—the prototype for Marcel Proust's Swann—knew both Mazzini and Garibaldi and was to become the first Jewish mayor of Rome. The Jewish Isaac Artom was the private secretary of Count Camillo di Cavour, the architect of Italian reunification. And finally, fighting for Garibaldi was yet another Jew, Giuseppe Ottolenghi, later to become a senator and minister of war.

Jews had never been so visible, in such numbers. As Susan Zuccotti relates in her book, *The Italians and the Holocaust*, both the youngest and oldest winners of medals for valor to die in World War I were Jews. A third, lesser-known Rosselli brother, Aldo, also died in combat in the war. And in the years after the war Jews continued to be conspicuous by their civic contributions, by their activities at the highest levels of culture, and by their unswerving national devotion—none of which, when the next war came, would save the Italian Jewish community from the gas chambers.

It would be tempting to suppose that in the 20's and 30's most Italian Jews were, like the Rossellis and the Modiglianis, committed to the struggle against fascism. But that was simply not the case. Many supported Mussolini, at least until the fascist movement turned openly anti-Semitic, and a few remained faithful to Mussolini right up to the declaration of war. Even such rabid anti-fascists as Carlo Rosselli, Carlo Levi, and Leone Ginzburg were convinced that fascism differed fundamentally from Nazism on the question of the treatment of Jews. Not coincidentally, for many years one of Mussolini's most steadfast supporters was his Jewish mistress, Margherita Sarfatti. (Her portrait, by Boccioni, is in the exhibit.) She had been the galvanizing force behind the artistic movement *Novecento*; one of its members was Aldo Carpi, whose grisly concentration-camp sketches are on display at the museum.

All such discriminations, however, were lost on the fascist press, which soon launched an unbridled campaign of anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist propaganda. The Turati affair, which would have cost Carlo Rosselli a five-year jail term had he not escaped, became an occasion for insinuating that Jews were disproportionately represented among those opposed to, and indeed willing to act against, Mussolini's regime. Though the charge may not have fully registered the first time around—blame for Turati's escape was also shared by two prominent non-Jewish anti-fascists, Ferruccio Parri, later Italy's prime minister, and Sandro Pertini, later its president—the second time around no one was allowed to miss it.

THAT was in 1934, in the wake of what would become known as the Ponte Tresa affair. An Italian Jew named Sion Segre had been caught at the border town of Ponte Tresa trying to smuggle in anti-fascist propaganda from Switzerland. The literature in question reflected the view of *Giustizzia e Libertà*, a non-Marxist, non-Zionist anti-fascist organization founded and led by Carlo Rosselli. Segre's accomplice managed to escape by swimming across the icy river to Switzerland, all the while hurling insults at his pursuers: "Italian dogs, cowards." The escaped young man turned out to be none other than Mario Levi, Professor Giuseppe Levi's son and Natalia Ginzburg's brother.

In fact, the list of people implicated in the Ponte Tresa affair reads like a roster of those already involved, some of them marginally, in Turati's flight. Of the seventeen final suspects in the incident, eleven were Jewish. Four knew each other very, very well: Leone Ginzburg, Giuseppe Levi, Gino Levi, and Carlo Levi. It might even be argued that those Italian Jews who attained any degree of fame in the years surrounding World War II could all be traced, in one way or other, to the circles intimately involved in the Turati or Ponte Tresa affairs. Most, as it happens, turn up in the museum show.

Leone Ginzburg, the brilliant Russian émigré who was eventually killed by the Nazis, married Natalia, Professor Giuseppe Levi's daughter and Mario Levi's sister. Mario Levi himself was to marry the painter Amedeo Modigliani's daughter. Gino Levi, Natalia's other brother, also implicated in the Ponte Tresa affair, was eventually promoted to manager of the Olivettis' typewriter factory. He was a very close friend of Adriano Olivetti, who fell in love with and married still another Levi daughter, Paola. A cousin of Giuseppe Levi, Margherita Sarfatti, besides being Mussolini's mistress, was a friend of Anna Kulischova, Turati's life-long mistress and, of course, Mussolini's arch-enemy. In yet another irony, Natalia Levi Ginzburg's path would ultimately cross the writer Primo Levi's (no relation) when, as an editor at Einaudi immediately after the war, she would reject his manuscript, *Survival at Auschwitz*.

But more important to the exhibit at the Jewish Museum is Carlo Levi—again no relation to either Giuseppe Levi or Primo Levi. He was a physician, painter, and writer, and also Filippo Turati's friend.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Carlo was the lover of Paola Olivetti, Adriano's wife; she is the "Small Nude" on exhibit at the museum, where one also finds Levi's portraits of his friends Carlo and Nello Rosselli, of Leone Ginzburg, and of the novelist Alberto Moravia (born Pincherle). Moravia was Carlo and Nello Rosselli's first cousin. His sister, Adriana Pincherle, was a painter in her own right; her colorful self-portrait, which already shows traces of Modigliani's influence, is part of the show.

The network, however, is even more intricate. Carlo Levi was an extremely devoted friend of the Triestine Jewish poet Umberto Saba, himself a good friend of the painter Arturo Nathan, whose desolate portrayals of rocks, shipwrecks, and volcanos (on display at the museum) trace their origins both to the influence of Giorgio de Chirico and to psychoanalytical sessions with Freud's first Italian disciple, Edoardo Weiss. Another Triestine Jew with an interest in psychoanalysis was Italo Svevo (born Ettore Schmitz), arguably Italy's best-known 20th-century novelist and, incidentally, the first Italian translator of Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams.*

Saba's poetry, too, is laced with the history of his lifelong relationship with psychoanalysis. His meditative, introspective vein has been captured by the painter Vittorio Bolaffio, whose contemplative portrait of Saba against the lush blue of the Triestine esplanade is one of the most lyrical paintings at the exhibit. It was along that same esplanade that the aging Italo Svevo once confided to a friend the sad thought that it is not race or ethnicity but life itself that makes one a Jew.

ONE should not be misled by this cat's-cradle of names. True, the individuals themselves often joked about the peculiar fatality that always seemed to draw one totally secularized Jew to another, equally secularized Jew. And the reticulum is just too intricate *not* to be reminiscent somehow of ghetto life. But the irony is that if one thing distinguished Italian Jews from their Eastern European co-religionists at this time, it was precisely that they had outgrown the ghetto and the mentality that went along with it. Most were totally assimilated Jews for whom the question of a Jewish identity, much less of a Jewish homeland, was entirely supererogatory.

The word "assimilated" has come to acquire a pejorative connotation, implying a loosening or even a renunciation of Judaism. That is partially what took place in Italy. The Jewish middle class had embraced all aspects of Italian national life and defined its aspirations in terms of the prevailing social, economic, and intellectual conditions. Jews may have continued to attend synagogue and to pray in Hebrew; but many knew enough only to mouth the words, while others did not know them at all or were more familiar with Christian than with Jewish ritual. A sizable number intermarried. For the Jewish intelligentsia, Judaism as a defining principle of life could never compete with the ferment of ideas brought about by the European Enlightenment.

The Olivettis, for example, had intermarried—as had the Rossellis and the Pincherles—and led entirely secular lives, complete with a love for fast cars, Hollywood-style parties, and hasty jaunts to skiing resorts. Emilio Sereni and Umberto Terracini were totally given over to the Communist cause. The very title of Carlo Levi's book, *Christ Stopped at Eboli* (1945), seemed intended to jostle readers with an image at loggerheads with the author's last name. Alberto Moravia's novels reflect the estrangement, boredom, and indifference of middle-class characters fatuously preoccupied with sexuality.

The case of Giorgio Bassani, himself Jewish and the author of *The Garden of the Finzi-Contini* (1962), is hardly different. In the wonderful film made from this book there is a lingering scene of a Passover seder as it was still being celebrated by the upper-class Finzi-Continis; but a better flavor of the essentially secularized life led by these Jews occurs toward the end of the novel when, in a heart-to-heart chat, the narrator's father, a physician, congratulates his son for paying regular visits to a brothel and cautions him against venereal disease.

Natalia Ginzburg provides another example of Jewish assimilation in her book *Family Sayings* (1963) as she quotes her father gruffly insisting that Leone Ginzburg, her future husband, is very ugly, because all Jews are ugly. "But aren't you a Jew also?" teases Levi's wife, who is not Jewish. "Well, yes, I am ugly too." But then later he adds, "He [Ginzburg] is ugly because he is a Sephardic Jew. I am an Ashkenazi and that is why I am less ugly." It would be just typical of a secularized Jew not to know that a Ginzburg from Russia would be most unlikely to be a Sephardi.

And then there is the case of Primo Levi who, at Auschwitz, drew some form of spiritual solace not from reciting Jewish texts or by recalling Jewish ritual but by remembering and quoting passages from Dante, the most Christian of Italian poets. One could, of course, claim that any such manifestation of love for a remembered text in periods of exile or confinement is a distinguishing trait of the People of the Book. But then the 19th-century Italian patriot Silvio Pellico whiled away the years of his political imprisonment by memorizing a canto a day from *The Divine Comedy.* It was, after all, a very Italian thing to do.

PRECISELY because of the high degree of assimilation among Italian Jews, it is difficult to isolate what exactly distinguishes Judeo-Italian art. Indeed, any attempt to single out some all-embracing characteristic that would make such art unique or different is bound to rest on questionable methodological grounds. If anything, it is the absence of such an element which is striking in the exhibit at the Jewish Museum, particularly among the modern painters.

But this has not deterred the organizers of *Gardens and Ghettos,* or the contributors to its catalogue, from trying to locate that elusive quiddity. The following sentence is from Emily Braun's article, "From the Risorgimento to the Resistance: One Hundred Years of Jewish Art in Italy":

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> While it is difficult to detect nuances of an ethnic identity in the styles of these late 19th-century intimists, the probing psychological depths led to a growing sense of detachment rather than unquestioned assimilation among the artists and writers of Trieste.

Or take this remark from a wall label accompanying the work of the 20th-century painter Antonietta Raphaël Mafai: "A personal ethnic flavor distinguishes her art from that of the more assimilated, native Italian Jews."

From the works themselves, it is difficult to determine what might constitute these distinguishing "nuances," these traits of "ethnic flavor." In the case of Antonietta Raphaël Mafai, at least, the scene being depicted is a Yom Kippur service in a synagogue. But one can no more extrapolate a broad ethnic meaning from that scene—as one might, say, with a similar scene by Chagall—than one could from the arrangement of the Kol Nidrei prayer by the composer Max Bruch, who after all was not even Jewish.

Such speculations—and, to be fair, they are very few—betray, perhaps, an unstated assumption on the part of the show's sponsors: that, regardless of the degree to which Italian Jews were, or tried to be, completely assimilated, they continued to exhibit aesthetic and intellectual tendencies indissolubly linked to their Jewish origins. Assumptions of this sort are tricky in every sense of the word. And yet one sees why they are made. For one thing, they enable a viewer to apprehend all these diverse and various artifacts and works of art under a single overarching principle. But more importantly, the assumptions themselves reflect the inevitable reinterpretation of the meaning of Jewish experience that has taken place in the wake of the Holocaust.

For, in addition to shaping the course of postwar Jewish life and consciousness, the Holocaust has cast a long shadow backward as well. In particular, it has pulled the rug out from under the hapless dance of assimilation. From the vantage point of today, it is impossible to view pre-World War II Jewish Italian art without drawing some connection, however naive and even historically unfair, between, for example, Vittorio Corcos's woman with the provocatively dreamy gaze, or Carlo Levi's father convalescing with his arm in a sling, or Levi-Montalcini's languid *summerscape with friends slouching* everywhere on the grass, and Aldo Carpi's hurried sketches of corpses heaped upon a wagon in front of a crematorium. Alongside the indisputable charm and color that radiate from every facet of this marvelous show, there thus lingers as well an aura of finality, of sadness, and of implacable historical judgment.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Bureaucrat & the War

LOST VICTORY: A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT OF AMERICA'S SIXTEEN-YEAR INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM. By WILLIAM COLBY with JAMES MCCARGAR. *Contemporary Books. 438 pp. $22.95.*

Reviewed by ANGELO M. CODEVILLA

WILLIAM COLBY, director of Central Intelligence (1973-75), and perhaps the highest ranking American with the longest record of service in and about Vietnam (1959-75), has written "my contribution to the effort to achieve understanding . . . of the vital lessons to be drawn from the suffering and agony of the Second Vietnam War."

Like Peter Braestrup's *Big Story* (how the American media turned the U.S. victory at Tet 1968 into a strategic disaster) and Harry Summers's analysis of how U.S. military superiority was wasted, Colby's new book shows that the U.S. won a victory of another kind but threw it away. The victory Colby is talking about was in the political struggle for control of South Vietnam. And indeed he shows convincingly enough that by about 1972 that struggle was over. The Communists had failed in their own chosen method of guerrilla warfare both because the South Vietnamese and the Americans had done a lot of things right and because the 1968 Tet offensive had proved disastrous to the Vietcong. Life for nearly all South Vietnamese civilians had become normal and secure. Colby drives home the point by recounting that on the Tet holiday of 1972 he was able to take an unescorted, carefree motorcycle ride across the Mekong Delta.

Three years later, on April 30, 1975, North Vietnamese troops in Soviet tanks (not barefoot Southern guerrillas) smashed through the gates of the presidential palace in Saigon. The U.S. victory in North Vietnam's original style of warfare had become irrelevant. North Vietnam had been able to switch its efforts to a conventional war which the U.S. had stopped fighting, or even supporting.

How did this come to be? While Braestrup and Summers explain rather well how their respective victories were turned to disaster, Colby does not do the same for his.

COLBY recounts the familiar story. Beginning about 1961, the U.S. government set up a conventional military shield behind which South Vietnam established a working society. By 1972, South Vietnam had its own military shield, no more dependent on the U.S. than North Vietnam was dependent on the Soviet Union. In the spring of 1972, with the U.S. forces having withdrawn from ground combat, the government of South Vietnam successfully repelled a full-scale invasion from the North. The South Vietnamese people supported their government. There was no subversion in the rear, and the refugees from the fighting went exclusively southward. But later that year the U.S. government pulled the rug out. It coerced South Vietnam to accept a "peace" agreement that legitimized the North Vietnamese army's presence on its soil. The agreement also delegitimized any attempt to stop North Vietnamese preparations for a final assault, and plainly foreshadowed the total withdrawal of U.S. support. After all, if there had been a peace agreement, why continue to fuel a war? And indeed, both South Vietnam's supplies and its morale dried up. When the final blow came, the South Vietnamese government was fighting (in the words of a North Vietnamese general) "a poor man's war" against a superb Soviet-supplied military machine.

Colby, however, having explained in detail the motives and judgments of various U.S. government officials regarding the political *development* of South Vietnam, does not begin to explain the thoughts in the minds of those same officials with regard to the *scuttling* of South Vietnam. In sum, then, he fails to deliver on his larger promise to "achieve understanding of the vital lessons."

The book's substantive shortcomings are related to its literary ones: it rambles and repeats itself. In general, both style and substance express the outlook of a bureaucrat—a man whose vision of a situation is circumscribed by particular programs, by his own career, by the primacy of the process through which the will of superiors translates into the acts of subordinates and, not least, by a particular kind of language.

Colby was a good bureaucrat. He believed in and rigorously obeyed the five Presidents he served *re* Vietnam. He also believed in the cause of South Vietnam's independence, and especially in the role he was assigned to play in the struggle to turn it into a politically viable nation. His *engagé* background in domestic politics, and as one of the CIA's political-action officers, gave him a sophisticated understanding of what actually makes political movements and governments viable or unviable. He therefore appreciated that Ngo Dinh Diem had earned his position as South Vietnam's political leader (1954-63), and that none of his detractors, Vietnamese or American, had the knowledge, the skill, or the drive to do better by that country than Diem was doing. Colby worked with Diem and his brother Nhu to teach Vietnamese villagers how to defend themselves. Together they believed that these islands of organized safety would merge like spots of oil on a blotter.

Hence Colby fought hard to dissuade the U.S. government from fomenting the 1963 coup that killed Diem—an event which Ho Chi Minh is said to have called "a gift from heaven." But when the ill-thought-out orders came, Colby saluted and helped to accomplish what he knew would be both wrong and erroneous. Four years

ANGELO M. CODEVILLA, *a fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, is the co-author of* War: Ends and Means *and the author of* While Others Build.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

later, Colby was pleased to work the same oil-spot strategy with President Nguyen Van Thieu, who also thought Diem had done a good job.

THE bulk of the book is a reiteration of the arguments Colby made within the U.S. government from the 50's to the 70's for concentrating on the strategy of extending effective government and citizen self-defense throughout South Vietnam.

The most famous, and misunderstood, part of the Colby strategy was the Phoenix program. It consisted of pooling all allied intelligence resources to identify the Communist cadres throughout Vietnam. Once identified, they were either to be encouraged to switch sides or to be arrested, interrogated, and punished. Many were killed resisting arrest. The Phoenix program worked. By 1971 most of the Communist cadres who had taxed, conscripted, terrorized, and propagandized the South Vietnamese countryside were either in jail, in exile, or dead.

Colby defends Phoenix as "police work," as a process designed to be as objective as possible, and as being very much within the traditional rules of land warfare. Fair enough. But he misses the chance to discuss the role—both moral and practical—of the killing done under Phoenix, or indeed of any and all killing in warfare.

The only justifiable purpose of such killing, both from the standpoint of military efficiency and of morality, is to end the war and to secure those goods for which the war is being fought. Hence it is both most efficient and morally most justifiable to concentrate on those who most embody the enemy's purpose in the war, and who have the greatest role in the enemy's war effort. Colby could have argued, but did not, that targeting people reasonably suspected of being part of the Vietcong infrastructure was far more defensible in every way than shooting at rank-and-file Vietcong in battle. In opposition to this argument, some American officials sanctioned the killing not just of enemy draftees, but also of their families at home, while



Jane Fonda once said if the American people knew what communism was, they would get down on their knees and pray we would someday be communist.

Jane Fonda isn't saying that today.

How Marxism, a system so despotic, bathed in blood and spawning world misery, came to beguile so many, is told in *The Seductive Illusion.*

This is a timely expose of the international communist movement. A founding member of the U.S. Communist Party, former New Left activists and others, reveal its organization and the methods used to seduce idealistic minds, manipulate public opinion and subvert America's democratic institutions.

This is the story of the great confidence game of the 20th century told with dramatic, gripping film footage. It will explain the significance of the great communist crack-up now taking place.



Now available at the special sale price of $24.95

3569

To: ACCURACY IN MEDIA
1275 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 371-6710

YES, please send me *The Seductive Illusion:*

_____ copies at the special sale price of $24.95 ea. $ _____. Shipping $3.50 per tape. Add $1.00 for each additional tape. U.S. only. Other countries extra.

☐ My check is enclosed.
☐ Charge VISA/MasterCard/AMEX

_____

Expires: _____

Name: _____

Address: _____

City, State, Zip: _____

CREDIT CARD ORDERS: CALL 1-800-345-8112

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

abhorring the killing of enemy officials, which they mindlessly labeled "assassination." Colby could have attacked *this* attitude not as an excess of moral refinement but as a moral perversion with serious practical consequences. Yet neither in his congressional testimony in the 1970's nor in his book did he ask: "Whom would you have had us kill—the draftee or the drafter?" Perhaps the reason he did not is that the logic of that question leads directly to others: "Why not win the war by obliterating the politburo of North Vietnam, or bombing the Red River dikes?" And if we were unwilling to do what was necessary to win, what *were* we doing?

COLBY's explanation of why the U.S. government threw away the victory that his own political warriors had won is that the antiwar movement triumphed in the battle for public opinion, "the democratic process worked," and the officials in power in Washington followed suit. In the end, Colby blames the American people, who, he says, were manipulated by the media.

This sort of explanation is dear to Washingtonians, especially conservatives. The U.S. government does something dumb or dishonorable. Never inquire into the thoughts of those who did it, or blame them. Wistfully say that disaster is the price that we must pay for being a democracy. When President Carter cancels the neutron bomb, or when President Reagan winds up accepting one-fourth the number of MX missiles that President Carter had proposed, public opinion *must* be responsible—even though most Americans did not endorse, much less urge their leaders to take, these actions.

In the case of Vietnam, as one may see in John E. Mueller's *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion,* the polls lagged *behind* U.S. government policy as it moved inexorably to abandon its ally. Indeed, every time a U.S. President did something aggressive in Vietnam the polls rose. They fell again as U.S. leaders made clear that their highest aspiration was to get us out. Moreover, the antiwar movement lost the two polls that counted the most, the presidential elections of 1968 and 1972. The American people voted for the "tough" candidate, who said that saving South Vietnam was essential to the security of America, and who, like his predecessor and successor, vowed to do it. The government bowed, all right. But not to majority opinion.

Colby says that Presidents Nixon and Ford, like Johnson before them, and their chief assistants, did the best that anyone could have done to save Vietnam, but were overwhelmed. This is nonsense. As is clear from the book itself, the process of abandonment was driven by high-level incompetence, political cowardice, and deference to the few who comprised the antiwar movement over the many voters.

Consider incompetence. Colby notes—to cite only one example—that in December 1972, President Nixon finally discovered the old military truth that "escalating by increment rather than by overpowering force would not work," and wished he had tried overpowering force earlier.

Consider political cowardice. According to Colby, Congress is not only the villain of the piece but the *deus ex machina* as well. Yet Colby's only piece of evidence for the proposition that Congress forced the President's hand is that it passed the War Powers Act over President Nixon's veto. Because of this Act, Colby says, President Ford could not order U.S. naval and air forces to help stem North Vietnam's final assault in April 1975. But the War Powers Act only requires that the President submit a report to Congress 60 days *after* initiating a military action. After 60 days of serious B-52 raids there would have been no more North Vietnamese army.

WHY was so much deference paid by our leaders to the antiwar movement? Why, from the very first, did Lyndon Johnson refuse to call the war by its name, thereby failing to put everyone on notice that the antiwar movement was an activity lethal to other Americans? Why did he, and his successors, continue to praise the motives of those in the antiwar movement, thereby legitimizing them even as they worked to delegitimize the country? Why did Lyndon Johnson, in March 1968, once he had given up any thought of winning the war, not tell the American people about the direction in which he had turned and where it would lead? If he did not have it in him to bear the responsibility for choosing either victory or defeat, why did he not, as suggested by Max Ascoli, then editor of the old-line liberal magazine the *Reporter,* resign and leave this responsibility clearly to his successor? Why did Presidents Nixon and Ford persist in this deference even unto the disaster itself?

It is significant that a book by a man who sat in the highest councils of government sheds no light at all on these absolutely crucial questions.

Zionist Rabbi

ABBA HILLEL SILVER: A PROFILE IN AMERICAN JUDAISM. By MARC LEE RAPHAEL. Introduction by ALEXANDER M. SCHINDLER. *Holmes & Meier. 328 pp. $49.50.*

Reviewed by DAVID G. DALIN

ABBA HILLEL SILVER, who died in 1963, occupied a unique place both in American public life and in the public life of the American Jewish community. The long-term rabbi of an imposing Reform synagogue in Cleveland where he preached to thousands every month, Silver played an instrumental role in convincing his colleagues within the Reform movement—most of whom up until 1937 were opposed to the idea of Jewish statehood—that a follower of liberal Judaism could (and should) also be a Zionist. As a Zionist, he helped build that movement into a political force in the United States, and in 1947 argued the case for Israel's statehood before the UN General Assembly. Finally, as a Republican and a vocal critic of the Roosevelt administration in an era when support for the Democratic party was considered almost

DAVID G. DALIN, *an ordained rabbi, teaches American Jewish history at the University of Hartford.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

synonymous with adherence to Judaism, Silver not only helped to diversify American Jewish political allegiances but eventually found a place for himself within Republican politics at the national level, serving as an adviser to the Eisenhower administration on Israel and Middle East affairs. Yet until now Silver has never been the subject of a book-length biography, which is reason enough to welcome this informative new study by Marc Lee Raphael of Ohio State University.

Following his ordination from Hebrew Union College in 1915 and a brief stint in Wheeling, West Virginia, Silver was called to the pulpit of Congregation Tifereth Israel of Cleveland where he would remain as spiritual leader until his death. Within a decade of his arrival, Tifereth Israel had grown to more than 1,200 members, making it the largest Reform congregation in America. Despite the growing demands and responsibilities of his public career, and a frenetic schedule of travel and speeches, Silver, according to Raphael, always saw "his primary role" as a congregational rabbi—though Raphael also admits that Silver had "a strong disdain for the pastoral work of the rabbi," and throughout his tenure in Cleveland there were complaints that he did not care much about his congregation or his rabbinic vocation, but merely exploited them as bases from which to pursue his career elsewhere.

Throughout his busy life, Zionism was the cause to which Silver was always most passionately devoted. Raphael analyzes in vivid detail the expanding functions he assumed within the leadership of the American Zionist movement during the 1930's and 1940's, including his appointment as chairman of the United Palestine Appeal, the major Zionist fundraising organization in America, his "sensational" appearance at the Biltmore Conference in 1942 at which he made an eloquently militant speech on behalf of Jewish statehood, his wartime work with Stephen S. Wise (another Reform rabbi who was also an early Zionist) in the American Zionist Emergency Council, which they both co-chaired from August 1943 until December 1944, and the events leading up to his appointment as chairman of the American section of the Jewish Agency in 1946 and his crucial appearance at the United Nations as spokesman for world Jewry.

WHILE Raphael emphasizes Silver's personal charisma and administrative and organizational genius, he does not ignore the less attractive qualities that marked his public career. His long-time rival Nahum Goldmann characterized Silver as "a foul personality, a nasty character—absolutely ruthless to his opponents"; political invective, to be sure, but containing more than a grain of truth. By all accounts Silver was an unbending autocrat who was personally disliked even by many of his allies and who seemed to have a natural talent for making enemies. Raphael devotes considerable space to Silver's ongoing conflicts with these enemies within the Zionist leadership, including Goldmann, David Ben-Gurion, Chaim Weizmann, and Stephen S. Wise.

The most highly publicized such battle, with Wise, revolved around the latter's faith in the promises and good intentions of Franklin D. Roosevelt vis-à-vis both the trapped Jews of Europe and the fledgling Jewish national community in Palestine. This faith Silver condemned as illusory. Attacking Wise as a "Court Jew" who had "shielded, defended, and apologized" for a Democratic administration that had done "next to nothing for the Jewish people," Silver contended that Zionist aims and interests would be better served by support for the GOP. His defeat of Wise for the leadership of the American Zionist movement in 1946 reflected a wider disenchantment with the Democrats which he himself had done much to foster.

Silver's own disenchantment had begun earlier. His close ties with the Republican party—for many Jews, one of the most controversial and inexplicable aspects of his career—had their genesis during the 1940 election when he publicly urged FDR not to seek a third term and endorsed Wendell Willkie for

FROM CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Now in paperback...

THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, 1947–1949

Benny Morris

"...A book of extraordinary power and integrity...Hitherto this subject has been the realm of publicists and protagonists—Zionists, Palestinians, many others. In Benny Morris, this episode has its first historian and chronicler—no axe to grind, no apologies to make." —Fouad Ajami, *Washington Post Book World*

"A balanced analysis of a complex phenomenon." —Robert O. Freedman, *Jewish Monthly*

"Any serious examination of the refugee problem will have to take Benny Morris' work into account, as will anyone who wishes to see two peoples who have experienced tragedy reconcile their lives together in the absence of myths." —David Wemple, *American-Arab Affairs*

Cambridge Middle East Library $14.95

LAND, LABOR AND THE ORIGINS OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT, 1882–1914

Gershon Shafir

In this highly researched book, which demystifies much of the Zionist wisdom on the subject, the author addresses the emigration of East European agricultural workers to Palestine between 1904 and 1914. He argues that it was the particular condition of the conflict over land and labor markets between the Jewish settlers and the Palestinians that generated the typical characteristics of Israeli society.

Cambridge Middle East Library $44.50

At bookstores or from

Cambridge University Press

40 West 20th Street, NY, NY 10011. Call toll-free: 800-872-7423, outside NY State. 800-227-0247, NY State only. MasterCard & VISA accepted. Prices subject to change.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

President. The ties were strengthened through his work with Senator Robert Taft of Ohio and New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey in drafting the Palestine platform for the Republican national convention of 1944. The presidential campaign that year confirmed Silver in his pragmatic belief that Jewish votes should be exchanged only for promises kept: "Silver argued," writes Raphael, "both that a promise was only a promise, not a fact, and that pressure would be more likely to lead to the fulfillment of such a promise than would the present situation in which the President, certain of the Jewish vote, did not have to do anything concrete to assure it."

In 1948, Silver publicly praised Dewey, the Republican presidential candidate, for his "sincerity and forthrightness" in supporting the cause of Jewish statehood, and for speaking up "at a time when others were silent." His political steadfastness was rewarded during the late 1940's and 50's when, notes Raphael, "his easy access to Dulles, Dewey, and Eisenhower certainly aided Israel as it struggled for survival during its first decade of existence." By using his "wider pulpit" to further the contention that support for the Republican party was a legitimate expression of Jewish self-interest, Silver was truly a man ahead of his time.

MARC LEE RAPHAEL has written a thoughtful and absorbing book, but one that also contains some serious omissions. Although we learn a great deal about Silver's public career, there is surprisingly little about dimensions of his private and family life that properly belong in a biography. Thus, for example, Silver's relationship with his two sons, one of whom would succeed him as rabbi in Cleveland, is a subject compressed into two uncritical paragraphs.

But the most glaring omission is Raphael's failure to discuss at all Silver's role within the Central Conference of American Rabbis (CCAR), whose presidency he assumed in 1945 and whose reorientation toward Zionism he did much to bring about. The CCAR had been on record on this matter at least since 1897 when, just a few weeks before the First Zionist Congress in Basel, it voted its unanimous disapproval of "any attempt for the establishment of a Jewish state." While a few other prominent American Reform rabbis besides Silver did strongly support Zionism during the 1920's and 30's, they were a distinct minority in a movement that until 1937 remained staunchly opposed.

In his introduction to this book, Rabbi Alexander Schindler devotes some attention to a speech by Silver before the CCAR in 1935 in which he cogently attacked the anti-Zionist ideology of classical Reform Judaism and called for a reformulation of the movement's philosophy. Raphael, however, does not even mention this historic speech, nor does he discuss Silver's role as a member of the committee drafting the principles that became the basis of the Columbus Platform of 1937, in which the Reform rabbinate for the first time affirmed its commitment to Jewish nationalism. Even more surprisingly, there is absolutely no word about Silver's subsequent election to the presidency of the CCAR.

Despite its many virtues, then, this book is still not the definitive biography its fascinating subject deserves.

High Anxiety

FEAR OF FALLING: THE INNER LIFE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS. By BARBARA EHRENREICH. *Pantheon. 293 pp. $18.95.*

Reviewed by WILFRED M. MCCLAY

THE debacle of the 1988 presidential election not only left the very word "liberalism" badly battered, but may have administered the *coup de grâce* to the only opposition movement with a shred of intellectual and political vitality: the so-called "neoliberals." Hence, in 1992, the Democratic party will find that it once again has to face the relentless demands of its Left; and that Left, if it is feeling any vestigial desire to win elections, will have to come up with a plausible strategy for attracting middle-class voters, rather than continuing to invoke the *deus ex machina* of the unregistered and nonvoting masses—a strategy that might better be called "waiting for Godot."

Such is the very problem that *Fear of Falling* is designed to address. Stitching together an elaborate account of the changing structure of classes and class perceptions in postwar America, Barbara Ehrenreich hopes to provide arguments that will persuade the middle class, particularly that part of it she calls "the professional middle class," to make common cause with the working and "lower" classes, and thereby reinvigorate the Left's prospects in contemporary American politics.

The principal obstacles standing in the way of such solidarity, she believes, are the persistent misunderstandings and phantasms infesting the mind of the middle class. She intends to dispel these elements of false consciousness, in particular by persuading the middle class of two things: first, that its persistent fears, since the end of World War II, of "going soft" or "losing ground," and thus "falling" into the lower classes, have been selfish and harmful delusions; and second, that its position in the structure of the U.S. economy is infinitely more insecure than it appears to realize. It is hard to see how both these propositions can be true.

One would be justified in hoping for a more compelling thesis from Barbara Ehrenreich. She is a graceful and often witty essayist, usually at her best in writing of everyday, commonplace things—food, dieting, fashion, leisure, "relationships," and pop culture—from a mildly heterodox feminist position. As a prominent figure in the "communitarian" Left, she seems to have a genuine, if somewhat abstract and overly economic, appreciation of the forces that hold a community together. Beneath her rather conventional attacks on "consumer culture" lies a grudging admiration (an admiration one sees more clearly in a cultural critic like

---

WILFRED M. MCCLAY'S *article, "Religion in Politics; Politics in Religion," appeared in our October 1988 issue.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Christopher Lasch) for the old-fashioned Victorian virtues, especially work, family, thrift, and self-restraint.

But it is a grudging respect at best, deriving more from hatred of contemporary consumerism than from genuine regard for bourgeois values. Indeed, she finds consumption all-consuming, and attributes enormous coercive and hegemonic power to the "consumer culture." One never knows quite what to make of this fashionable term, which seems to designate what Poles, Russians, Chinese, and much of the rest of the world so ardently desire. But its use seems especially peculiar in a writer whose prose and thinking show so conspicuously the marks of the slick "lifestyle" journalist.

IN THE 50's, Miss Ehrenreich begins, all middle-class Americans believed themselves to be living in an affluent, classless society. A comfortable middle-class suburban existence was thought to be the American norm. But despite their well-being, members of the middle class were nagged by a persistent "fear of falling" out of their station (an understandable feeling, one would have thought, for those who could remember the Depression and the war).

Such anxieties, the account goes on, found a diverting outlet in the obsession with juvenile delinquency, which "gripped the public imagination in the 50's," and at the same time served as a "comforting distraction" from the "issue of class." Then, with the burgeoning civil-rights movement, and Michael Harrington's *The Other America* (1962), the middle class was induced to "discover" the existence of poverty. But instead of extending the range of its sympathies, the middle class merely projected its fears of downward mobility onto the poor, whom sociologists had conveniently taught Americans to think of stereotypically as "infantilized" products of a "culture of poverty."

According to Miss Ehrenreich, these condescending misperceptions of the "lower" classes were but the first in a parade of similarly self-protective illusions. Next came the charge of "permissiveness," directed especially against the "class traitors" who populated the student movement of the 1960's—traitors because they challenged the "class fortress" of the professions by their disdain for authority and expertise, and because they adopted rock and roll, the subversive "invention of the poor," as their own. Now the middle class was projecting its intense "fears of falling" onto its very own unruly youth.

But there arose an unexpected source of self-exculpating relief. Thanks to the well-publicized anti-antiwar militancy of the "hard-hats," and the presidential candidacy of George Wallace, the middle class suddenly "discovered" the existence of the working class, and promptly projected onto *it* all manner of contradictory urges: on the one hand, the working class could be a reservoir of traditional values in a time of cultural upheaval; on the other hand, it was a cesspool of authoritarian personality traits, bigotry, and hopelessly bad taste. The working class could thus be seen as a bulwark of "middle-American" values, at a moment when middle-class kids were deserting those values; and simultaneously the Archie Bunkers of the world could still be regarded with a comfortable sense of superiority.

The middle class also found that it could project onto the "liberal elite" or "New Class"—media elites, university professors, Washington intellectuals, foundation bureaucrats, etc.—all the "permissive" qualities that it most feared in itself. For the neoconservatives and the New Right, in particular, the concept of an ambitious and arrogant New Class became a "bludgeon" with which to beat opponents into submission—and self-contradictorily so, for what were the neoconservatives themselves but denizens of the New Class?

Finally, inevitably, came the yuppie. Emboldened by the intellectual Right's discrediting of anti-business attitudes, and freed from the sense of moral responsibility

Blackwell

JEWISH CULTURE

The Blackwell Companion to Jewish Culture
From the Eighteenth Century to the Present
Edited by
GLENDA ABRAMSON
$65.00 cloth 876 pp.

Survey of Jewish Affairs 1989
Edited by WILLIAM FRANKEL
$52.95 cloth

Woody Allen
New Yorker
GRAHAM McCANN
$24.95 cloth

The Levinas Reader
Emmanuel Levinas
Edited by SEÁN HAND
$16.95 paper $49.95 cloth

Jesus and the Judaism of His Time
IRVING M. ZEITLIN
$19.95 paper

Basil Blackwell, Inc.
Three Cambridge Center, Cambridge, MA 02142
TOLL-FREE ORDERING 1-800-445-6638

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which professional status once entailed, the yuppie simply threw in his lot with the corporate elite, displaying the seasoned cynicism of the well-paid courtesan. He accepted the fact that his class was a privileged one, and intended to make the most of those privileges, gorging himself at the cornucopia of consumerism while also working excessively hard at his job and exercising compulsively at the health club—all to prevent "going soft," to allay the "fear of falling."

Fortunately, however, the reign of the yuppie was brief, punctuated by the stock-market crash of 1987. His extreme self-centeredness was just too much for the middle class to take as a plausible image of itself; and the yuppie has crawled back into the mahogany woodwork. But the "fear of falling" remains, reassuming much the same form it took in the 1950's.

THIS, then, is Barbara Ehrenreich's walk through recent American history. It is like a stroll through a hall of funhouse mirrors; one finds oneself surrounded by a crowd of grotesque images whose apparent agitation and movement exist only in the eye of the beholder. We learn little about the lives of real Americans except that we do not know what we thought we knew about them. We learn little about the inner life of the middle class, other than a glimpse of its alleged fears, obsessions, and delusions. Readers who doubt whether the terms of individual psychology are so fully applicable to groups will have to suspend disbelief and enjoy the show; for this is one of those books that must be believed to be read.

Of course: middle-class people seem to have certain characteristic anxieties. But that is not exactly a new discovery. The "fear of falling" has always been a defining characteristic of modern middle-class life, as Tocqueville recognized a century and a half ago, long before the "consumer culture" or the solipsism of the suburbs.

Nor is there much that is persuasive in Miss Ehrenreich's oddly conflicted view of the professions. For the most part she accepts the standard radical critique: with their high educational demands, long periods of apprenticeship, and absolute control over accreditation and access, the professions are artificial barriers thrown up by ambitious middle-class "experts" for the purpose of monopolizing cultural authority and keeping out intruders and poachers, particularly those of the "lower" classes. There is an element of truth in this view, but like Miss Ehrenreich's favorite notion of "projection," according to which ideas of reality are only so much evidence of psychic delusion, it is rendered false and pernicious if carried too far.

For one thing, the radical critique ignores the degree to which the internal discipline and cultural authority of the professions contribute to, and in turn derive from, the genuine pursuit of real knowledge. Ehrenreich prefers to think the middle class erected steep barriers to the professions solely to make and protect a fortress. Yet she also argues that a major source of anxiety for the perpetually anxious middle class lies precisely in its fear that its own children will be unable to mount those very walls; hence its "obsession" with "permissiveness" and with "going soft." A less tendentious writer might have conceded that the professions deserve high marks for attempting to impose rigorous and impartial standards for admission to their "fortress"; in Miss Ehrenreich's account, it looks more like the story of the class that couldn't shoot straight.

What is most disappointing about this book, however, is its total unwillingness to take its opposition seriously. One would never guess from Miss Ehrenreich's account that a lively and wide-ranging debate over the means and ends of the welfare state has been taking place in this country over the last two decades. In her rendering, writers like Charles Murray have not been engaged in a reconsideration of public policy; they have merely been—guess what?—projecting onto the poor (and the fictive New Class liberals) "the anxieties of their class." And as for the liberals who ought to have been countering them, well, these "tortured" souls have suffered a failure of nerve and need to "regain the use of their backbones." This is a bizarre, ostrich-like way of reading recent American history.

BUT enough of the sordid past. What lies ahead for the feckless middle class, which this book means to woo as well as to indict? Perhaps, Miss Ehrenreich opines, echoing the cyclical sentiments of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., a release of its "pent-up idealism"—but first it must clearly understand where its interests lie. That understanding will begin with one central fact: "the discovery of the rich" as the main enemy. So long as the middle class does not recognize the degree to which it, too, like the working and lower classes, is putty in the hands of capital, so long will the middle class remain separate from its "natural" allies.

Now we can see where all this has been leading. By cultivating a loathing for the Trumps, Forbeses, Iacoccas, and Helmsleys who run the world, the middle class will shake free of the insubstantial projections flitting across the walls of its Platonic cave. In alliance with the classes below, it will walk in the sunshine at last, and no longer fear falling. For all the conditions engendering that fear will have withered away. Nor, in a truly egalitarian society, will the professional middle class disappear—far from it; it will expand and expand, "until there remains no other class." Huey Long's slogan, "Every Man a King," will be updated for the 90's: "Every Person a Professional." And all the children, presumably, will be above average.

Idealism is generally to be preferred to cynicism; and there is nothing cynical or insincere about this earnest effort to reunite the appeals of democratization and expertise, populism and progressivism. Whether it is any more realistic than the other phantasms haunting this book, however, is another matter. If, for example, the structure of the professions is a specific cultural formation which reflects and aids the ascendancy of a particular class, then why would that class willingly open its "fortress" to the classes below? What would make it willing, Barbara Ehrenreich answers, is a more richly informed and visceral hatred of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rich. But it is hard to understand why she is so sure the middle class has nothing to fear from such blatant appeals to class-conscious resentment. As the example of Weimar Germany suggests, hatred, once released, can be exceedingly difficult to contain or direct.

It is more than a little discouraging to see the argument finally descend to this level. Henry Adams—who *was* something of a cynic, albeit a less than sincere one—asserted near the end of his life that politics is "the systematic organization of hatreds." But that formulation, like much about Henry Adams, was more clever than wise. What has been valuable about the communitarian Left today has been its willingness to question some of the Left's longstanding assumptions, in the pursuit of a more elevated definition of politics and the public realm. A book like this one raises doubts about how deep that willingness runs.

The Grate Society

NOWHERE TO GO: THE TRAGIC ODYSSEY OF THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL. By E. FULLER TORREY. *Harper & Row. 256 pp. $18.95.*

Reviewed by RAEL JEAN ISAAC

E. FULLER TORREY, a well-known psychiatrist in Washington, D.C., has written a scathing account of the community mental-health centers which were created by the federal government in the 1960's to take the place of state hospitals in caring for the majority of the seriously mentally ill, vast numbers of whom were still warehoused in often miserable conditions. The centers were described in President John F. Kennedy's 1963 State of the Union message as "a bold new approach" that would supplant "the cold mercy of custodial isolation" with "the open warmth of community concern and capability."

There were to be 2,000 community centers, geographically distributed so that everyone would fall into a catchment area. Each center was supposed to provide five services: hospital beds for individuals in crisis; partial hospitalization (generally by day); outpatient services; twenty-four-hour emergency services; and consultation and education.

In the haste to get the centers built, many were funded despite the absence of inpatient or 'round-the-clock emergency services—the kinds essential for serving the seriously ill. Of the 2,000 projected centers, fewer than 800 would be built over a twenty-year period. On only one point did President Kennedy's predictions prove accurate. He declared that it would be possible "within a decade or two to reduce the number of patients now under custodial care by 50 percent or more." In fact, within two decades the number of long-term mental-hospital beds was slashed by 75 percent. But instead of inaugurating a new and better era, the program, in Torrey's mordant pun, helped bring about a "grate society."

What went wrong? In Torrey's analysis, the chief blame lies with his own profession, which promised too much and delivered too little. He traces the problem all the way back to psychiatry's pursuit of the chimera of mental health at the beginning of this century, and in particular to two major ideas. One was the notion of prevention, a dominant theme in American medicine which psychiatrists wrongly believed could be applied wholesale to mental illness. The second was Freudianism, which, by explaining mental illness in terms of early childhood experience, overlooked the biological causes of such major illnesses as schizophrenia and manic-depressive disorder.

Enamored of scientifically unsupported notions that they could dispense "mental health," and thereby prevent mental illness, psy-

---

RAEL JEAN ISAAC *is the author, with Virginia Armat, of* Back to Bedlam, *a book on deinstitutionalization, to be published by the Free Press in September 1990.*

The Key to Understanding Germany...

VOICES FROM THE THIRD REICH

Introduction by Helmut Schmidt

To understand what is happening in Germany today, one must understand what happened to Germany in World War II. VOICES FROM THE THIRD REICH tells you like no other book. Germans, from the famous--Manfred Rommel, Klaus von Bismarck, and Helmut Kohl--to the ordinary, tell what it was like to participate in --or resist--the rise of Hitler and to fight in all German theaters of the Second World War.

Compiled by General Johannes Steinhoff, Dr. Peter Pechel, and Dr. Dennis Showalter.

"The individual voices, speaking from the pages of this book, go a long way towards inhibiting any blanket generalization about 'the' Germans during the years 1933-1945. Taking individuals seriously, in both their strengths and their weaknesses, may be more difficult than dealing with abstractions. Yet it is the only way in which a just verdict can be reached."

– Dr. Jakob J. Petuchowski

"Highly recommended."

– LIBRARY JOURNAL

"Both as a historian and German foreign correspondent, I can recommend this book."

– Alistair Horne



HISTORY BOOK CLUB ALTERNATE SELECTION

Published by Regnery Gateway, $24.95

To order with credit card, call:

1-800-333-6583, ext. 23

Otherwise, write:
Regnery Gateway, Suite 600
1130 17th Street, NW,
Washington, DC 20036.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

chiatrists by the 1960's were displaying what seems in retrospect a pathetic hubris. As Torrey points out in a chapter entitled "Psychiatrists Who Would be Kings," they recognized no limit to what could be dealt with through the promotion of mental health: "poverty, crime and delinquency, racism, sexism, unemployment, divorce, school dropouts, terrorism." Charitably Torrey omits from his litany of folly Dr. Harold Rome's 1968 article, "Psychiatry and Foreign Affairs," published in the *American Journal of Psychiatry* and arguing that "no less than the entire world is a proper catchment area for present-day psychiatry, and psychiatry need not be appalled by the magnitude of the task."

To be sure, it was not with claims for redeeming the earth that psychiatric spokesmen went before Congress to urge passage of the legislation creating community mental-health centers. To Congress they made the rather more mundane promise that the centers would provide an alternative to state hospitals. This is certainly how Congress understood the purpose of the program. Torrey quotes Congressman Kenneth Roberts of Alabama: "We will bring these services back to the grass roots, so to speak, or back to the hometown of the patient who is affected, and gradually large institutions that are concentrated maybe in one or two or more places in each state will be out of the picture. . . ." Yet when the regulations were written by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), no provision was made for a mandatory working relationship between the centers and the state mental hospitals for whose patients they were supposed to assume responsibility. And once the centers were established, their role as caregivers for former or potential state mental-hospital patients was quickly forgotten, to be disinterred chiefly when the time came to approach Congress for additional funds.

What did the centers do instead? A few, at least initially, took seriously the heady mission of transforming society. As Torrey writes, however, their visions of grandeur soon foundered. He cites the experience of Lincoln Hospital Mental Health Services in New York, designated by NIMH as one of eight model centers in the country. Here, in one of America's worst slums, the professional staff set out to promote mental health through political action. Local black and Puerto Rican activists were hired as aides; the directors of the program preached community control.

The "community" took them at their word. Two hundred strikers, including 70 percent of the program's employees, occupied the offices of the directors, locked them out, and named a new director from their own ranks. In the words of a report in the New York *Times*:

> Dr. Harris B. Peck, director of the Lincoln Hospital Mental Health Service, used to pound the table at staff meetings and call for a "revolution." He urged community workers, one of them recalled, to wrest control of their South Bronx mental-health project from him and other professional administrators and put him out of a job. Yesterday they did.

But if the centers soon gave up the idea of promoting mental health through political organizing, with a few honorable exceptions they still failed to focus their attention on the chronically mentally ill. Rather, Torrey reports, they provided many millions of sessions of psychotherapy and counseling each year to the worried well: the rebellious teenager, the couple considering divorce, the man experiencing a mid-life crisis. It turned out, unsurprisingly, that there was an enormous demand out there for government-subsidized psychotherapy.

In the meantime, psychiatrists themselves were fleeing *both* the state hospitals and the community centers for private psychiatric hospitals and private practice. The more federal funds went into training mental-health professionals, including psychiatrists, the fewer professionals went into the public


THE FARM FIA$CO
JAMES BOVARD
How federal agriculture policy squanders billions of dollars a year, sacrifices the poor to the rich, and gives congressmen and bureaucrats vast arbitrary power over American citizens
$18.95 cloth / 364 pages

"A damning exposé . . .

Bovard lays the truth on the table for everyone to see."

—*The Washington Times*

"The hardest hitting, best written, and best documented indictment of the government's farm programs I have ever read."

—Don Paarlberg, former Assistant Secretary of Agriculture

ICS Press
Dept. 820
243 Kearny
San Francisco, CA 94108
415-981-5353 / FAX: 986-4878

Distributed to the trade by
Kampmann National Book Network

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sector—although the expectation that they would do so had served as a rationale for the funding. By 1980 foreign medical graduates occupied 54 percent of state psychiatric staff positions; today, the system would collapse without them.

And what happened to the chronically mentally ill patients being discharged in droves from state hospitals? The failure of the community centers to take responsibility for this population certainly did not stop the process of deinstitutionalization. As Torrey emphasizes, there were tremendous financial incentives for state officials to empty the hospitals, for starting in 1963 federal programs would provide income support and pay medical expenses for the mentally ill only if they were *not* in state hospitals. Their destination became nursing homes and boarding houses, single-room-occupancy hotels, and, increasingly, jails, streets, and shelters.

E. Fuller Torrey has described passionately and well how psychiatry and the community mental-health centers failed the severely mentally ill. The problem with *Nowhere to Go* lies not in what it describes, but in what it ignores. Torrey pays virtually no attention to the rise of the anti-psychiatry movement of the 1960's, yet that movement, and the mental-health bar which it spawned, created a situation which fatally influenced the course of deinstitutionalization, quite apart from the fiasco of the community centers.

According to the tenets of anti-psychiatry, which resonated widely in the atmosphere of the counterculture, there was no such thing as mental illness. There were only nonconformists, labeled mentally ill by a society that did not want to tolerate their behavior. This redefinition of mental illness was wrought chiefly by maverick psychiatrists—the most important of them being Thomas Szasz and Ronald Laing—who were joined by "labeling theorists" from the field of sociology. The latter treated mental illness as "residual rule-breaking" on the part of people whose "deviance" was then "stabilized" by official agencies of control.

With amazing casualness, these ideas were incorporated into the newly emergent mental-health bar. The man who must be considered its founder was Bruce Ennis, the first director of the New York Civil Liberties Union's litigation project to expand the rights of mental patients. Ennis had applied for a job as staff attorney at the NYCLU but was told there were no openings; he was asked instead if he would be interested in starting a special project on the rights of the mentally handicapped. Knowing (as he has testified) nothing about the subject, Ennis went to the library, looked under the headings of law and psychiatry, and found books by Thomas Szasz. On the basis of a reading of Szasz, who of course denies the existence of mental illness, Ennis concluded that there was an enormous civil-liberties problem here and determined to devote much of his life to addressing it.

During the 1970's state laws governing commitment and treatment of the mentally ill fell like dominoes under the onslaught of Ennis and his followers. Existing laws, admittedly often too loose, were tightened so that only those dangerous to themselves or others could be committed for treatment. Yet, as the columnist Charles Krauthammer (himself a psychiatrist) has pointed out, the new standard was "not just unfeeling; it [was] uncivilized." Before commitment became possible, severely ill individuals had to deteriorate radically. Individuals incapable of caring for their most minimal needs were adjudged no danger to themselves so long as their families cared for them. That gave families a choice: serving as institutions, or putting their ill member on the street in the hope that he would then become eligible for treatment. Unfortunately, even hallucinating on heat grates offered no guarantee of treatment.

The full safeguards of the criminal law were grafted onto commitment statutes: effective and timely notice; notice of right to a jury trial, to appointed counsel, in some cases to remain silent; exclusion of hearsay evidence; and a standard of

PASSOVER



The Seder is right around the corner. Add a touch of elegance to your Seder table with a traditional kiddush cup.

Crafted in Sterling Silver, this 5.6 inch cup is a beautiful addition to your table and will be cherished for generations.

$139.95

includes shipping, handling and insurance

please send check or money order to:

TRADITIONS PLUS
119 Rockland Center
Suite 257-C
Nanuet, NY 10954

allow 4-6 weeks for delivery
NY residents, please add applicable sales tax



The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence
Ervin Staub

Focusing particularly on genocide, Staub explores the psychology of group aggression. He sketches a conceptual framework for the many influences on one group's desire to harm another. Within this conceptual framework, Staub then considers the behavior of perpetrators and bystanders in four historical situations: the Holocaust (his primary example), the genocide of Armenians in Turkey, the "autogenocide" in Cambodia, and the "disappearances" in Argentina.

1989 / 320 pp. / 35407-2 / Hardcover $29.95

At bookstores or order from
Cambridge University Press
40 West 20th Street, NY, NY 10011.
Call toll-free: 800-872-7423, outside NY State.
800-227-0247, NY State only. MasterCard & VISA accepted. Prices subject to change.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Even once committed, individuals could refuse treatment under rulings that began to be handed down by state courts in the late 1970's, some of which protected psychotic thought as a First Amendment right. (Drug therapy was held to interfere with the freedom to form insane ideas.) The effect was to permit the mentally ill, as psychiatrist Darold Treffert put it in a much-quoted phrase, to "die with their rights on."

Torrey gives only glancing notice to the transformation of the laws governing treatment of the mentally ill—he remarks that they were "apparently drafted by the law firm of Franz Kafka and Lewis Carroll"—and he never explains how and why those laws came to be written. As for anti-psychiatry, he offers only a brief reference to the writings of Thomas Szasz and another to Erving Goffman, the sociologist who popularized the idea that the behavior of mental patients was primarily a reaction to the "total institutions" in which they resided.

THAT Torrey should scant the role of anti-psychiatry is surprising, or upon reflection perhaps not so surprising, in that earlier in his career he himself contributed to the anti-psychiatric movement. Today, Torrey co-directs a major study of schizophrenia in identical twins for the National Institute of Mental Health. As a clinician, he is one of the rare psychiatrists who volunteer time to care for the seriously mentally ill in Washington's shelters. As a publicist seeking to improve care of the mentally ill, he has written not only this book but has cooperated with Ralph Nader's Health Research Organization in ranking state systems of care so as to put pressure on those with the weakest programs. (Not the least of Torrey's services has been to keep Nader's groups away from the shoals of anti-psychiatry on which they would otherwise almost certainly have run aground.) As a champion of families, he is the chief adviser to the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill and the author of a fine book, *Surviving Schizophrenia.*

But in the early 70's, while still a resident at Stanford, Torrey wrote *The Death of Psychiatry.* In a blurb for that book, Thomas Szasz commended Torrey for his "reasoned review of the mythology of mental illness and the persecutory practice of psychiatry." Actually, even then Torrey was far from a thoroughgoing denier of reality, for he stipulated that schizophrenia was an organic brain disease. But he also quoted Szasz liberally, denounced involuntary commitment, and declared that "we, who are psychiatrists and should know better, project our irrational impulses onto others whom we cannot understand, label them as mentally 'ill,' confine them, and feel better."

Given Torrey's energy and the range of his talents, it is fortunate for the mentally ill and their families that he has today moved very far from *The Death of Psychiatry.* But the movement with which he was once involved still has to be understood—and grappled with—if the mentally ill in the decades ahead are to have, finally, somewhere to go.

"One of the best reference works in the United States and certainly the best in the field of Jewish affairs."
JACOB R. MARCUS, Director, American Jewish Archives

"Even a small Jewish library should include the American Jewish Year Book."
GERSON D. COHEN, Chancellor Emeritus
Jewish Theological Seminary



The standard, authoritative record of events and trends in Jewish life here and abroad

600 pp. **$28.50** prepaid

Order from:
THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
165 East 56 Street, New York, NY 10022

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 1989 EDITION

The Impact of Feminism on American Jewish Life
by Sylvia Barack Fishman
Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies, Brandeis University

Recent Trends in American Judaism
by Jack Wertheimer
Department of History, Jewish Theological Seminary of America

Plus...reports on Israel and Jewish communal life around the world • Jewish demographics • directories of national organizations, federations, welfare funds, and community councils • list of periodicals • obituaries • Hebrew calendars

Outer Space

JOURNEY TO THE STARS: SPACE EXPLORATION TOMORROW AND BEYOND. By ROBERT JASTROW. *Bantam Books. 214 pp. $18.95.*

Reviewed by JEFFREY MARSH

A GOOD DEAL of intellectual energy has been expended lately in the debate over whether history is coming to an end now that there is, allegedly, an almost universal consensus on the ultimate goals of society. Analogously, a hundred years ago many argued that, the basic laws of nature having already been discovered, and man having in his possession the fundamental tools for understanding the workings of

JEFFREY MARSH *writes on science for* COMMENTARY *and other periodicals.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the universe, all that remained for science to do was simply to fill in details.

But biological and astronomical discoveries made in the last decade of the 19th century and early part of the 20th showed that many of those details were inconsistent with long-held assumptions. What the discoveries suggested was that on the submicroscopic scale the world was fundamentally capricious, its exact behavior undescribable, even in principle, by the human observer. And on the largest scale of all, there was perhaps a greater shock: not only did the seemingly serene and unchanging beauty of the stars belie a very different, even violent, reality, but the whole universe seemed to have come into existence as the result of an inconceivably massive cataclysm.

The implications of the second shock, concerning the origin and "destiny" of the universe, have taken a long time to filter into public consciousness. One scientist who has written perceptively about those implications is the distinguished physicist Robert Jastrow. His writings include, in addition to professional publications and a well-known astronomy textbook, a series of popular works—among them *Red Giants and White Dwarfs, Until the Sun Dies,* and *The Enchanted Loom*—describing in unusually clear prose the latest developments in astrophysics and cosmology. He has also, in *God and the Astronomers,* devoted some attention to the psychological shock and embarrassment felt by scientists who, like himself, consider themselves agnostic, in the face of the problematic theological implications of their work.

Jastrow's latest book focuses on space exploration. In slightly over 200 fast-moving pages, including copious black-and-white illustrations, he summarizes the current scientific picture of the evolution of the universe, offers some personal reflections on the history of space exploration, describes current and possible future missions to different parts of the solar system, and speculates on whether and where life might exist outside earth and how humanity might discover and communicate with extraterrestrial life forms.

JASTROW is uniquely qualified to provide a historical account of the origins of the U.S. space program, and particularly of the moon project. Employed as a nuclear physicist until 1958, he was one of the first scientists hired by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) when that agency was established in great haste as part of the post-Sputnik panic that galvanized much of the U.S. scientific effort in the 1960's. As head of NASA's theoretical division, Jastrow was charged with devising a program of space-related physics research. A neophyte in the field of astronomy, he was very impressed with an argument made by the Nobel laureate Harold Urey—that exploration of the moon could teach us much about the early history of the solar system—and he was instrumental in the writing of a memo that first proposed lunar exploration as a major component of the U.S. space program.

What Jastrow espoused was a series of unmanned landings of packages of scientific instruments. These landings were indeed carried out in the early 60's, a fact that seems to have been forgotten—if, indeed, it was ever known—by the many millions who watched the manned moon landing of 1969 on television. Jastrow, a realist, concedes good-naturedly that manned space flight, although much more expensive and dangerous, and although possibly less productive scientifically than exploration with remotely-controlled instruments alone, has by far the better chance of attracting public support. Sometimes, indeed, manned flight is necessary to support even unmanned equipment, as in the case of the enormously expensive space telescopes that are to be launched via the space shuttle and whose lifetime can be extended in the case of damage only if they are repaired by



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

intelligent and skilled humans. Observations made by those telescopes will greatly extend man's ability to perceive astronomical phenomena occurring far out in space, meaning also far back in time.

Jastrow is particularly interested in what can be learned about the planets—both those in our solar system and those that may exist around stars other than the sun. Current theories suggest the strong possibility that planetary systems condense out of the material surrounding a large fraction of stars; space-based telescopes should help confirm or disconfirm those theories. Within the solar system itself, measurements of a recently discovered satellite of Pluto suggest that the mass of that planet is too small to account for the perturbation it causes in the orbit of Uranus. This leads Jastrow to speculate that there may still be another planet, perhaps twice as massive as earth, that has not yet been discovered.

THE greatest mystery with which Jastrow contends in this book concerns the possibility of extraterrestrial life. It is generally believed that experiments carried out during the unmanned 1976 Viking project demonstrated the absence of life on Mars, but other experiments carried out at the same time might, Jastrow says, be consistent with its presence. Soviet plans for further unmanned exploration of Mars have been designed in part to answer this question more definitively. Jastrow offers a detailed description of how a future manned expedition to Mars might proceed, using massive space ships assembled in orbit.

Such an expedition would be simple as compared with the "journey to the stars" proposed in the book's title. Jastrow explores conceptually some possible ways in which human beings could visit planets orbiting stars other than the sun, stars whose distances from us must be measured in light years. The possibilities include high-powered rocket engines fueled by anti-matter, self-contained "space arks" that would travel for centuries—or millennia—and robot-manned space ships with frozen humans or embryos who would be resuscitated on arrival.

That is the stuff of science fiction; in real life, NASA scientists are preparing to search for radio communications that could demonstrate the existence of extraterrestrial intelligent life. As Jastrow points out, for the past three or four decades powerful television transmissions have been beaming into space from earth, providing unmistakable (if perhaps unflattering) evidence of life detectable by intelligent creatures elsewhere in the universe who might be engaged in a similar search. If such creatures exist within a few tens of light years, our signals may already have been detected.

Following a traditional line of thought among writers on this topic, Jastrow is careful to cite the perils as well as the opportunities we would face if we actually came into contact with a more advanced civilization than our own. On the negative side, he reminds us that "it is the usual lot of the less developed peoples to be destroyed by the encounter." But there might also be a plus: "the wisdom of an older and far superior civilization could be ours."

Toward the end of his book, summarizing the "most striking revelation" provided by the scientific mind, he puts the same paradox in different words: "Mankind is supreme among the forms of life on this planet, but in the cosmic order his position is humble." To the author of *God and the Astronomers*, this sentence must surely also recall the words of the Psalmist millennia ago: "What is man, that You should acknowledge him. . ./ But You have made him little less than the angels."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



If you knew what they know, would you do what they do?

More than any other single force on earth, America's foreign policy will determine what kind of world we and our children live in.

And every one of us can influence that policy. That's what the nonprofit, nonpartisan Foreign Policy Association is all about: working to develop the kind of informed public opinion that will help our government make enlightened, responsible foreign policy decisions.

Last year alone, more than 250,000 Americans across the nation—in discussion groups, classrooms and community centers—participated in our *Great Decisions* program.

The *Great Decisions* book provides objective background on eight key foreign policy issues. Discussions help you form your views; you express them on opinion ballots, which FPA presents to Washington officials.

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION 1918

To find out more, call us now at (212) 764-4050. Or write to Foreign Policy Association, Department A, 729 Seventh Ave., New York, N.Y. 10019. Donations are tax deductible.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Buick is the only American car to make the top 10...

in 3 major consumer surveys.

These surveys, conducted by J.D. Power and Associates, recently measured consumers' opinions three different ways:

- **Customer satisfaction** with product and dealer service after one year of ownership.
- **Sales satisfaction** with the car, the way it was sold and delivered by the dealer.
- **Initial quality,** based on owner-reported problems during the first 90 days of ownership.

In the Initial Quality Survey, Buick LeSabre ranked as the most trouble-free American car. And Buick Riviera and Electra/Park Avenue ranked as the two most trouble-free American luxury cars.

Out of over 150 models, Buick was the only domestic brand to make the top 10 in all 3 surveys.

Now, the 1990 editions of these premium automobiles are available. If you're looking for quality—go looking for your Buick dealer.

The New Symbol for Quality in America.

BUICK

GM Let's get it together...buckle up.

BUICK SMARTLEASE by GMAC

©1989 GM Corp. All rights reserved. LeSabre and Park Avenue are registered trademarks and Riviera and Electra are trademarks of General Motors Corporation.
J.D. Power and Associates 1989 Customer Satisfaction with Product Quality and Dealer Service℠ Buick ranked 10th overall. 1989 New Car Sales Satisfaction Index℠ Buick ranked in a tie for 3rd overall. 1989 Initial Quality Survey.℠ **Buick ranked 7th overall.**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED